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I. INTRODUCTION: SCHOOL CLASSIFYING PRACTICES
AND THE LAW
He who would do good must do so in minute particulars.1
A. The Law Inside the Schoolhouse
Since the 1954 Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education,2 courts have increasingly scrutinized decisions once made
solely by school administrators and boards of education. Most promi-
nently, racial policies and practices of states and school districts3 and
methods of allocating financial resources among school districts4 have
been subjected to extensive legal analysis and challenge.
Such challenges have addressed school policy on the grand scale.5
They focus on the state,6 the metropolitan area,7 or the school district
as the entity whose conduct is to be reviewed. That approach implies
a model of educational reform which presumes, first, that racial and
fiscal inequities ought to be undone (a proposition with which there
can be little quarrel); and second, that the most effective means of
undoing them is to focus on the largest governmental unit that can
successfully be haled into court.
For some issues the grand scale approach is demonstrably cor-
rect. For example, the problem of interdistrict resource inequality can
I W. BLAx , JEnusAmLE, ch. 3, § 55.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Recent school segregation cases are discussed in Dimond, School Segregation in
the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARv. CIv. RIGHTs-Crv. LiB. L. REv. 1
(1972).
4 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973); cf.
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971) (intradistrict equalization of ex-
penditures).
5 The cases concerning students' procedural rights and civil liberties are of course a
notable exception to this generalization. For analysis of this developing body of law, see
Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Edu-
cational Public Forum, 5 HARv. Civ. RiGTs-Cv. LiB. L. Rav. 278 (1970).
6 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, S Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
7 See, e.g., Bradley v. School Ed., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970).
1973]
708 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:705
be most cogently addressed only at the state or national level.' But
in those matters which directly and tangibly affect the quality of
children's schooling experiences, the equation of largest with best
makes little sense. The school, not the state or even the school dis-
trict, has primary impact.9 It is at the school or classroom level that
many of the critical decisions about teacher assignment, classroom
composition, and curriculum are made.10
The grand scale approach intrudes on these intraschool decisions
in only limited, indirect fashion. An interdistrict finance equalization
suit, if successful, may affect the amount of money available to the
school district, but has no necessary consequence for the individual
school or classroom. 1 An intradistrict finance suit may establish the
aggregate number of dollars to which a given school is entitled,'2 but
the process of translating gross allocations into incremental educa-
tional advances is again an uncertain one. A desegregation suit may
determine the racial composition of the school, but the force of that
determination is often muted by policies for placing children in groups
whose composition is directly correlated with racial background.' 3
Educational reformers have increasingly come to recognize both
the limited potential of grand scale reform and the importance of
decisions made within schools. Christopher Jencks, whose widely dis-
cussed study Inequality is frequently treated as an assault on traditional
notions of education's significance, observes that "it is more important
to eliminate inequality within schools than to eliminate inequality
between one school and another."' 4
8 See Kirp & Cohen, Education and Metropolitanism, in METRoPoLIA -ZAToN AND
PUBLIC SERVICES (L. Wingo ed. 1972). See also Coons, Chicago, in U.S. CommarN ON Cr.
RIGHTS, CiVm RPIGHTS U.S.A.: PuBeuc ScooLs: Crrms ix mz NORTH =iD WEST 175,
184 (1962).
Of course, many racial policy and resource allocation decisions are made at the school
district level. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 455-56 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en
banc sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (availability of advanced
classes); Dimond, supra note 3 (teacher and pupil assignment); Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAgv. L. REv. 564 (1965) (pupil
assignment).
9 See, e.g., P. JAcKsoN, LHE iN CLASSROOMS (1968); J. STEENS, Tim PROCESS OF
ScHooENG (1967).
10Wbile policy concerning some of these matters is nominally set by school super-
intendents and state and local education agencies, there is (in schools as in other public
and "private large-scale institutions) considerable disparity between policy assertion and
actual implementation.
11 See Kirp & Yudof, Book Review, 6 HAav. Civ. RisGTs-Civ. Lm. L. Rev. 619
(1971).
12 See Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
13 See Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); J. Mc-
Partland, The Segregated Student in Desegregated Schools: Sources of Influence on Negro
Secondary Students, June, 1968 (Center for the Study of the Social Organization of
Schools, Johns Hopkins Univ. (Report No. 21)); Barber, SWann Song from the Delta,
INEQUALITY iN EDUCATION, Aug. 3, 1971, at 4.
14 C. JM]cS, M. SmTH:, H. AcrLAN, M. BATE, D. CoHEN, H. GJNTIS, B. HEms,
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The reasons underlying judicial reluctance to intrude in intra-
school matters-to review, for example, student grouping ostensibly
based upon ability, or student assignment to special programs
designed for children with particular disabilities-are also obvious
and understandable. The minuteness of many within-school (and
within-class) decisions makes it difficult to conceive of them as posing
legally manageable problems. Such decisions are complex, interrelated,
and numerous. For that reason, a court which undertook to review
them might well find itself acting as schoolmaster, in an uncomfortably
literal sense."; Furthermore, ability grouping, grading, and other simi-
lar activities lie at the heart of the school official's claim to profes-
sional competence. A challenge to such practices may well be perceived
as a threat to that competence, and strenuously resisted for that
reason.
Small wonder, then, that the most ambitious foray into this area,
Hobson v. Hansen,"0 has not had more judicial imitation, and that
most within-school controversies resulting in court decisions focus in-
stead on such peripheral matters as hair length and armband-wearing.
The necessarily limited capacity for judicial review of within-school
policy questions does not, however, foreclose all judicial inquiry. Prop-
erly framed, certain aspects of what this Article terms the "school
classification" process can be addressed in intelligible and manageable
fashion by courts.'
7
S. MCHELsox, INEQUAIT=Y 250 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JENcxs, ImQUAITY]. See
also O rcE or EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELARE, EQUALITY Or
EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTUNITY 299 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CoLEMAH REPORT]; Jencks,
The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in ON EQuALmY oF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTNI 69 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MosT=Er
& Moy]NnHA; St. John, Desegregation and Minority Group Performance, 40 REv. EnUc.
RESEARCH 111 (1970).
25 See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("Curricular decisions, the structuring of grade levels, the planning of
extra-curricular activities, to mention a few, are matters lying solely within the province
of school officials, who maintain a day-to-day supervision that a judge cannot.").
The concern that courts might be asked to "manage" schools has long disturbed
some justices. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in refusing to bar compulsory flag salutes, declared
that the Court should not function as "school board for the country." Id. at 598.
16269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17This Article considers only the constitutional dimension of the classification issue.
For a discussion of nonconstitutional case law, see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of
School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional
Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. Rlv. 373 (1969). See also Elgin v. Silver, 15 Misc. 2d 864, 182
N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sup. Ct. 1998); Board of Educ. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 47 Ohio App.
417, 191 N.E. 914 (1934).
That the judicial role contemplated by this Article is relatively modest may be better
appreciated by comparing the approach taken here with Saretsky & Mecklenburger, See
You In Court?, SATURDAY REv. oF EDUC., Nov. 1972, at 50.
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B. School Classification
The term "school classification" is meant to serve double duty:
first, as a description of public educational practice,18 and second, as
a tool of constitutional analysis. 9 Classification describes the welter
of schooling practices which render differentiated judgments of aca-
demic worth or potential, creating (in equal protection terms) classes
or categories of students.
Public schools regularly sort students in a variety of ways.20 They
test them when they first arrive at school and at regular intervals
thereafter in order to identify aptitude-i.e., capacity to learn. Al-
though such capacity may not in fact be measured, and may indeed
be unsusceptible to measurement, what is important for descriptive
purposes is the fact that schools act on the assumption that tests can
measure aptitude.
21
From primary school until graduation, most schools group (or
track) students on the basis of estimated intellectual ability, both
within classrooms-the brighter "tigers" separated from the less in-
telligent "clowns" 2 -- and in separate classes. In primary school group-
ing, the pace of instruction, but typically not its content, is varied.
Grouping decisions may be made for each school subject-the clever-
est in arithmetic may be dullards at spelling-or a given group may
stay intact for the entire curriculum. During the school year, students
are graded. Those grades, combined with aptitude and achievement
test results and teacher recommendations, determine whether a child
8 Historically, practices of non-public schools have been viewed as outside the scope
of the fourteenth amendment because of the limited involvement of the state. Where
the state does intervene in the affairs of private schools, determining their educational
requirements, an argument that such intervention renders those schools "public" for pur-
poses of constitutional scrutiny can be made. But see Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412
(7th Cir. 1971). Where the nexus between school regulation and state law is more direct,
the argument becomes substantially stronger. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d
1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
19 For a seminal analysis of the application of the equal protection clause, see Tuss-
man and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 C=. L. REV. 341 (1949).
Student classification raises constitutional issues of due process as well as equal protection.
2 0 This description of "typical" classification practice is based on survey data
reported in W. FnTDLEr & M. BRYAx, ABILITY GROUPIMG: 1970 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as FiNDL EY & BRYAN] and JENcxs, IEQUAITY, supra note 14, at 33-34.
21 Test terminology is tricky. Some tests purport to measure "aptitude"--capacity
to learn-while others test "achievement"--material mastered. In fact, "all tests measure
both aptitude and achievement .... [Sluccess on IQ tests, aptitude tests, and achieve-
ment tests [reveal] varieties of intelligent behavior." JENCES, INEQuALT=, supra note 14,
at 54-57. By school convention, IQ tests are individually administered while aptitude
tests are group tests; individual testing is commonly employed only for special class
placement.
22 For a careful study of the rationale and effects of within-class grouping in one
ghetto school, see Rist, Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling
Prophesy in Ghetto Education, 40 Huv. EDUC. Ray. 411 (1970).
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is promoted to the next grade level and into which ability group he is
placed.2 3
In secondary school, variations among educational "tracks" re-
flect both interest and ability. There, for the first time in his educa-
tional career, the student may be offered choices. As the process
actually works, however, grammar school success usually means col-
lege track or academic high school assignment while mediocre grade
school performance leads frequently to placement in a general (non-
college preparatory), business, or vocational program.24 It is coun-
selors, and not students, who frequently make these decisions, by
matching school offerings to their own estimates of each student's
ability and potentiaL25 That classification determines both the nature
of the secondary school education-Shakespeare, shorthand or ma-
chine shop-and the gross choices-college or job-available after the
twelfth grade.20
Students whom the school cannot classify in this manner are
treated as "special" or "exceptional" children. These students by no
means resemble one another. They may have intellectual, physical or
emotional handicaps; they may not speak English as their native
language; they may simply be hungry, or unhappy with their particu-
lar school situation.27 These students share only their differentness.
23 The weight given to each of those factors may vary from school to school and
from program to program. See Cohen, Does IQ Matter?, Com-ENTAY, Apr. 1972, at
51, 54.
24 Marvin Lazerson describes the pattern in historical terms: "Educational testing
.. became justification for and a technique with which to overcome traditional notions
of choice . .. [it] could be used to pressure students and parents into particular pro-
grams." Lazerson, Educational Testing and Social Policy (unpublished paper, on file
at Center for Educational Policy Research, Harvard University).
25 A. CicoupxL & J. Kr-suss, Tam EDUCATIONAL DEcisIoN-MAxans (1963), describes
the counselor as serving the school's (and not the child's) needs. For a description of the
historical development of the counselor's role, see D. AnRuoR, TH Amc waaca SC:oOL
COUNSELOR 24-48 (1969).
.26An unpublished study of several Boston area high schools concludes that college
preparatory track assignment significantly affects whether a child will go on to a four-
year college; other high school placements seem to have little relationship to subsequent
vocations. Harvard Center for Law and Education, Putting the Child in Its Place 33-39
(1972) (preliminary draft) [hereinafter cited as Putting the Child in Its Place]. Chris-
topher Jencks estimates that for 5 to 20% of all students, track placement may determine
whether an individual goes to college, a "not trivial" effect. Jxcxs, INEQUA=IY, supra
note 14, at 158.
27 [A]ll the terms for special kids really just mean kids who can't or won't or
don't do things the way the school thinks they ought to be done; once labelled
as special, the school can pretend that there is a normal group which is well
served by the custom of the school. The school's obvious inability to satisfy many
children can then become natural, since the kids are "special" and shouldn't be
satisfied by any normal procedures and the school does not need to change its
ways at all, has only to create some arrangements on the outskirts of the school
to keep them special kids and special teachers out of the way.
J. HERNDo, How TO SuRvrva x YouR NATYE LAND 55 (Bantam ed. 1972) (emphasis
in original).
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The number and variety of differentiating characteristics is large;
overlapping among the characteristics (multiple differentnesses) fur-
ther complicates the pattern.18 Yet the school, in part because its
resources are scarce, cannot tailor individual programs to satisfy
individual needs. Instead, it develops classifications which attempt to
reconcile the variations among "exceptional" children with the limi-
tations of school resources2 9 When a school or school district provides
only a single "special education" program, the classroom may resem-
ble a Noah's Ark of deviations from the school norm: the retarded,
the crippled, and the emotionally disturbed. The teacher assigned to
such a class cannot hope to do much more than maintain order. A
more amply endowed school district may offer several "special" pro-
grams, differentiating both among levels of retardation ("educable,"
"trainable," "profound") and between retardation and such other
school handicaps as "learning disabilities" and "emotional distur-
bance."30 Students unamenable to such special help-either because
the school concludes that they are "ineducable," i.e., unable to profit
from any presently-provided educational program, or because they
make life difficult for teachers and classmates-may be excluded from
school 1
28 This overlapping is a particularly common phenomenon among children who are
considered "seriously" or "profoundly" mentally retarded. Gruenberg notes that one-third
of "trainable" retarded children (whose IQ's are between 30 and 50) have other physical
handicaps. Gruenberg, Epidemiology, in MENTAL RETARDATION 259, 274-75 (H. Stevens
& F. Heber eds. 1964). The Mississippi State Department of Education found that nearly
50% of educable mentally retarded children tested had hearing or sight deficiencies.
Mississippi State Dep't of Education, Study of Screening Procedures for Special Education
Services to Mentally Retarded Children, June 1960. Mercer reports that among white
middle class educable mentally retarded children, most had associated physical disabilities.
Mercer, Sociocultural Factors in Labeling Mental Retardates, 48 PEABODY J. EDuc. 188,
192-93 (1971).
2 9 These classifications may be financial bonanzas for the schools. James Herndon,
noting that California schools receive $550 extra each year for each retarded child, raises
the question whether there "might be a shortage of $550 kids to be retarded," if they
were tested appropriately by the schools. J. HmmoN, supra note 27, at 96-97.
so Often the schools' "supply" of special services determines demand. In Boston, for
example, 4000 students are assigned to classes for the retarded; only 70 have been classi-
fied emotionally disturbed. Putting the Child in Its Place, supra note 26, at 97. Prevalence
estimates of handicapping conditions suggest that between 1.3% and 2.54% of the student
population is retarded, and 2.0% of the student population is emotionally handicapped.
2 REPORT OF THE NEW Yomx STATE ComInsSIoN oiT TE QuArITY, COST AND FINANCING
OF ELEIMNTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 9B.2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CosT oF
EDUCATION].
31 See TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL, T3E WAY WE Go TO SCHooL: THE
EXCLUSION OF CHIrDREN IN BOSTON (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE WAY WE Go TO
SCHooL]. Legislation and regulations refer to this process as one of "school excusal." The
historical term--"elmination"--is less polite and more apt. One national study of exclusion
concluded that "through legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal devices or through apathy,
schools cause, encourage, and welcome the lack of attendance in school of millions of
American youngsters. Such activity by the educational system serves as a denial of civil
rights as massive as the separate school systems maintained by law in prior years .... "
THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF CHILPDEN FROM SCHOoL 15 (7. Regal ed. 1971) (DHEW
grant OEG-0-70-3126).
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While the range of school classifications is almost infinite,32 the
Article examines three-exclusion from publicly-supported schooling,
placement in "special education" programs,3 3 and ability grouping 34-
as well as the aptitude tests used to facilitate the assignment of stu-
dents to these groupings. 5 What factors distinguish these classifica-
tions from other school classifications? (1) They are each of relatively
long duration: exclusion is almost invariably a one-way ticket out of
school; movement between special and regular programs or between
slow and advanced ability groups is infrequent.86 (2) Their conse-
quences are both significant and difficult to reverse: the child barred
from school as "ineducable" becomes more difficult to educate because
of his exclusion; the student assigned to a slow track, or a special
education class, cannot easily return to the schooling "mainstream."
(3) The questionable nature of the bases for these sorting decisions
suggests that the possibility of misclassification, and consequent seri-
ous injury to the child, is significant. (4) These placement decisions
(unlike within-class grouping decisions, for instance) are highly visi-
ble. Typically, they are made-or at least ratified-not by classroom
teachers but by school or district administrators. (5) A given student
is assigned to one of these classifications relatively infrequently-once
32 For example, grading, testing, tracking, within-class grouping, exclusion, and
separation of classes or schools by sex, race or age are all school classifications under
under this author's definition. See text accompanying notes 16-28 supra.
33 "Special education" refers to classes for students with particular and acute learning
disabilities. The disability may be defined in terms of test scores, see note 249 infra,
physical impediments (i.e., classes for the blind, deaf and dumb, or perceptually handi-
capped), or psychological disturbance (i.e., classes for the emotionally disturbed). Special
education classes are a relatively recent and increasingly common phenomenon. A recent
national estimate of enrollment in special education concludes that 2,106,100 children
(35% of those who "need" such help) are enrolled in some special program. Retarded
children are somewhat better served than other children in need of special education-
based on a prevalence estimate of 2.3%, close to one-half of retarded children are in special
classes. R. _ACKIE, SPEciAL EDUCATION IN nm UNIT=D STATES: STATISTICS 1948-1966, at
39 (1969).
3 4 Ability grouping, or "tracking," refers to the differential classification of students,
ostensibly on the basis of aptitude, for instruction in the regular academic program.
FDEY & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 4; REsEArCH D IoN, NAIONAL EDUCATION ASso-
cIAoN, AnnmiTE GROU NG 6 (1968) [hereinafter cited as NEA SuimY].
3 5 See notes 218-49 infra & accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Gallagher, The Special Education Contract for Mildly Handicapped
Children, 38 ECEmIoNAL CHLDRm 527, 529 (1972): "[Dlata collected informally by the
Office of Education suggested that special education was, de facto, a permanent place-
ment. In a number of large city school systems far less than 10 percent of the children
placed in special education classes are ever returned to regular education." CosT OF
EDUCAmTON, supra note 30, at 9.22-9.39 offers one explanation for this phenomenon; chil-
dren in special education classes are infrequently reevaluated. In New York City, during
the school year 1969-70, 1,603 retarded children had not been evaluated in over three
years; 2028 retarded children had not been evaluated in over Jive years. See also Mercer,
Sociocultural Factors in the Education of Black and Chicano Children, paper presented
at the 10th Annual Conference on Civil and Human Rights of Educators and Students,
National Education Association (Feb. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mercer, Sociocultural
Factors]; Mercer, Sociological Perspectives on Mild Mental Retardation, in SocIAL-
CuLxuRAL AsPECTs OF MENTAL RETARDATION 287 (C. Haywood ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Mercer, Sociological Perspectives].
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every year at most. (6) Each of these classifications carries the poten-
tial of stigmatizing students. In sum, exclusion, special class assign-
ment, and track placement are of greater moment to the student than,
for example, a failing grade on a particular exercise. They are also
more obvious candidates for judicial review.
C. School Classification and School Needs
1. Historical Development of Classification"1
While, as one testing manual contends, "the original [classifica-
tion] was when God ... looked at everything he made and saw that
it was very good,"' only during the past sixty years have schools de-
voted considerable effort to classifying and sorting students. The pro-
totypal common school, energetically promoted by Horace Mann and
Henry Barnard, was designed to provide a common educational ex-
perience for all comers-all, that is, who could afford to stay in school
for an extended period of time. Through the nineteenth century, the
shared curriculum was characteristic of schools which, at least in
theory, respected neither class nor caste.
The arrival of significant numbers of immigrants from Eastern
and Southern Europe late in the nineteenth century obliged school
officials to provide instruction for children who spoke no English and
had little, if any, previous schooling. It made no sense to place these
students in regular classes; they needed assistance of a kind that
schools had not previously been asked to provide. Urban school sys-
tems created "opportunity classes," special programs designed to over-
come the students' initial difficulties and to prepare them for regular
schoolwork.
Other societal factors served to promote the need for differen-
tiation among students. 9 The insistence that schools be "business-
like" and efficient was increasingly heard, and American educators
began to adopt the modern business corporation's complex organiza-
tional structure as their model.40 Further, the increasingly complex
American economy and society demanded a differentiation of skills
that a common education simply couldn't provide. As Boston's super-
intendent of schools argued in 1908: "Until very recently [the schools]
37 For an amplification of these brief historical comments, see L. CRnN, THE TRAs-
FORMATION OF THE SCHOOL (1961). Cf. C. GREER, THE GREAT SCHOOL LEGEND (1972).
3 8 
W. MEHRENS & I. LEHmxAN, STANDARDIZED TESTS IN EDUCATION 3 (1969).
3 9 For a fuller exposition, see R. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT or EFFICIENCY
(1962) ; Lazerson, supra note 24.
40 Cf. R. CALLAHAN, supra note 39, at vil-viii ("What was unexpected [in my investi-
gation] was the extent, not only of the power of the business-industrial groups, but of
the strength of the business ideology.... "). See also G. Cours, THE SocIAL CoMaosI-
TION or BOARDs OF EDUCATION: A STUDy N THE SOCIAL CoNTRoL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1927).
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have offered equal opportunity for all to receive one kind of education,
but what will make them democratic is to provide opportunity for
all to receive such education as will fit them equally well for their par-
ticular life work. 4 Varied curricula were developed for students
of varying ability.
The advent of standardized aptitude testing early in the twentieth
century provided a useful means of identifying and placing those
students. As Ellwood Cubberly, one of the most influential educators
of that time, maintained:
The educational significance of the results to be obtained
from careful measurements of the intelligence of children
can hardly be overestimated. Questions relating to the choice
of studies, vocational guidance . . . the grading of pupils,
promotional schemes ... all alike acquire new meaning and
significance when viewed in the light of the measurement of
intelligence.
42
Intelligence tests were increasingly used by American educators be-
cause they accorded with the educators' demand for categorization
and efficiency. Tests offered scientific justification for the differen-
tiated curriculum, enabling it to function with some rationality.
43
Today ability grouping claims widespread adherence among non-
rural school districts. 44 Federal and state support has made particu-
lar specialized programs-notably industrial and agricultural trade
courses45-- financially attractive to school districts. Differentiated spe-
cial education programs, also given impetus by state and federal
legislation, have expanded with similar speed (if not quite the same
universality) since the 1920'. 46
2. Current School Needs
Educators sometimes suggest that school classification represents
merely the aggregation of unconnected phenomena lacking coherent
4 1 Brooks, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Superintendent of Public Schools
53, in SCHOOL COMIM=ITIEE, CITY OF BOSTON, Docuar" Ts OF THE ScHOOL CoMrM
(1908) (emphasis in original).
4 2 L. TmEmA, THE MEASmmENT or INTELLIGENCE vu-vi (1916).
43 See Schudson, Organizing the 'Meritocracy': A History of the College Entrance
Examination Board, 42 HaRv. EDUC. Rav. 34, 51 (1972).
44 See Fninr & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 2, 18. A 1958-59 survey undertaken by
the National Education Association Research Division reported that among school districts
with more than 2500 pupils, 77.6% grouped by ability in the primary grades and 90.5%
utilized ability grouping in secondary schools. NEA PxsasxcH SuzrARY, supra note 34,
at 12. A similar pattern was reported 7 years later. See id. 15-17.
4
5 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 11-28 (1970) (Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act).
46 Lord, Medical Classification of Disabilities for Educational Purposes-A Critique,
in P oBoa s AND IssuEs n THE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTONAL CHMDREN (R. L. Jones ed.
1971). The growth of differentiated special education in the United States from 1948 to
1966 is traced in R. MACxm, supra note 33.
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purposes.47 Yet the frequency.with which schools classify students and
the importance that attaches to those classifications belie that impres-
sion. Grouping, special education assignment, and exclusion have sig-
nificant and similar school purposes. They: (1) provide mechanisms
for differentiating among students; (2) offer rewards and sanctions for
school performance; (3) ease the tasks of teachers and administrators
by restricting somewhat the range of ability among students in a given
classroom; 48 and (4) purportedly improve student achievement.49
Interestingly, the first two purposes-sorting and rewarding-
punishing-are seldom mentioned by school officials. 0 The sorting
function is self-evident: where previously there existed just students,
classification permits the parcelling out of students among different
educational programs.5' That certain of these classifications reward
and others punish is apparent from investigations of the effects of
grouping on students' self-perception.52 The reward-punishment facet
of classification represents one aspect of the school's stress on intel-
lectual competition, with praise accompanying only performance that
the school or teacher defines as successful.53
The third and fourth purposes--easing the tasks of teachers and
administrators, and improving the education of students-are more
commonly advanced.54 These purposes-one emphasizing benefits to
47 Cf. C. SILBERMAN, CIsIs IN Tm CLASSROOM 81 (1970) ("Schools fail, however,
less because of maliciousness than because of mindlessness."). Judge Wright's comments
in Hobson v. Hansen concerning the "arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness," 269 F. Supp.
401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd en banc sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), are also relevant here.
4 8 The qualifier "somewhat" is deliberately used here, since the capacity of schools
correctly to identify ability, and potential, is an open question. Mississippi State Dep't of
Education, supra note 28, reveals that most classifying systems used by school systems
have low reliability.
49 For an impressionistic account of the effect of certain school classifications, see
L. DExTER, THE TYRNNY o Sc HOLING (1964). The efficacy of ability grouping and
special education is considered in Section II infra.
Classifications serve an additional purpose, one not directly related to the public
schools: they provide a means for other public and private institutions (universities, em-
ployers, etc.) to distinguish among students, thus serving-for better or worse-the de-
mands of the larger society.
50 School exclusion is a conspicuous exception to this rule. It is frequently justified
as necessary to the school's maintenance of order, if not to its survival. See H. Goldstein,
J. Moss & L. Jordan, The Efficacy of Special Class Training on the Development of
Mentally Retarded Children (1965) (Univ. of linois Institute for Research on Excep-
tional Children).
51 Certain critics charge that sorting is indeed all that schools do, see Lauter & Howe,
How the School System is Rigged for Failure, N.Y. Rav. BooxKs, June 18, 1970, at 14,
and perhaps all that they have ever done. C. GREm, Tm GREAT SCHOOL LEGEND (1972).
See also Stein, Strategies for Failure, 41 HARv. EDuc. REV. 158 (1971).
5 2 See J. BARKER LUiNN, SmEAmmG In TH PRMARY ScirooL (1970); W. BORG,
ABnxTY GRouPIno In THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1966) [originally appeared in 34 J. ExPERi-
MENTAL EDuc., Winter 1965, at 11; Mann, What Does Ability Grouping Do to the
Self-Concept?, 36 CHILDHOOD EDUCAToI 356 (1960); cf. M. GOLDBERG, A.H. PAssow &
J. JusnAr, Tan Emcrs oT ABnrn GRoUPING (1966).
58 See, e.g., J. HENY, CULTURE AGAINST AN 283-322 (1963).
5 4 A recent study of ability grouping asked school officials whose districts grouped
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teachers and administrators, the other emphasizing benefits to stu-
dents-permit school officials to view classification as an unmixed
blessing. There is little recognition that classification may have de-
cidedly limited educational benefits for schoolchildren and that cer-
tain sorting practices may even do educational injury.55 The belief that
classification helps everyone is significant for two reasons. It partially
explains the popularity that grouping enjoys among teachers: only
18.4 percent of teachers surveyed by the National Education Associa-
tion preferred to teach non-grouped classes.5" It also underscores the
problems that reformers-whether pedagogues or lawyers-unhappy
with present classification practices are likely to encounter in seeking
to restructure them.
D. School Classification and the Critics
1. Innovation
School sorting practices have been criticized on several fronts.
The fashionable educational innovations of the past twenty years-
nongraded classes, team teaching, "open classrooms" patterned after
the English Leicestershire model 7-- all represent efforts to modify
school classifications by introducing elements of flexibility, diversify-
by ability to indicate the reasons they favored such an approach. The most common set
of answers revealed a primary orientation toward the needs of teachers and administra-
tors: "improves [teacher] attention to individual [student] needs," "reduces ability and
achievement range within the classroom," "facilitates curriculum planning," "permits
[schools to adopt] both remedial and enrichment programs," "results in better teaching,"
"permits the more effective selection and use of materials," and "makes instruction easier."
FmDLYE & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 15.
The second most frequently advanced set of rationales concerned the benefits that
accrue to students from classification: "permits students to progress at their own learning
rate," "allows the student to compete on a more equitable basis," "makes it possible for
each student to achieve success," and "results in . . . more effective learning." Id.
55 Of 180 school administrators from ability grouped districts who responded to the
question, "What do you consider to be the disadvantages of homogeneous grouping in
your school district?" only nine indicated that grouping "does not necessarily result in
better learning." Id. 16. Fewer still noted problems with establishing criteria for grouping,
or recognized that grouping "tends to 'lock' slower learners into slow groups." Id. The
recognition of possible educational harm (as distinguished from social harm) was even
less among districts that used limited grouping, or no grouping at all. Id. 16-17.
56 Research Division, National Education Association, Teachers' Opinion Poll: Ability
Grouping, 57 NEA J., Feb. 1968, at 53.
This discussion does not deal with general parental preferences with respect to
classification. Decisions concerning classification are made primarily, if not exclusively,
by school administrators; parents have little if any say. The nature and intensity of
general parental attitudes on the subject has not been measured.
57 See, e.g., CENTRAL ADvIsoRY CouNCIr :oR EDUCATION, CHIDREN AN TH PRI-
INrAY ScuooLs (1967) (generally referred to as the Plowden Report); J. FEATHESTONE,
ScHooLs WnERE CmarDRN LEARN (1971); J. GOODLAD & R. ANDERS N, TnE NONGRADED
ELE TARY ScHooL (1959); C. SIrBERmAN, supra note 47 (1970); Glaser, The Design
of Instruction, in THE CHANGiNG AmERiCAN ScHooL 215 (J. Goodad ed. 1966) (65th
Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education).
Grouping on the basis of tested intelligence has long been criticized. See, for ex-
ample, the Appendix to Appellants' Briefs in the School Segregation Cases, reprinted as
The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science State-
inent, 37 MlNN. L. Rav. 427, 435-36 (1953): "EM]any educators have come to doubt
the wisdom of class groupings made homogeneous solely on the basis of intelligence....
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ing the school program while making any particular "classification"
of more limited duration and significance. Although these innovations
do reject sorting, they challenge the premise that any given grouping
should include only students of like ability. They attend to subtler dis-
tinctions, varying patterns of cognitive and emotional development."
2. Educational Research
Educational research poses a quite different kind of challenge
to present classification practice. It has increasingly undermined one
of the essential premises of sorting: that it benefits students. The re-
search concerning the educational effects of ability grouping and spe-
cial education"9 reveals that classification, as it is typically employed,
does not promote individualized student learning, permit more effec-
tive teaching to groups of students of relatively similar ability, or,
indeed, accomplish any of the things it is ostensibly meant to do.60
Educational efficacy studies generally find either no effect or marginal
adverse effects on achievement and attitude for students who are clas-
sified, when these students are compared with non-grouped peers.
These findings apply both for the average and the slow student (in
some studies the brightest students appear to benefit slightly from
grouping) and in evaluations both of ability grouping and special
education programs for the mildly handicapped, in England and other
European countries as well as the United States.61
The research indicates that classification effectively separates stu-
dents along racial and social class lines,62 and that such segregation
causes educational injury to minority groups.63 It also suggests that
adverse classifications stigmatize students, reducing both their self-
image and their worth in the eyes of others. 64 Indeed, if the research-
ers had their way, the profession would now be "[w] riting an epitaph
for grouping."6
this type of segregation, too, appears to create generalized feelings of inferiority ... and
reduces learning opportunities which result from the interaction of individuals with varied
gifts."
56 See, e.g., Hall, On the Road to Educational Failure: A Lawyer's Guide to Track-
ing, INEQuALTY iN EDUCATIoN (June 30, 1970), at 1; Stodolsky & Lesser, Learning
Patterns in the Disadvantaged, 37 HARv. EDuc. REv. 546 (1967).
59See notes 96-99 infra & accompanying text.
60 See Section II infra.
61 See, e.g., W. BORG, supra note 52; M. GOLDBERG, A.H. PAssow & J. JusTMAX,
supra note 52; G. HOELTxE, Essaczvzxsss op SPEcrAL CiAss PLAcEMENT PoR EDUCABLE
ENTALLY RETARDD CILDEN (1966); J. BARXER LuxN, supra note 52; Kirk, Research
in Education, in MENTAL RETARDATION 57 (H. Stevens & R. Heber eds. 1964).
62 See FNNIr o & BRYAN, supra note 20; P. SEXToN, EDUCATION AND INcoME (1961).
63See McPartland, supra note 13; Wilson, Educational Consequences of Segregation
in a California Community, in 2 U.S. Com'eN oN Crvr- Ri LTs, RAcIAL ls1AnIoxN In
T= PUBLIC Sc ooLs 165 (1967).
64See sources cited note 52 supra; Section II infra.
e5 Heathers, Grouping, in ENcYCLOPEDIA oF EDUCATIoNAL RESEARCH 559, 568 (4th
ed. R. Ebel 1969).
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3. Misclassifications
Even those who accept the basic premises of school sorting have
reason to question whether schools can adequately do the job. Two
retests of students assigned to classes for the retarded reveal notable
system-made errors. In Washington, D.C., the system itself conducted
the retesting; it found that two-thirds of the students placed in spe-
cial classes in fact belonged in the regular program. A study of 378
educable mentally retarded students from 36 school districts in the
Philadelphia area concluded that "[t] he diagnosis for 25 percent of
the youngsters found in classes for the retarded may be considered
erroneous. An additional 43 percent [may be questioned] ."66 To the
latter study's authors, the findings yield cause for concern. "One can-
not help but be concerned about the consequences of subjecting these
children to the 'retarded' curriculum .... The stigma of bearing the
label 'retarded' is bad enough, but to bear the label when placement
is questionable or outright erroneous is an intolerable situation." 7
4. Heredity versus Environment
Classification on the basis of intellectual ability has also been
attacked by those who assert that such distinctions are based on judg-
ments of inherited rather than acquired intelligence, and are therefore
undemocratic. Fifty years ago, Walter Lippmann criticized intelligence
testing on precisely those grounds, predicting that the use of such tests
"could not but lead to an intellectual caste system in which the task
of education had given way to the doctrine of predestination and infant
damnation."6 Milton Schwebel, discussing the practice of grouping
students, makes a similar charge:
The most direct evidence of a school system's stand on
ability is the way it educates the mass of its children ...
Only the school system which regards the genetic factor as
paramount, and the environmental as . . . insignificant
[would] rightly subdivide its population in accordance with
native ability [as] revealed by achievement tests and would
proffer a curriculum suitable to the talents of each group.
The decision whether it is wise to group children by ability
depends upon one's views of the origin of intelligence.69
The claim that ability grouping treats intelligence as determined
by heredity and not environment" is political dynamite. It encourages
66 Garrison & Hammill, Who Are the Retarded, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CH-nDREN 13, 18
(1971).
6 7 Id. 20. One difficulty with the Garrison and Hammill study is that they, unlike the
school districts they studied, used five different measures to determine retardation.
6 8 Lippman, The Abuse of the Tests, 32 NEW REPUBLIc 297 (1922).
6 9 
M. SCUVEBEL, WHO CAN BE EDUCATED? 75-76 (1968).
70 See, e.g., Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39
19731
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blacks to view grouping as the pedagogical equivalent of genocide and
radical whites to regard it as "not the means of democratization and
liberation, but of [class] oppression."" This hostility to ability group-
ing has translated into varied forms of political pressure. Black psy-
chologists and community groups have demanded, with some success,
that intelligence testing be abandoned.72 Others have urged the aboli-
tion of all classifications in which racial minorities are overrepresented
relative to their proportion of the school population.
73
Some of these efforts minimize the real differences among children
which, whatever their source, do require varied educational programs;
their equation of classification and the doctrine of inherited intelligence
oversimplifies a complex problem. But whatever the objective merits
of such attacks, they have had significant political impact.
E. School Classification and the Courts
These quite different criticisms-the innovators' view that existing
classifications are too rigid, the researchers' conclusions that most
classifications serve little educational purpose and that schools fre-
quently misclassify students, the political attacks on sorting as racist
in motivation or result-have not markedly diminished the public
schools' penchant for classification. Nonetheless, courts have begun
to limit the schools' discretion in the ways they sort students and the
categories into which they sort them. Judge J. Skelly Wright's decision
in Hobson v. Hansen,74 which "abolished" tracking in the District of
Columbia, is the most famous but not the only case addressing the
constitutional propriety of school classification practices.75 Exclusion
of children from school, whether because of asserted ineducability,76
HARv. EDuC. REv. 1 (1969); Herrnstein, I.Q., ATLamirrc, Sept. 1971, at 43. A host of
reactions to the Jensen article are published in Discussion: How Much Can We Boost
IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HAav. EDuC. Rv. 273 (1969).
71 Lauter & Howe, supra note 51, at 18.
72 The California legislature overwhelmingly passed a bill, vetoed by Governor
Reagan, which would have accomplished just that. Assembly Bill No. 483 (Aug. 1, 1972)
(vetoed Aug. 17, 1972). Cf. CA. EDuC. CODE § 12825.5 (Supp. 1973).
7 3 The "People's Platform," distributed in San Francisco before the 1972 Democratic
National Convention called for "the abolishment of IQ tests in the schools, the tracking
and discrimination that result therefrom. . . ." Cf. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306,
1314 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some
Critical Issues, 48 NoRxF Daa LAW. 133, 135 (1972).
74269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the decision in an opinion which undercut much of the force
of the district court's tracking discussion. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (en banc).
75 Unreported decisions and complaints in a number of school classification cases are
collected in HARVARD Um-vERsrry CENTER FO LAW & EDUCATION, CrAssmicAioN MA-
TERTALs (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLAssrcATioN MA'aaIr.s].
76E.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (exclusion of
children labeled as behavioral problems, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
hyperactive); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp.
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alien status,77 or pregnancy," has been overturned by a number of
courts; the manner in which students are assigned to classes for the
mildly retarded has been reviewed to determine the rationality of the
classification procedures employed; 79 and courts have rejected attempts
of formerly de jure segregated school districts to employ ability group-
ing, finding such efforts inconsistent with the obligation to desegregate.8
Judicial analysis in this area is largely borrowed from school
discipline and desegregation cases, and does not develop an analytic
framework suited to the particular problems of school classification.
Nevertheless, the beginnings of such a framework can be fashioned
from the existing case law and a description of the common charac-
teristics of classification practice.8'
One approach considers the educational harm attributable to
exclusion, assignment to special education programs, or to slow ability
groups. The assorted ill effects of these classifications-the impact on
school success; the stigmatization of individuals; the likelihood that
such assignment will be viewed by school personnel as confirming
judgments of stupidity, thus rendering the school's initial judgment a
self-fulfilling prophesy-render plausible the claim that they deny
students an equal educational opportunity. The deprivation, if factually
demonstrated,8 2 is in Professor Michelman's terms both "absolute" and
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (consent order enjoining exclusion of mentally retarded children) ;
accord, Wolf v. Legislature, Civil No. 182,646 (Utah Dist. Ct., Jan. 8, 1969) [reprinted
in CL.ssmcATiox MATEPirAs, supra note 75, at 171] (exclusion of mentally retarded
children enjoined under Utah constitution). See also Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp.
846, 847-48 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (dictum).
77 Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
7 8 E.g., Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971).
79 See, e.g., Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., Feb. 8, 1971)
[reprinted in CLASSIFICAnON M xATm .s, supra note 75, at 234] (denying defendants'
motion for summary judgment); Diana v. California State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 70-37
RFP (N.D. Cal. 1970) [reprinted in CLAssmicATio AIxma ALs, supra note 75, at 292]
(consent decree); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 504, 519-20
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (fact-finding in regard to grouping practices).
8 0 E.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson
v. Jackson Parish School Bd., 423 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tunica
County School Dist., 421 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate
School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd in part on other grounds, 396 U.S. 290
(1970); Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971).
For an earlier and quite different treatment of the same issue, see Borders v. Rippy,
247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
8 1 Professor Van Alstyne, in reviewing the application of due process standards to the
school setting, has argued eloquently that "even the vague and general written standards
fixed in the constitution [neither] contemplate [nor] require a technique of judicial
needlepoint." Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
DuxE L.J. 841, 876.
82 While these three classifications share, to some extent, the effects noted above,
the nature of the injury varies with the classification. Slow track and special education
placement provide the student with an education different from that which the school
offers other children, but whether "different" can be equated with "lesser" depends on
an analysis of the educational evidence. No such inquiry is necessary to establish that
exclusion represents deprivation, for failure to provide a service is by definition equivalent
to provision of lesser service. See notes 218-23 infra & accompanying text.
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"relative," a "real" disadvantage given additional significance by
virtue of the affront, the psychic injury that it occasions.
8
3
The Supreme Court's recent decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,"e upholding the constitutionality of Texas'
school finance statutes, casts doubt on the utility of constitutional
analysis couched in terms of equality of educational opportunity.
Rodriguez concludes that education is not, in constitutional terms, a
"fundamental interest"; more critically, the majority opinion seems to
foreclose any assault upon relative inequalities in the provision of edu-
cational services. Yet, for several reasons, the application of an equal
educational opportunity standard to school classification issues merits
pursuing. First, one such classification-exclusion from school-repre-
sents an absolute deprivation of services, and as such is clearly dis-
tinguishable from Rodriguez. 5 Second, the nature of the injury caused
by other classifications, such as assignment to special education pro-
grams, differs markedly from the harm that assertediy flows from re-
ceiving a less well-financed education."6 Third, the constitutional
approach adopted in Rodriguez, its unwillingness seriously to test even
the rationality of present state practices, warrants critical appraisal.
Even if the "fundamental interest" analysis is abandoned by the Court,
a weighing of state and individual concerns more precise and careful
than that adopted in Rodriguez, and more typical of other recent Su-
preme Court decisions, may ultimately prevail."
A second constitutional approach focuses on the fact that minority
children are assigned to slow learners' groups and classes for the mildly
retarded in numbers far exceeding their proportion of the school popula-
tion, and are thus denied classroom contact with white and iddle-class
schoolmates. The existence of such racial isolation, coupled with evi-
dence of the racially specific injury it produces, should be sufficient to
require a demonstration that these classifications are in fact based on
adequate nonracial grounds and that their educational benefits outweigh
the racially specific harm of within-school isolation.8
83See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L. Rav. 7 (1969).
84 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
85 See notes 218-23 infra & accompanying text.
86 See notes 92-147 infra & accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). While each of these cases
purports to apply a "rationality" standard of review, the inquiry in each is considerably
more searching than that undertaken in Rodriguez. See generally Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
88See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CAw. L. Rv. 275 (1972). The constitutional standard suggested in this
Article differs from the traditional "rational relationship" and "compelling interest" ap-
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The equal educational opportunity and racial analyses both rely
on the equal protection clause in challenging the legitimacy of at least
some school classifications. A third approach focuses not on the legiti-
macy of the classifications themselves, but on the procedure by which
the school determines how a particular student or class of students
should be treated. This due process approach is triggered by two related
factors: a significant school-imposed change in educational status; and
the negative label-the stigma-which invariably attaches to students
placed in these programs.
These three legal strategies are at least plausible. Each draws on
previous court decisions which have sought to define with particularity
the meaning of the "equal protection of the laws" and "due process"
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Yet legal plausibility does not
necessarily or automatically yield educationally sound results. This
caveat assumes particular importance when courts begin to raise ques-
tions about matters as central to the educational enterprise as school
classification determinations. In these as in other issues of educational
policy, decisions based on the Constitution can have a salutary effect.80
They can determine the bounds of constitutionally permissible school
action, reveal arbitrary conduct, and impose some measure of fairness
on school procedure. But the courts can neither revamp the educational
system nor improve the quality of those who administer that system.90
II. EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION
Any educational system is, among other things, a great
sorting-out process.9 '
A. The Impact of School Classifications on Student Success
The Supreme Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education that
the opportunity for education, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, "is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." 2 While the inequality against which Brown inveighed was
proaches often adopted by courts. For reasons suggested in Sections 11 and III, both
seem too mechanical and result-oriented to be appropriate in resolving questions as
complex as those posed by school classification.
89 For a general discussion of the efficacy of law in addressing civil rights questions,
see Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 199 (1964). See also
Kirp, The Role of Law in Educational Policy, SocmL PoLicY, Sept./Oct. 1971, at 42.
9 0 This restates the distinction between viewing the Supreme Court as the "school
board for the entire country," presumably an undesirable (and unattainable) goal,
and regarding the Court as "teachers in a vital national seminar." Compare Mlinersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), with Rostow, The Democratic Character
of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952).
91 RocFxF=R BRorxams Fu D, THE Puasurr oF Excaa, LEcE 17 (1958).
92 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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racial, non-racial educational inequities"8 have been struck down by
the lower courts. Those decisions note the constitutional importance of
education and view with sympathy the claims of children-a voteless,
classless minority. Is the child's interest in an "equal" education
sufficiently diminished by placement in a slow track or special class,
or by exclusion from school, to warrant constitutional scrutiny?
School sorting practices, unlike explicitly racial classifications,
cannot be condemned as inherently harmful. Some classification is
clearly necessary if schools are to cope with the bewildering variety
of talent and interest that characterizes children. Whether particular
classifications are harmful, and hence equality-depriving, is essentially
an empirical question. Thus, in a lawsuit attacking school sorting prac-
tices, demonstration of injury may well be as important as constitu-
tional theory. "Adverse" school classification may result in two kinds
of injury: educational ineffectiveness and stigmatization of students.
1. Educational Achievement
What does the evidence concerning the educational effectiveness
of school sorting demonstrate? The least research has been carried
out on the effects of school exclusion, with good reason: excluded
children are difficult to locate.9 Further, the educational effects of
exclusion are likely to be inseparable from the impact of other social
adversities, making it difficult to identify the "cause" of harm. Yet
the few studies that do consider the effect of exclusion (or the impact
of school shut-downs) on children predictably conclude that the lack
of schooling does retard achievement.95
93See, e.g., cases cited notes 76-78 supra.
94 Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 1, § 21, col. 3. Estimates of the number of
excluded children range from 450,000 to more than 4 million. Compare THE ExcLUsION
oF CMLDRN FrROM SCHOOL 3 (3. Regal ed. 1971) (DHEW Grant OEG-0-70-3126)
(450,000) with 118 CONG. REc. H1257 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1972) (remarks of Congress-
man Vanik) (4,250,000). The data ferreted out through litigation provide only gross
approximations. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (plaintiffs
estimated 18,000 retarded, emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and speech or learning
disabled children excluded from Washington, D.C., schools; defendants admitted 12,340
handicapped children excluded); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion
to Convene a Three Court judge [sic] at 5, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) [reprinted in CrAssr nC~oN MATE-
RIAIs, supra note 75, at 44] (as many as 53,400 mentally retarded children excluded
in Pennsylvania). The number of excluded children actually located after the Mills and
PARC decisions are considerably smaller than these estimates.
95 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1970, at 1, col. 1 (children tested after year in
which schools were closed for two months due to teachers' strike, showed two months'
loss in reading achievement); Green & Hofmann, A Case Study of the Effects of Educa-
tional Deprivation on Southern Rural Negro Children, 34 J. NEGRO EDUC. 327 (1965).
The children studied by Green and Hofmann had attended school in Prince Edward
County, Virginia, which closed its schools to avoid desegregation. Since the effects of
school exclusion and the segregation controversy-either of which might have had
adverse educational consequences-are inextricably linked, it is difficult to separate the
impact of each adversity on achievment. See also deGroot, War and the Intelligence
of Youth, 46 3. ABNORMAL & SocrAL. Ps ycHoLoGY 596 (1951). The impact of exclusion
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
With respect to internal school classifications-special education
programs and ability grouping-abundant research has been under-
taken. The diligent reader has available to him studies of every sort:
survey data and single school studies; "natural" and "experimental"
research; studies undertaken in this country and abroad. 6
The research is, however, flawed by a host of methodological
difficulties: some studies are too short in time, and thus do not take
into account the possibility that children behave differently because
they are part of an exciting (or at least novel) experiment; "experi-
mental" groups, assigned to particular classifications, are not ade-
quately matched with "control" groups, so that performance variation
may be explained by initial student differences; measures of change
and growth vary from study to study; responses to questionnaires
prove inadequate to reckon with the subtleties of sorting;
97 most
important, the definition of what constitutes ability grouping or an
educable mentally retarded program varies from study to study.9
Despite these problems, the consistency of result among all the
studies (and particularly among those most carefully executed) is im-
pressive: it indicates that most school classifications have marginal
and sometimes adverse impact on both student achievement and psy-
chological development. 99
The "not proven" conclusion, an ancient Scottish verdict, should
on retarded children is somewhat clearer. See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 61; Toombs, O'Neill,
& Rouse, Pre-School for the Mentally Retarded: A Training Program for Parents of
Retarded Children, in CoNGrTAL MENTAL RETAIRATioN 302-09 (G. Farrell ed. 1969).
9 6See, e.g., W. BORG, supra note 52; M. GOLDBERG, A. H. PAssow & J. Jvs AxN,
supra note 52; B. JACKSON, STREAMING: AN EDUCATION SYsTEx n MnmuA'nn (1964);
S. Ainsworth, An Exploratory Study of Educational, Social and Emotional Factors in the
Education of Mentally Retarded Children in Georgia Public Schools (1959) (Univ. of
Georgia); H. Goldstein, J. Moss & L. Jordan, supra note 50; Baldwin, The Social Posi-
tion of the Educable Mentally Retarded Child in the Regular Grades in the Public
Schools, 25 EXCE ONAL CmLDRaN 106 (1958); Blatt, The Physical, Personality and
Academic Status of Children Who Are Mentally Retarded Attending Special Classes as
Compared with Children Who Are Mentally Retarded Attending Regular Classes, 62
Am. J. MENTAL DFmccy 810 (1958); Kern & Pfaeffle, A Comparison of Social
Adjustment of Mentally Retarded Children in Various Educational Settings, 67 A-. J.
MENTAL DEFiCENCY 407 (1962).
97The questionnaire is cheap, easy, and mechanical. The study of human
behavior is time consuming, intellectually fatiguing, and depends for its success
upon the ability of the investigator. The former method gives quantitative
results, the latter mainly qualitative. Quantitative measurements are quantita-
tively accurate; qualitative evaluations are always subject to the errors of
human judgment. Yet it would seem far more worth while to make a shrewd
guess regarding that which is essential than to accurately measure that which
is likely to prove quite irrelevant.
LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Actions, 13 SocrAL FORCES 230, 237 (1934).
98 H. Goldstein, J. Moss & L. Jordan, supra note 50, at 10-15, notes the difficulties
with special education research; M. GOLDBERG, A.B. PAssow & J. Jusnm, supra note
52, at 17-22, analyzes similar weaknesses in tracking studies.
99 See, for example, the studies cited in note 96 supra, notes 105-07 infra. FnDLEY
& BRYAN, supra note 20, and Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded: Is Much
of It Justified?, in PROBnasS AND ISSUEs 3W THE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CrLDREN
382 (R. L. Jones ed. 1971), collect and summarize much of the literature.
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surprise no one familiar with contemporary educational research. That
research has been able to indicate only what appears not to matter.
It reveals that, given the existing range of school efforts, none of the
school-centered explanations for children's differential academic success
-facilities, teacher qualifications, school desegregation-significantly
influences educational outcomes.1 10 Proof that programs as hotly de-
bated as classes for the mildly retarded or slow learner groups really
accomplish their goals would be extraordinary. Equally singular would
be a conclusive finding of educational harm.'1
The particular problems associated with doing research on school
classifications almost assure tentativism. Few parents (or school sys-
tems, for that matter) are willing to permit researchers to assign stu-
dents randomly to different ability level groups. 02 The possibility that
"adverse" classifications do have significant harmful effects is real;
the outcomes of experimentation are consequently risky. It is also
difficult in undertaking such research to distinguish causation from
correlation, and to know which factor-the educational program or the
children's ability-is the cause and which the consequence. For these
reasons, existing research is unable to predict how similar children
might fare if classified differently. It can draw only hesitant con-
clusions.' °3
100 See, e.g., CoLE wAN REPoRT, supra note 14; Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PuB.
INTEREsT, Summer 1972, at 90; cf. St. John, Desegregation and Minority Group Per-
formance, 40 REV. EDUC. RESEARCH 111 (1970).
101 Professor Lilly, commenting on the special education efficacy studies, wryly
observes:
To avoid exhaustive argument with regard to research design and confounding
variables in these efficacy studies, let us accept the statement that they are
inconclusive to date. It must be added, however, that in the true spirit of re-
search they will be inconclusive forever.
Lilly, Special Education: A Teapot in a Tempest, 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 43, 43-44
(1970).
102 Cf. Gilbert & Mosteller, The Urgent Need for Experimentation, in MosTEuLza &
MoYN AN, supra note 14, at 371, 372: "The random assignment of the experimental
treatment triumphs over all the little excuses for not attributing the effect to the difference
in treatment .... George Box said it well: 'To find out what happens to a system when
you interfere with it, you have to interfere with it (not just passively observe it).'"
None of the ability grouping research fits this model, for reasons suggested in the text.
103 The need for caution in evaluating ability grouping on the basis of present
research is underscored by Light & Smith, Accumulating Evidence: Procedures for
Resolving Contradictions Among Different Research Studies, 41 HARV. EDuc. REv. 429
(1971). The authors criticize conclusion-drawing based either upon aggregation of
research studies or upon selecting the "best" study available.
To be satisfied with this approach is tacitly to assume that genuinely contradic-
tory results can never be a valid description of reality. Would we really be so
surprised to find that one kind of ability grouping benefited children in one
school, but that a similar program failed to benefit comparable children in a
different school? Nature may be consistent, but to assume that her consistency
has been captured exactly in current research is rather a strong ...[and] not
a particularly credible [assumption].
Id. 438.
Cf. Gallagher, supra note 36, at 527, 528 (1972): "[W]e cannot have much faith
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
The research concerning the efficacy of special education programs
is best treated as two sets of data. Studies of programs for children
with profound problems-for example, autistic children or those whose
IQ is below 25-reveal that careful intervention can secure substan-
tial benefits.""4 Of course, the measure of benefit differs for these chil-
dren: the ability to tie one's own shoes or to talk is a major success.
But the benefits are real, and for the most part unquestioned.
Research concerning classes for children with etiologically more
ambiguous handicaps-the educable mentally retarded,10 5 mildly emo-
tionally disturbed and perceptually handicapped' 06-- reach quite differ-
ent conclusions. Those programs do not tangibly benefit their students,
whose equally handicapped counterparts placed in regular school classes
perform at least as well and without apparent detriment to their "nor-
mal" classmates.
It is indeed paradoxical that mentally handicapped children
having teachers especially trained, having more money (per
capita) spent on their education, and being enrolled in classes
with fewer children and a program designed to provide for
their unique needs, should be accomplishing the objectives of
their education at the same or at a lower level than similar
mentally handicapped children who have not had these advan-
tages and have been forced to remain in the regular grades.0 7
That finding has led one psychologist to term such programs "the
'human waste disposal authority'-dead places,' ' 0 8 and another to
suggest that he would go to court before permitting his child to be
placed in a "'self-contained special school or class.' )2109
The methodological difficulties, noted earlier, suggest one reason
for treating these findings with some caution. Where, for example,
in the decision not to label as turning out well merely because the children who have
been labeled achieved limited academic success."
104 See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 61.
05See Dunn, supra note 99.
106 See E. RUBIN, C. SImso" & M. BETWEE, EMOTIONALLY HANDICAPPED CILDREN
IN m ELEMENTARY SCHOOL (1966).
07 Johnson, Special Education for the Mentally Handicapped-A Paradox, 29
EXCEPTIONAL CarDREN 62, 66 (1962). Similar findings are reported in G. HOELTXE,
EFFECTrvENEsS OF SPECIAL CLASS PLACEMENT FOR EDUCABLE, MENTALLY RETARDED
CHILDREN (1966); Christoplos & Renz, A Critical Examination of Special Education
Programs, 3 J. SpEcIAL EDUC. 371 (1969); Kirk, supra note 61; Lilly, supra note 101;
Smith & Kennedy, Effects of Three Educational Programs on Mentally Retarded Children,
24 PERCEPTUAL Am MOTOR SKLLS 174 (1967). But cf. Johnson, supra, at 66 ("The only
area in which the special class has demonstrated superiority of any significance is in peer
acceptance.").
108Burton Blatt, interview in Update (Syracuse University School of Education
Publication, Winter, 1972).
109 Dunn, supra note 99, at 385. See also Zito & Bardon, Achievement Motivation
Among Negro Adolescents in Regular and Special Education Programs, 74 Am. J. MENTAL
D FICI cy 20 (1969).
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"special education" is a euphemism for a day-sitting room staffed by
an unqualified teacher, as is too often the case, any benefits that it
yielded would be remarkable. 10 Yet the philosophy of isolated special
class treatment also makes the failure of such ventures understand-
able. These programs typically adopt a "passive-acceptant" approach,
reflecting the assumption that
the retarded individual is essentially unmodifiable and, there-
fore, that his performance level as manifested at a given stage
of development is considered as a powerful prediction of his
future adaptation. . . . Strategies aiming at helping him to
adapt... will consist of molding the requirements and activi-
ties of his environment to suit his level of functioning, rather
than making the necessary efforts to raise his level of func-
tioning in a significant way. This, of course, is doomed to
perpetuate his low level of performance."'
Thus, even if a child performs admirably in the special class, he in-
evitably falls further behind his counterparts in the regular program.
Only an "active-modificational" approach-which rejects the educa-
tional isolation and early labeling of retarded children-is likely to
reverse this pattern."2
In sum, the research conclusion about special education programs
is consistent, if modest: programs for the severely handicapped do
benefit children, while classes for the mildly retarded and mildly
emotionally disturbed do not serve those children better than regular
class placement. Nor, it should be pointed out, do those classes mark-
edly impair academic performance: if the empirical findings are cor-
rect, special education assignment has little effect on student achieve-
ment.
Studies of ability grouping generally reach a similar conclusion:
differentiation on the basis of ability does not improve student achieve-
ment. It improves the performance of the brightest only slightly (and
only for some academic subjects), while slightly impairing the school
performance of average and slow students."' Professor Borg, whose
11o For criticism of special education programs on these grounds, see H. Goldstein,
J. Moss & L. Jordan, supra note 50, at 13-14.
111 Feuerstein, A Dynamic Approach to the Causation, Prevention, and Alleviation
of Retarded Performance, in SociocuLTURA AsP ECs op M.NTAL RETARDATION 341, 343
(H. Haywood ed. 1970) (emphasis added).
112 Id. 345; cf. A. YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 324 (1970) (rejecting "the pessimistic
views, which have been so widely and for so long entertained regarding the ineducability
of the mental defective .... ").
113 See, e.g., FINDLEY & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 23-31; Heathers, supra note 65, at
565-67. Cf. Goodad, Classroom Organization, in ENCYCLOPEDIA or EDUCATIONAL YsEARCsH
221, 224 (3d ed. 1960). As noted earlier, the force of these findings is lessened by the
failure of the several studies to define consistently what grouping constitutes. A. Sorensen,
Organizational Differentiation of Students and Educational Opportunity, 43 SocIoLoGY oF
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
tracking study is perhaps the most careful yet undertaken, found
that
neither ability grouping with acceleration nor random group-
ing with enrichment is superior for all ability levels of ele-
mentary school pupils. In general, the relative achievement
advantages of the two grouping systems were slight, but
tended to favor ability grouping for superior pupils and ran-
dom grouping for slow pupils.114
The National Education Association, surveying the tracking literature,
concludes: "Despite its increasing popularity, there is a notable lack
of empirical evidence to support the use of ability grouping as an in-
structional arrangement in the public schools."" 5
The premises of ability grouping are in many respects similar to
those of special education programs. Both assume the relative immu-
tability of learning capacity; both structure educational offerings to
match what is presumed to be the maximum capacity of the child.
While students do change tracks, the amount of such movement ap-
pears relatively small-predictions of student ability become its proof
as well. Professor Coleman has made a similar point:
The idea inherent in the new [ability-grouped] secondary
school curriculum appears to have been to take as given the
diverse occupational paths into which adolescents will go after
secondary school, and to say (implicitly): there is greater
equality of educational opportunity for a boy who is not going
to attend college if he has a specially-designed curriculum than
if he must take a curriculum designed for college entrance.
There is only one difficulty with this definition: it takes
as given what should be problematic-that a given boy is go-
ing into a given post-secondary occupational or educational
path.
1
The conclusion that tracking has only slight effects is not surpris-
ing. However, one reanalysis of data collected for the massive Equality
of Educational Opportunity (commonly referred to as the Coleman
Report, after its chief author) suggests that the grouping studies may
EDUCATIONT 355, 359-63 (1970), develops a typology of grouping systems. Sorensen defines
such systems in terms of their inclusiveness (to what extent does grouping limit or expand
future choices); electivity (to what extent does placement reflect student choice);
selectivity (what is the degree of homogeneity resulting from the selection process) ; and
scope (how long-lasting is the effect of any particular classification decision on the
individual student).
114 W. BORG, supra note 52, at 30.
115 NEA RFxsARacE S- irrARY, supra note 34, at 44.
116 Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, in EQUAL EDcA-
TIONAL OPPoRTUN= 9, 15 (Harvard Educational Review ed. 1969) (emphasis in
original). For a discussion of the essential equivalence of diversified curricula and ability
grouping, see text accompanying notes 38-46 supra.
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have underestimated the impact of sorting on achievement' 17 The
source of that speculation is the striking, albeit little noticed, finding
of the Coleman Report that "a generally low proportion of variance in
achievement lay between schools .. . between 15 and 20 percent for
blacks, and less than 15 percent for whites. ' 118 Marshall Smith argues:
Because information about school resources was only
gathered on a schoolwide basis, the school resource factors
could not account for any of the differences between students
within the same school. Therefore, the percent of total vari-
ance that lies between schools is a kind of upper limit on the
amount of variance school resources could account for.
Even so ... a great diversity exists among children within
schools and little diversity exists between schools. This sug-
gests that if the survey had gathered data on the utilization
of the school resources differentially among students within
schools, the conclusions of the Report might have been very
different.19
It is difficult to know what to make of the Coleman Report's find-
ing, or how to relate it to the classification studies. Professor Coleman
himself has suggested that since the between-school portion of variance
in student achievement is constant during twelve years of education,
schooling may be merely confirming initial student differences, which
are indeed marked. 2 0 Yet the magnitude of the achievement gap in-
creases significantly: a deficiency initially measured in months grows
to several years by the end of the schooling process. One is tempted
to say that something is happening within the school, and to leave it
at that.
Smith offers a different explanation:
The early home-background experiences have a strong effect
on the measured achievement level at which the student enters
1st grade. This helps determine the child's initial placement
into fast or slow reading and arithmetic groups and affects the
quality of work expected by his teachers. The initial grouping
in conjunction with continued family influences helps to main-
tain and may in some cases amplify the early differences be-
tween the children within an elementary school.'
21
"1
7 See Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity: The Basic Findings Re-
considered, in MOSTELLER & MoNIAx, supra note 14, at 230, 247-49.
118 Coleman, The Evaluation of Equality of Educational Opportunity, in MosTEatnR
& MoYNI AN, supra note 14, at 146, 164. An inspection of the same data reveals that,
in the North, the between-school variation was only 7-14% of the total variance. Smith,
supra note 117, at 248.
119 Smith, supra note 117, at 247, 249 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
120 Coleman, supra note 118, at 164.
121 Smith, supra note 117, at 263 (emphasis in original).
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While Smith's approach makes intuitive sense, it remains merely an
unverified hypothesis.
These studies define the effects of school sorting in terms of test-
measured achievement. A quite different approach considers the effect
of sorting on subtler measures of attitude and outlook, examining the
possibility that certain classifications stigmatize students.
2. Stigmatization
a. Stigmatization as a Social Process
Stigma, what Erving Goffman calls "an undesired differentness,"
is a fact of social life. 22 In some societies stigmatization officially
identifies classes of individuals of different worth. The Indian caste
system, for example, created a category of persons so unfit for social
intercourse as to be literally untouchable. The banishment of lepers to
isolated colonies, although based on a different motive-fear of disease
-accomplishes the same end. 28
In American society, the processes of stigmatization are more ex-
tended, complex and elusive.'24 No class is officially branded outcast;
indeed, the concept of equality which theoretically governs democratic
social relations refuses to recognize any class-based traits. Nonetheless,
for segments of the society, labels as varied as "blind," "Negro,"
"homosexual," and "convict" convey broadly accepted meanings. They
are social stigmas.
A stigma is not inherently value-laden; the stigmatizing attri-
bute is neither creditable nor discreditable per se. Its value lies in
how people perceive it-that is, its socially accepted meaning. For
example, the polygamist fulfills his traditional Mormon duty, yet he
also violates American norms. Stigma is thus properly defined in rela-
tional terms. 2 5
Stigmatization, whether formal or informal, facilitates interaction
with certain types of individuals by prescribing appropriate social
strategies for managing encounters with them. Society pities the blind,
shuns the criminal, disdains the homosexual, all without reference to
122 E. GoFMA, STIGMA (1963). This discussion relies heavily on the insights of
Professor Goffman.
123 Precisely the same point may be made about legally imposed racial segregation.
124 Cf. L. DExTER, suPra note 49, at 30:
Our society does not actually kill or seriously mutilate anybody for being stupid.
The most our authorities do is to commit certain high-grade retardates accused
of "creating trouble" to institutions for defective delinquents or to colonies for
retardates, for very long terms, without much effort to determine whether
they actually are guilty.
125 "The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives. These
are generated in social situations during mixed contacts by virtue of the unrealized norms
that are likely to play upon the encounter." STIGMA, supra note 122, at 138.
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the personal qualities which complicate the labeling process. Individual
differences are subsumed under the common, negatively perceived
attributes.
Stigmatization also serves a number of other societal purposes.
As Goffman notes:
The stigmatization of those with a bad moral record clearly
can function as a means of formal social control; the stig-
matization of those in certain racial, religious, and ethnic
groups has apparently functioned as a means of removing
these minorities from various avenues of competition; and the
devaluation of those with bodily disfigurements can perhaps
be interpreted as contributing to a needed narrowing of court-
ship decisions.'26
Even in an egalitarian society, some stigmas are legitimately imposed
through official action. The convicted murderer is labeled and punished
for a deed which society feels deserving of punishment. His stigma is
justified as a form of social control.1
27
This process (which might be termed just or permissible social
stigmatization) is so basic to society that it typically passes unnoticed.
Yet there are other more subtle stigmas, equally real and debilitating,
which are officially imposed by the state. Many laws classify: they
divide the world into classes of people, only some of whom are eligible
for or benefit from particular treatment. And many classifications can
be said to stigmatize: zoning laws perpetuate a "wrong side of the
tracks"; 28 licensing laws separate the qualified from the charlatan. 29
The decisionmaking agency may well not intend this result. It
is more likely to be interested in providing humane treatment or in
126Id. 139. "Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the comple-
ment of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories.
Social settings establish the categories of persons likely to be encountered there." Id. 2.
Cf. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance,
15 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 175 (1967).
127 "The act is branded as reprehensible by authorized organs of society, and this
official branding of the conduct may influence attitudes quite apart from the fear of
sanctions." Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 81 (1968).
In both the cases of the Mormon polygamist and the murderer, the formal societal
involvement is the same. What distinguishes the two cases is our view of the justness
of the governmental stigmatizing process.
128 That phenomenon is increasingly subject to legal challenge. See Abascal, Municipal
Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme By Griiln v. Illinois, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 1367 (1969); Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal
Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARv. Civ. RioaTs-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 441
(1971).
129 The connection between legal classification and stigma is not always so straight-
forward. In some instances, such as welfare legislation, what is viewed by the recipients
as a right is perceived by others as a label denoting undesirable character traits. Cf.
R. O'NEIL, THE PRIca OF DEPENDENCY 251 (1970). Often the stigma which the classifica-
tion creates is nominal. And differing legal classifications may reward and stigmatize the
same individual for the same attribute. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19;
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
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securing administrative ease.' ° Involuntary confinement in mental
hospitals and even the incarceration of criminals, for example, are
asserted to be rehabilitative. Yet in understanding stigma, motive
matters less than consequences; the relevant inquiry is whether an
individual is effectively branded in a manner which he and those with
whom he comes into contact regard as undesirable.
b. Stigma and Schooling
Many of the classifications that schools impose on students are
stigmatizing. However well-motivated the decision or complex the
factual bases leading to a particular classification, the classification
lends itself to simplified labels. The slow learner or special student
becomes a "dummy." The student excluded from the school system
which initially compelled his attendance is simply an outcast, "told...
that he is unfit to be where society has determined all acceptable
citizens of his age should be.'
31
These adverse school classifications reduce both the individual's
sense of self-worth and his value in the eyes of others. For many
children, this process is particularly painful because it is novel. It
represents the first formal revelation of differentness. 32 The school's
inclination to cope with a particular learning or social problem by
130 See Robert Kennedy's description of "injuries which result simply from adminis-
trative convenience, injuries which may be done inadvertently by those endeavoring to
help-teachers and social workers and urban planners." Address by Attorney General
Kennedy, University of Chicago Law School, May 1, 1964, excerpted in Cahn & Cahn,
The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1337 n.27 (1964).
131 Buss, supra note 5, at 545, 577 (1971). Professor Buss adds: "Furthermore, the
stigma and humiliation attaching to ... expulsion may be 'life long.' Id. (citing Vought
v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (E.D. Mich. 1969)). See CosT or
EDUCATIOn, supra note 30, at 9.55-9.67. The concept of stigma, as used in this discussion,
is a relative one. The slow learner, performing at the bottom of a heterogeneous class,
may well regard himself as stigmatized; indeed his perception of stigma might even be
more acute than that held by his counterpart, performing well in a class for mildly re-
tarded students. That issue merits empirical investigation, which thus far has not been
undertaken. But the stigma associated with being placed in a special class differs in one
constitutionally noteworthy way: it is directly caused by an action of the school, rather
than arising informally from student interaction. Further, the "stigma" felt by the slow
learner in the regular class may well represent a more accurate awareness of his own
relative competency. Regular classes are much like the world outside the schoolhouse.
They recreate (as well as schools can) the environment in which a student will function
once he leaves school. The issue of relative stigma is similar to that posed by studies of
the self-image of black students in segregated and desegregated schools. Cf. Pettigrew,
Race and Equal Educational Opportunity, in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPpoRT1aN= 69, 76
(Harvard Educational Review ed. 1969): "[EJach child faces a two-stage problem: first,
he must learn that he can, within reasonably broad limits, act effectively upon his sur-
roundings; and, second, he must then evaluate his own relative capabilities for mastering
the environment."
132 Professor Goffman observes that "public school entrance is often reported as the
occasion of stigma learning, the experience sometimes coming very precipitously on the
first day of school, with taunts, teasing, ostracism, and fights." E. GoFEWa", supra note
122, at 33. See R. RIDDLE, LovE Is NoT Brmw 18 (1953) (experiences of a blind person);
H. VisCARDi, A MAI's STATURE 13-14 (1952) (experiences of a dwarf).
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isolating those who share that problem reinforces the child's sense of
stigma.
[T]he more the child is "handicapped" the more likely he is
to be sent to a special school [or to a special program within
the school] for persons of his kind, and the more abruptly
he will have to face the view which the public at large takes
of him. He will be told that he will have an easier time of it
among "his own," and thus learn that the own he thought he
possessed was the wrong one, and that this lesser own is really
his.' 3
The stigmatized child, who "tends to hold the same beliefs about
identity that [others] do,"'' 4 comes to learn, through contact with
the school, that he has in effect been devalued by both the school and
the society. 3 5
Children perceive all too well what the school's label means. Jane
Mercer observes that those assigned to special education classes "were
ashamed to be seen entering the MR room because they were often
teased by other children about being MR... [and] dreaded receiving
mail that might bear compromising identification.' 3 6 As one black
mother, whose own son is in a special class, reported:
Let's face it, children can be real cruel. I feel for the most part
the youngsters that are in those classes and retained suffer a
great emotional handicap. It's as if they have a sign around
their neck for everyone to read. Bill is being retarded in spe-
cial education. He doesn't like being labelled as retarded.
It's affecting him. He begs us to have him removed from that
class .... The only reason he consents to go [to school] is
because we have been promised that he'll be taken out of
that EMR class.3 7
Students assigned to the general or slow learner track described similar
feelings:
General teachers make kids feel dumb. Their attitude is,
"Well, nobody's been able to do anything with you, and I
can't do better."'
Differences among school children clearly exist, and it would be
133 E. GoFmm, supra note 122, at 33.
1'4 Id. 8.
185 Cf. A. Liw aswH & L. STRAUss, SOCm PSYCHOLOGY 180-83 (1956 ed.) ; Dreeben,
The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of Norms, 37 HA~v. EDUC. REV. 211
(1967).
138 Mercer, Sociocultural Factors, supra note 36.
137 Id.
138 Putting the Child in Its Place, supra note 26, at 41. See also Comer, The Circle
Game in School Tracking, INhouALxr in EDUCATiON, July 1972, at 23, 24-25.
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folly to ignore them: to treat everyone in exactly the same fashion
typically benefits no one. Yet even with that qualification, the conse-
quentiality of the school's classification is an awesome fact with which
the child must cope. Its psychological ramifications extend beyond the
child; they reach his family, and those with whom the child has con-
tact. 3 9 The child assigned to a special education class or a slow learners'
group discovers that his society is totally altered. His differentness is
what matters most to the school.' 4
The stigma is further exacerbated, at least in part, by the school's
curriculum. The curriculum offered to the "slow" or "special" child
is less demanding than that provided for "normal" children; even if the
child assigned to the special class does creditable work, he falls further
behind the school norm. The initial assignment becomes a self-fulfilling
prophesy; 14 1 the child's belief in his inferiority is reinforced by the
knowledge that he is increasingly unable to return to the regular school
program.142 In addition, because his classmates and teachers make
fewer demands on him (for by definition less can be expected of the
handicapped than the normal), he comes to accept their judgment
139 See R. EDGERTON, THE CLoAx OF CoPETENcE (1967); Freedman, Helme, Havel,
Eustic, Riley & Langford, Family Adjustment to the Brain-Damaged Child, in A MODRN
INTRODUCTION TO mTn FA.mxy 555 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds. 1960); Iano, Social Class and
Parental Evaluation of Educable Retarded Children, 5 EDuc. & TRAInnG OF THE MEN-
TALLY RrTAiowFD 62 (1970); Mercer, Social System Perspective and Clinical Perspective:
Frames of Reference for Understanding Career Patterns of Persons Labelled as Mentally
Retarded, 13 SocrAL PROBLEIS 18 (1965); Valentine, Deficit, Difference, and Bicultural
Models of Afro-American Behavior, 41 HAnv. EDUC. Rtv. 137 (1971); Vogel & Bell, The
Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat, in A MoDERN INTRODUCTION TO THE
FAanY 382 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds. 1960).
140 Goffman's description of the means by which society circumscribes the life chances
of those whom it stigmatizes is particularly relevant:
[W]e believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption
we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often un-
thinkingly, reduce his life chances. We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to
explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents, sometimes ration-
alizing an animosity based on other differences .... We tend to impute a wide
range of imperfections on the basis of the original one....
E. GoFmA, supra note 122, at 5. See Riesman, Some observations Concerning Marginal-
ity, 12 PHYLoN 113, 122 (1951); cf. H. BECxER, OuTsmERs (1963); M. EDEmA., THM
SytmouLc UsEs or PoLnics (1964). But this phenomenon is not inevitable. Cf. L. WEBB,
CHiLDREN w= SPFcIAL NEEDs x TBE ImAmms' SCHOOL 154 (1967):
Many of these youngsters come to think of themselves as bad, stupid and
doomed to failure .... Viewing themselves as incompetent, they behave as in-
competents, even in circumstances within their coping capacity. This at least, the
teacher can do something to prevent, and by use of no more than his own special-
ist skills and intelligent appreciation of the difficulties such children face.
While Webb's case studies of English children illustrate such "intelligent appreciation,"
they do not suggest how the system of education might be structured to behave similarly.
14 1 See Gallagher, supra note 36.
142 Dexter suggests that "Etjhe child may learn nothing else in school, but he does
learn to become sensitive to stupidity." L. DExTER, supra note 49, at 51.
143 Cf. Wilson, Social Stratification and Academic Achievement, in EDUCATIoN IN DE-
rpsSEm AREAS 217 (A.H. Passow ed. 1963) (suggesting that teachers give bright students
lower grades than slow students for the same work because they expect more from bright
students).
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of acceptable progress as his own.14' As one student said: "All the
kids here [in the slow track] are victims. They've finally believed it."'I4
The consequences of excluding a child who is allegedly ineducable
are even more substantial. The excluded child begins to understand
that the school, the social agency whose task is the education of the
young, can offer him nothing, or, worse, must protect itself from his
influence by excluding him. Such a child is most in need of the assis-
tance that structured instruction can afford him. Because of his limited
intelligence, he is less capable than the "normal" child of managing
his own affairs. Exclusion not only recognizes this fact-it confirms it.
The child excluded from school as ineducable is unlikely ever to ac-
quire even a measure of self-sufficiency.
The effects of school-imposed stigmas do not cease at the time
the child leaves school, for schools significantly are society's most
active labelers. The schools label more persons as mentally retarded,
share their labels with more other organizations, and label more per-
sons with I.Q.'s above 70 and with no physical disabilities than any
other formal organization in the community.'46 Slow track assignment
makes college entrance nearly impossible and may discourage employ-
ers from offering jobs; assignment to a special education program fore-
closes vocational options. For the child who cannot escape his past-as
by moving from the South to the North to seek employment, leaving
all school records except a diploma behind him-the "retarded" label
sticks for life. While many children labeled retarded by the school do
come to lead normal lives, the stigma persists. Robert Edgerton, who
interviewed one hundred formerly institutionalized retardates, reports:
To find oneself regarded as a mental retardate is to be bur-
dened by a shattering stigma, . . .the ultimate horror....
These persons cannot both believe that they are mentally re-
tarded and still maintain their self-esteem. Yet they must
maintain self-esteem .... [T]he stigma of mental retardation
dominates every feature of the lives of these former patients.
Without an understanding of this point, there can be no
understanding of their lives.
147
It overstates the point, but not by much, to suggest that through
144 See R. RosimTzI, & L. JACoBsON, PYMAION IN T CLASSROOM (1968). But
see Thorndike, Book Review, 5 Am. EDuc. RBSsAaEc J. 708 (1968).
145 Putting the Child in Its Place, supra note 26, at 41.
1 4 6 Mercer, Sociological Perspectives, supra note 36.
147 R. EDGERTON, supra note 115, at 205-08. See also D. BRAGINSxY & B. BRAGINSKY,
HANSELS AND GRETTEs (1971). This attention to stigma should not obscure the fact that
children labeled as retarded or different develop strategies for coping with their altered
environments. One study of institutionalized retardates--which concludes that "institu-
tionalized cultural-familial retardates can be understood in terms usually reserved for
'normal' people"--found retardates "no more helpless, inadequate, stupid, or less able
to control their fates than their non-institutionalized counterparts." Id. 102 (1971).
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adverse classifications schools can manage not only the lives of children
but the lives of adults as well.
B. Constitutional Standards-the Importance of Education and the
Interests of Children
That certain school classifications--exclusion, special education,
and slow track placement-do not benefit and may well injure students
readily evokes the policy conclusion that such sorting is educationally
dubious practice. Yet bad policy is not necessarily, or even usually,
unconstitutional policy. If the transition could be so effortlessly made,
courts would in fact function as super-legislatures. If, however, the
interests at stake are sufficiently closely linked to constitutionally
guaranteed rights, or the class of persons asserting discrimination is
demonstrably vulnerable to majoritarian abuse, then the claim that
particular policies operate inequitably becomes more susceptible to
judicial analysis; judicial deference to legislative judgment 48 gives
way to careful examination of competing interests. In a challenge to
school sorting, the bases for such judicial treatment are two: 1) the
inequitable deprivation of education, an important, if not a "funda-
mental" interest; 49 2) the status of children, a class of individuals
who deserve the protection of the courts in securing their rights.
The nature of that inquiry says rather interesting things about
the process of constitutional analysis and adjudication. The process
depends upon the accretion of normative judgments concerning such
concepts as fundamentality and protected classes, judgments not typ-
ically hospitable to empirical evaluation. 150 It may well be that the
248Under the traditional equal protection doctrine, courts uphold legislatively imposed
classifications which "bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end.' McDonald
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); see Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 129, at 1076-87. This standard results in near-total
deference to legislative discretion:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that,
in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Except in the case of total exclusion, the application of the "minimal scrutiny" stan-
dard, Gunther, supra note 87, at 8, would assuredly doom a suit challenging school classi-
fication practices. But cf. id. 18-20.
149 Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
Even the majority opinion professes "an abiding [judicial] respect for the vital role of
education in a free society." Id. at 1295.
150 Professor Hazard, discussing the uses of social science evidence in judicial decisions,
notes that "science requires the agreement of minds," a process which seems to Hazard
"more satisfying to the modem mind than the conclusions advanced from authority.
That, however, is not much consolation for law men, whose concerns are for immediate,
cheap, and significant decisionmaling. For them there are continuing attractions in the
Delphic Oracle." Hazard, Limitations on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the Law, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 71, 75, 77 (1967). Cf. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of
Law, 74 YALE LJ. 1402, 1406 (1965) ("[Plolicy-makers trained as lawyers are suscepti-
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derivation of principled standards, untested (and often untestable)
against empirical evidence, is all that constitutional review ought to
undertake. 151 Yet the run of legal labels that advocates on either side
typically advance do not materially promote reasoned analysis. It
seems equally unhelpful to assert that education is a "fundamental
interest" (in order to justify an alteration of prevailing practice)'
or that education is merely a publicly provided service (giving judicial
warrant to the uncritical preservation of inequities). In each instance,
the label negates analysis. The complexity of the school classification
issue demands careful review and balancing of the competing interests
-those of the child and of the school-not result-oriented legal short-
hand.
1. Education as a "Fundamental Interest"
Under the "new equal protection" theory which came into promi-
nence during the Warren Court era, legislative classifications touching
on "fundamental interests" or involving "suspect classifications" trig-
ger the reviewing court's strict scrutiny, and can be justified only by
a showing of a "compelling state interest."15 8 As Professor Gunther
has pointed out, this kind of scrutiny has proven to be "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact; 1'14 especially in light of the current inability
of the research to prove any real educational benefits due to sorting,'55
the school classifications discussed in this Article might well fall before
the mechanical application of a compelling interest test.
The claim that education either has been held to be, or, more
candidly, merits treatment as a "fundamental interest," was rejected
in San Antonio Unified School District v. Rodriguez. 56 The Supreme
Court affirmed its "historic dedication to public education,"' yet
could find no constitutional warrant for distinguishing educational in-
equities from inequities in the provision of any other publicly supported
ble to becoming trapped in their own logic. They may operate wholly from within a
logical system the basis of which (quite possibly mistaken) they do not question....
Men who 'think like lawyers' can rigidify the operations and the thinking of govern-
ment.").
15' See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L.
REV. 1 (1959); cf. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150 (1955).
152 Where courts have identified an interest as "fundamental" they have required the
state to show: (1) that its interest in classifying is "compelling"; (2) that the means
chosen to effectuate that interest are "less onerous" than available alternatives. See gen-
erally Note, Developments in the La--Equal Protection, supra note 129. The result of
applying such a test is predictable: the complainant invariably wins.
155 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
154 Gunther, supra note 87, at 8.
155 See text accompanying notes 94-121 supra.
156 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
157Id. at 1295.
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good or service. Having identified no special status for education ex-
plicit or implicit in the Constitution, the Court proceeded to apply the
traditional equal protection test-to determine whether state financing
schemes were "rational," and whether the means adopted by the state
"reasonably" furthered the state's avowed goal. 158 In short, the Rod-
riguez Court revived the mechanical two-level test inherited from the
Warren era; in so doing, it ignored its own more recent cases which
utilized a process of review less rigid in structure, and more evidently
attuned to the nature of the particular legal question at issue.159
Even before the Rodriguez decision, the insistence that education
-like voting,10 access to a transcript'6 ' or counsel 62 in state criminal
appeals, and travel 6 -- be classified as "fundamental" rested on shaky
factual and legal ground.
Several reasons have been advanced for the proposition that edu-
cation merits treatment as a fundamental interest. (1) Education is
critical to the securing of other basic personal rights: the capacity to
obtain work, to participate intelligently in the political processes which
govern society, and, perhaps most importantly, to exercise fully and
effectively the rights of speech and association guaranteed by the first
amendment.'64 (2) The fact that education is both universal and com-
pulsory differentiates it from other state-supported services and sug-
gests its more abiding importance.'65 (3) Schooling occupies a decade
or more of each child's life, a fact which renders it the most substantial
state encroachment on individual liberty. 66 (4) Education, unlike most
other public services, functions to shape individual character and
intellect, affecting not only personal development but, ultimately,
societal conduct. 67
Language in a number of pre-Rodriguez Supreme Court decisions
appeared to substantiate the claim of fundamentality: Justice Holmes'
158 Id. at 1300.
159 See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
160 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
101 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
162 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
163 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1 64 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
615-16 (1971) ("[Ejducation is a major determinant of an individual's chances for eco-
nomic and social success ... [and] a unique influence on a child's development as a citi-
zen and his participation in political and community life.") See also Kirp, The Poor, the
Schools and Equal Protection, 38 HARv. EDUC. R v. 639, 642-44 (1968).
165 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 609-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
619 (1971); J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIc EDuCA-
Tiox, 416-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE WEALTH].
166 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 609, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619
(1971).
1671d. at 609-10; 487 P.2d at 1258-59; 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
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observation that "Massachusetts always has recognized [education]
as one of the first objects of public care"; 168 the statement in Meyer v.
Nebraska that "[t]he American people have always regarded educa-
tion and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance,
which should be diligently promoted";16 9 and, of course, the Brown
paean to education as "perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments."' 7 If this language is extracted from the con-
texts of the cases, the claim that education has historically been re-
garded by the Supreme Court as a "fundamental" interest can be made
with some plausibility. However, an examination of the legal disputes
which prompted those observations undercuts much of the argument.
In Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Co. v. Massachusetts,
the Court upheld state legislation requiring a city transit company to
charge school children half-fare.171 But such legislation can be justified
as a valid exercise of the police power; it seems as consistent with the
state's authority to legislate for the general welfare as a similar policy
for senior citizens would be. That the particular statute enabled chil-
dren to attend school more cheaply is irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis. Meyer held unconstitutional a criminal statute proscribing
the teaching of foreign languages. The statute was held to violate
teachers' substantive due process rights. And Brown, viewed in retro-
spect, is more properly read as resting on the wrong caused by racial
discrimination, not on the importance of schooling.17
More recently, several lower federal courts which considered the
constitutionality of particular educational deprivations indicated that
education might be regarded as fundamental. In holding that officials
could not bar aliens from public schooling,'73 and that pregnancy did
not justify the exclusion of women, 174 these courts found education to
be a basic right which could not be routinely denied to various classes
of children. Serrano v. Priest 75 and its progeny,176 overruled by the
168 Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
169 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
170 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
171 The majority of the Court confined its decision to the ground that the challenged
statute was already in force at the time the defendant railway company received its char-
ter; since the act of incorporation made prevailing state law implicitly a part of the
charter, the company was deemed to have consented to the statute. 207 U.S. at 84. justice
Holmes, speaking for himself alone, proceeded to discuss the constitutionality of the
statute. Id. at 85-88.
172 See, e.g., Pollak, Racial Discrimination and .udical Integrity: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. RaV. 1, 24-32 (1959).
173 Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
174E.g., Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); cf. Perry v.
Grenada Mun. Sep. School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
175 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
176 E.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
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Rodriguez decision (insofar as they rely upon the equal protection
clause), also identified the fundamentality of education as requiring
close judicial scrutiny of school expenditure policies.
77
But the empirical findings concerning education's effects on indi-
vidual development indicate that the relationship between education
and its putative benefits is more complex and less self-evident than
these judicial opinions admit. 78 In considering critically the justifica-
tions proferred for education's special status, is it obviously true that
success in school routinely converts into life success? Does schooling
matter more than social class (or happenstance) in determining indi-
vidual outcomes? 179 If the state simply handed out money to individ-
uals, rather than investing society's resources in schooling, would those
individuals (or the society) be decidedly worse off? Christopher Jencks
concludes his reexamination of the Equality of Educational Oppor-
tunity8 0 data by observing:
If and when we develop a comprehensive picture of inequality
in American life, we will find that educational inequality is of
marginal importance for either good or ill. Such things as con-
trol over capital, occupational specialization, and the tradi-
tions of American politics will turn out to be far more impor-
tant than the schools' 8 '
These are not questions that judges are inclined to pose. But even
if the rationales advanced for the importance of schooling are correct,
do they not apply with greater force to the provision of food and
shelter? Why should the life of the mind-or for that matter, the right
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971).
177 Some state courts have rested school finance decisions in whole or part on state
constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, No. 8618 (N.J., Apr. 3, 1973);
Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). These deci-
sions may well survive the reversal of Rodriguez.
178 These decisions may be viewed as treating the importance of education as a given,
that is, a proposition which needs no proof. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). ("It requires no argu-
ment to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society. With-
out sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood,
to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsi-
bilities of good citizens."). Given the dizzying variety of educational efficacy evidence,
and the primitiveness of existing knowledge, that presumptive approach may be the only
one realistically available to the courts. Yet it does suggest that the court is adopting a
"don't confuse me with facts-I've already made up my mind" stance.
1 79 See generally COLEmAIm REPORT, supra note 14. However, David Cohen observes
that ability (as measured by standardized tests) and social status combined account for
less than half of the variation in student track assignment, college attendance, and voca-
tional success. Cohen, Does LQ. Matter?, COmMENTARY, Apr. 1972, at 51.
1 8 0 CoE= REPoRT, supra note 14.
181 Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in MosT=ER &
Moyym]A, supra note 14, at 69, 105. Jencks amplifies this point in JENcxs, INEQUALiTY,
supra note 14.
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to travel' 2-- be constitutionally preferred to the "economic needs of
impoverished human beings"?18 Might not "growing up with an abun-
dance of rats and a scarcity of physical security . . . mold a child's
personality and undermine his participation in 'free enterprise demo-
cracy' ,,184 as much as educational deprivation? The response that a
"child's mind is constitutionally distinguishable from his stomach 1 85
invents distinctions which can be maintained in courtrooms, and only
in courtrooms.
Rodriguez raises many of these problems, but the path that its
analysis follows-curt dismissal of the claim that educational inequities
merit something more than perfunctory scrutiny-is fully as unsatis-
fying an approach as the "fundamentality" technique. As Justice White
observes in dissent:
Requiring the State to establish only that unequal treatment
is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without also requiring
the State to show that the means chosen to effectuate that goal
are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal protec-
tion analysis no more than an empty gesture. 8
Justice Marshall's critique of the analysis-"an emasculation of the
Equal Protection Clause' 8 --is sharper, but equally correct.
Even if education is not of "fundamental" moment, it clearly
bears upon the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights. For that
reason, in reviewing assertions of inequity the Court should be able
to distinguish education from regulation of economic interests, where
the lenient standard of rationality has historically been applied. In-
deed, in a host of cases-particularly involving state legislation which
assertedly diminishes the individual's "right to privacy" 8 -- the Court
182 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1968).
183 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Dandridge distinguishes between
"regulation ... affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" and purely sodal
and economic regulation, demanding only rational justification for inequality with re-
spect to the latter set of interests. Id. at 484-85.
184 Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the
Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CASaF. L. REv. 720, 728 (1972). See also
Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court,
70 MicH. L. Rav. 1324 (1972).
185 Brief for John Serrano, Jr. and John Anthony Serrano as Amid Curiae at 40,
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973). Cf. Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARv.
Civ. RItHTs-CrV. LiB. L. RFv. 103 (1972).
186 93 S. Ct. at 1314 (White, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 1330 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (due process); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
Since the right to privacy is nowhere explicitly to be found in the Constitution, the Court
has to determine, first, that the affected personal interest can be characterized as an inter-
est in "privacy," and, second, that the right of privacy is itself closely linked to constitu-
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has, under the guise of "rationality," applied a more stringent stan-
dard of judicial review.' 89 That approach does not require the Court
"to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guarantee-
ing equal protection of the laws"'9 0 or "mark an extraordinary depar-
ture from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."'191 Instead, as Justice Marshall's dis-
sent notes, it calls for a determination of "the extent to which consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned
in the Constitution, 1 1 92 requiring the Court to consider, as it did in
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., "[w]hat legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal
rights might the classification endanger?"'
93
In rejecting the claim that education is of "fundamental" con-
stitutional significance, Rodriguez appears to foreclose all challenges
to inequities in the provision of education-or, at least, inequities
which are neither racial in nature nor represent complete denial of
schooling. Yet the analytic formula that the Court adopts is unsatis-
factory, at least in part because it is a formula. It seems more con-
stitutionally appropriate (if less result-oriented) to review each
assertedly adverse educational classification in order to determine
whether it suitably furthers an appropriate governmental interest. 94
That approach, as Professor Gunther argues, would "close the wide
gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the
minimal scrutiny of the old not by adandoning the strict but by
raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine
judicial inquiry."'1 5
tionally guaranteed rights. The link between education and the rights of free speech and
the franchise is more direct.
18 9 See cases cited note 159 supra.
190 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1297 (1973).
191 1d. at 1310 (Stewart, 3., concurring).
292 Id. at 1332 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
194 Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
195 Gunther, supra note 87, at 24. Professor's Gunther's effort to locate an equal pro-
tection theory underlying the decisions of the Supreme Court's 1971 term is not with-
out difficulties. As Gunther notes, a means-oriented (or revitalized rationality) approach
is "not a simple formula capable of automatic, problem-free application." Id. 48. The
approach also recalls the standard of review applied by the Supreme Court under the
guise of substantive due process. Compare, for example, the test applied in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934): does "the means selected ... have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought [by the legislature] to be attained." And, most impor-
tant, "i)t is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way
that the statutory classification is rationally related to it." Note, Legislative Purpose, Ra-
tionality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1972). Thus, when a court postu-
lates an incongruity between legislative means and ends, its analysis may be quite as
result-oriented as, if less candid than, the "new equal protection's" insistence on divining
fundamentality. Yet the "sliding scale" analytic approach proposed in Professor Gunther's
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If such an approach were to be adopted by a court considering
the constitutionality of school sorting practices, the claim for relief
might well be strong. The very things which link education to rights
guaranteed by the Constitution-political participation, intellectual
growth-seem to be directly affected by school classification. This
cause-and-effect relationship between the impact of the injury and
the nature of the right is most readily established with respect to
school exclusion. Since exclusion represents a total deprivation of
schooling, all of education's benefits are necessarily denied the ex-
cluded child. Special education or slow learner assignment presumably
also affects subsequent opportunities for political participation and
intellectual growth, although the link is not so easily fashioned.
2. The Interests of Children
Age requirements are not, in constitutional terms, "suspect clas-
sifications." The state may, for example, set minimum age limits for
driving a motor vehicle, drinking alcoholic beverages, or voting, 9
and no court is likely to subject the state's classifications to "strict
scrutiny." However, there is reason for the courts to treat with special
solicitude the constitutional claims of children,'197 requiring a degree
of judicial inquiry greater than a determination of mere rationality
but less severe than "strict scrutiny"-an approach complementary
to that suggested in the preceding section.' 98
The status of children is unique in the legal system. Children
cannot pursue their interests through political avenues; they are barred
from participation because of their youth.'99 Nor can they directly
seek redress through the courts; they must be represented by an
adult, typically a parent, whom the law presumes will act on their
behalf. 00 Their lives are managed and directed to an extent that
adults would find intolerable. Educational decisions are routinely made
Article does have one signal virtue: it permits courts to undertake a more exacting view
of competing interests than does the "fundamentality" approach.
196 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Lassiter
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
197 Cf. Kainowitz, Legal Emancipation of Minors in Michigan, 19 WAYNE L. REv.
23, 47-48 (1972).
198 Cf. Gunther, supra note 87 at 20-24.
199 That parents can vote is little comfort for the child, whose interests may not co-
incide with his parents. Cf. Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d
Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded for a determination concerning mootness, 409 U.S. 75
(1972). To the extent that children are barred from the political process, they may be
viewed as one of the "discrete and insular minorities [excluded from] those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
20OThat requirement sometimes serves to deny children access to the courts. See
Kaimowitz, supra note 197, at 27-33. See generally Green, The Law of the Young, in
Wrrx JUsTICE FOR SorM 1, 33-37 (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1970).
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by the state, which functions as the steward of youth. In almost all
states children are compelled to attend school for at least nine years,20'
and that initial compulsion serves as a basis for the imposition of
further constraints.
Most remarkable has been the ease with which the state has been
able to justify its imposition of values on those occasions when its inter-
ests and those of children collide. For example, the distribution of
religious literature, fit activity for adults, impairs the health and
welfare of children;"' 2 books suitable for adult consumption cannot
be sold to children, whose moral growth might be stunted.2 03 In each
case, the Supreme Court has viewed the child's interest in liberty as
conflicting with the state's general concern for the well-being of chil-
dren, and in resolving that conflict, the children have lost. 0 4 It is
instructive that the Supreme Court only four years ago declared ex-
plicitly for the first time that children "are 'persons' under our Con-
stitution. '20 Their rights as persons have been minimal,
Courts have recently begun to recognize the civil rights of chil-
dren independent of the rights of their parents.07 Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,208 which asserted the
first amendment rights of children, is of course the leading case. 0
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. °10 reveals judicial concern
2 0 1 See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 393-94 n.74 (1969).
202Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
203 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
204 In the Prince context-where children of Jehovah's Witnesses were barred from
distributing religious literature--it may be more accurate to say that the children's inter-
ests were not considered, than to assert an identity between the interest of children and
parents.
205 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 11
(1969).
20Even In re Gault, 397 U.S. 1 (1967), typically eulogized as protecting children
from the excesses of juvenile justice, affords the child only a watered-down version of
constitutional procedural protection. See Kaimowitz, supra note 197, at 25-26.
207 Earlier cases dealing with what could have been viewed as the rights of children
were instead decided on the basis of the rights of parents or teachers. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Even
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which came closest
to recognizing an independent right in the child, also involved prosecution of the parents.
208393 U.S. 503 (1969).
209 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded that
the Amish desire to maintain a religious community which frowned on worldly schooling
justified exempting the "plain people's" children from compulsory education beyond the
eighth grade. Yet, as Justice Douglas noted, while Amish youngsters may in fact benefit
from the decision, the Court's concern lay with the rights of parents, not children:
The Court's analysis assumes that the only interests at stake are those of the
Amish parents on the one hand, and those of the State on the other. The difficulty
with this approach is that, despite the Court's claim, the parents are seeking to
vindicate not only their own free exercise claims, but aiso those of their high-
school-age children.
rd. at 241. Justice Douglas would have remanded the case in regard to two of the re-
spondents in order to determine the children's religious views.
210406 U.S. 164. "Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered
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for the rights of one class of children-those born out of wedlock.
In at least two other kinds of cases, lower courts also have explicitly
recognized children's personal rights. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in a case involving the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse
medical treatment for her sixteen-year-old child where the child's life
was not in imminent danger, remanded for a hearing to ascertain the
wishes of the child.21' In Chandler v. South Bend Community School
Corp.,212 a federal district court upheld the independent interests of
children in education. The district court, which struck down a school
policy of suspending students and withholding their report cards un-
less their parents either paid a textbook fee or established their in-
digency, declared: "The school fee collection procedure... conditions
[children's] personal right to an education upon the vagaries of their
parents' conduct, an intolerable practice .... 1)213
The claim that adverse and harmful school classifications deny
equal protection recognizes another interest of children: a concern
for educational choice, for securing the maximum liberty possible
within the liberty-constraining setting of a compulsory school system.
Children are both too unformed and too precious to be treated arbi-
trarily by the state. That claim of worth, and the family's interest in
preserving the worth of the child by securing his differentness, has
received passing judicial recognition. 14 It underlies the Court's ob-
servation in Tinker that children may not be viewed as "closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate,"21
a proposition that logically applies with even greater force to school
instruction than to political activities which happen to transpire in
the schoolhouse.
All of this may be treated as legal speculation. Yet the presumed
equality of all children ("equality of innocence," as Professor Coons
by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down
discriminatory laws relating to status of birth." Id. at 176. See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
211 In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
212 Civil No. 71-S-51 (N.D. Ind., Oct. 22, 1971). See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d
939 (7th Cir. 1972). But see Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871
(2d Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded for a determination concerning mootness, 409 U.S.
75 (1972).
213 Civil No. 71-S-51, at 5. Professor Coons and his colleagues suggest that cases con-
cerning children's rights to an equal educational opportunity can be distinguished from
Prince and Ginsberg. Those cases, they argue, pit different conceptions of the child's best
interests against each other, a tension lacking in the education arena. Their argument dis-
misses as de minimis state interests (saving money, sorting children) which are indeed
antagonistic to the claims of the child. PRiVATE WALTi, supra note 165, at 422-24.
214 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
215 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
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puts it)21 provides strong basis for contesting actions which threaten
that equality by restricting the child's potential for growth.21 7
C. Applying the Constitutional Standard
All school classifications do not assume equal importance in the
life of a child. Exclusion and assignment to special education and
slow learner programs have been singled out as the most consequen-
tial sortings, those most likely to warrant judicial inquiry. There are
also important distinctions among these three classifications; the ap-
plication of a constitutional standard necessarily differs for each.
1. Exclusion
School exclusion, the most extreme classification, is also the sim-
plest to confront in legal terms. Exclusion represents the complete
denial of a service, not merely the provision of an inferior service;
no provision is by definition unequal provision. Even if education
plays only a marginal role in shaping life opportunities, denial of
education is not a trivial matter: without instruction, children are
unlikely to reinvent physics or reading. In addition, exclusion based
on a judgment of ineducability is likely to cause real and irreversible
harm to both the child's achievement and psyche. Thus courts can,
and should, hold that exclusion from school is unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection even in the absence of a showing of actual
injury. Several courts appear to have adopted this theory; 218 most
prominently, in Mills v. Board of Education, the district court ordered
that the Washington, D.C., school system readmit all previously ex-
cluded children "regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physi-
cal or emotional disability or impairment."2 19
For the excluded child, access to some form of publicly supported
education and special assistance to permit him to overcome the school-
216 PRVTE WEAT, supra note 165, at 420.
217 This focus on "children" should not obscure the fact that those injured by adverse
school classification are only a small sub-class of children. Yet an assertion of the inter-
est of a defined sub-class seems analytically indistinguishable from an assertion of the in-
terest of children as a whole; there is no apparent conflict between the interests of
children generally and those "adversely" classified, no clear benefit flowing to some chil-
dren from the sorting of others. The same factors, noted in this section, which support spe-
cial judicial solicitude for children apply to adversely classified children as well.
218 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1298-
99 (1973) (dictum) (denial of educational service); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633 (1969) (dictum) (exclusion of indigents); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155
(D. Mass. 1971) (exclusion of pregnant students); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316
(D.V.I. 1970) (exclusion of aliens).
219 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972); accord, Wolf v. Legislature, Civil No.
182,646 (Utah Dist. Ct., Jan. 8, 1969) Ereprinted in Classification Materials, supra note
75, at 171]; see Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (dictum).
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imposed handicap22° is all that he can constitutionally demand. To
insist upon more, to require that the school system make an educa-
tionally "correct" placement, calls upon the court to treat complex
judgments of educational needs as constitutional requirements, a posi-
tion that courts will justifiably be reluctant to adopt.2 21 Yet the two
district courts which have confronted the issue of exclusion based
on asserted ineducability have, in defining remedy, spoken in terms
of individual needs and appropriate placement, leaving those matters
in the hands of a court-appointed master or school officials 2 2 As a
discretionary exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction, that approach
seems clearly warranted. It assures that the educational opportunity
that is in fact offered is not meaningless and unusable; it tailors the
remedy to fit the constitutionally cognizable harm. As the Supreme
Court has often noted, a court of equity has vast powers in framing
its decree to "go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equi-
table jurisdiction and decide whatever other issues and give whatever
other relief may be necessary under the circumstances."' ' 3
2. Within-School Classifications
Challenges to within-school classifications pose more difficult con-
stitutional problems. They demand that a court weigh the quite dif-
ferent benefits and costs associated with varied educational approaches,
a task usually-and quite properly-left to educators. The difficulty
is compounded because the balancing process is riddled with ambi-
guity. If, for example, few students return from special to regular
classes, does the explanation lie with the structure of the educational
offering or the capacities of the child? As the court of appeals' de-
cision in Hobson notes: "In some cases statistics are ineluctably am-
biguous in their import-the fact that only a small percentage of
pupils are reassigned [from slow to faster programs] may indicate
220 Cf. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). In that case the court of appeaft ordered the previously
segregated school district to provide remedial educational assistance in order to overcome
past inadequacies in the education of those children who had attended all-Negro schools.
Id. at 891-92, 900.
2 21 Cf. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd imem. sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). In rejecting an educational "needs" standard,
the three-judge district court noted that: "[T]here are no 'discoverable and manageable
standards' by which a court can determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when
it is violated." 293 F. Supp. at 335. See also Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572
(W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mnem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
222Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (consent or-
der).
223 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
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either general adequacy of initial assignments or inadequacy of re-
view. '224 How does a court, confronted with two equally plausible
hypotheses which existing evidence can neither affirm nor reject, re-
solve that ambiguity?
One easy but unsatisfactory solution to such dilemmas is to treat
all within-school sorting decisions similarly, as matters of educational
discretion beyond the ambit of judicial review. That approach ignores
distinctions between the benefits and harms associated with special
education placement, on the one hand, and track assignment on the
other; these are differences of degree, to be sure, but differences upon
which constitutional distinctions can logically rest.
a. Special Education
Special education placement is clearly the more onerous of the
two classifications. Even the euphemistic "special" conveys a judg-
ment of abnormality, which all the well-intentioned efforts to label
the handicapped as well as the gifted as "exceptional children" cannot
undo. Sarason has observed that "[i]n the school culture special
education ... has been treated in much the same way that the race
problem was treated by the larger society,' 225 explaining that "these
classes tend to be viewed as alien bodies in the school culture, with
the result that children in these classes ... feel different and apart
from the school. ' 226 Students with mild disabilities-physical, mental,
or emotional-are carefully removed from their "normal" peers to
isolated classrooms or different school buildings. They are not rou-
tinely considered as candidates for readmission into the mainstream
of the educational program. In large city school systems, fewer than
one of every ten students assigned to special programs ever returns
to regular classes2 27 Special education assignment thus embodies a
judgment of consequential differentness which carries "a potential to
injure through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons by implying
popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeserving-
ness.) 228 Furthermore, such programs typically present only scaled-
down educational offerings, presuming that children placed in them
224 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1969), aff'g en banc Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
225 Sarason has noted that "[in the school culture special education ...has been
treated in much the same way that the race problem was treated by the larger society,"
explaining that "these classes tend to be viewed as alien bodies in the school culture, with
the result that children in these classes ... feel different and apart from the school" S.
SAnAsoN, THE CULTUrE oF THE SCHOOL AD THE PROBLEM OF CHAGE 156 n.2 (1971).
226 Id.
227 Gallagher, supra note 36.
228 Michelman, supra note 83, at 20.
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can never hope to be more than marginal members of the society."'
And, too often, that presumption becomes fact.
The perceptible harms--stigmatization, lessened educational offer-
ings and reduced life chances-wrought by special education place-
ment for the mildly handicapped presumptively deny those individuals
equal educational opportunity. For that reason, it seems appropriate to
alter the normal allocation of procedural burdens. In a suit challenging
the constitutionality of special class treatment, once evidence of harm
has been introduced, school officials should be required to show that the
special education program accomplishes what it is supposed to do:
that it sufficiently benefits students to justify the inevitable stigma
that attaches to such placement.
That standard of "demonstrable benefit" has been applied in
challenges to involuntary confinement in institutions for the retarded.
The district court in Wyatt v. Stickney declared that institutionalized
retardates "have a constitutional right to receive such individual ha-
bilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a
more useful and meaningful life and to return to society.' ' 2n ° Although
229 Feuerstein, supra note 111.
This Article does not treat in detail the recently advanced claims that schools have
a constitutional obligation to create additional classifications for certain classes of children.
Two quite different groups have recently pressed such an argument: non-English speaking
children, asserting that they have a constitutional entitlement to bilingual instruction, see
Lau v. Nichols, 472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973); Morales v. Shannon, No. DR-70-
CA-14 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 13, 1973); Aspira of New York v. Board of Educ., No. 724002
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 23, 1973) (denying defendants' motion for summary dismissal); Serna
v. Portales Mun. School Dist., 351 F. Supp. 1279 (1972); and children with particular
handicapping conditions, asserting that they are entitled to educational programs which
attend to that condition, see Tidewater Soc'y for Autistic Children v. Tidewater Bd. of
Educ., No. 426-72-N (ED. Va., Dec. 26, 1972). The claims made in these cases may be
couched in terms of "equal access." Both the non-English speaking and the handicapped
argue that for the state to provide the same education to all is not to provide "equal"
education. As the Aspira court characterizes plaintiffs' complaint:
'nondiscriminatory,' compulsory public education in the English language is a
fraud and an affliction, at war with federal law and the Constitution, for people
who speak only Spanish and are not taught the language of instruction.
Yet these demands resemble earlier arguments, rejected in McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.
Supp. 327 (N.D. Ili. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969),
that the state must satisfy the varying "educational needs" of its children.
The dissent in Lau sought not to make "needs" an absolute requirement but to
balance this "needs" concept against the state's resource constraints: "once the state
chooses to put itself in the business of educating children, it must give each child the
best education its resources and priorities allow." That rejoinder raised another problem
for the Lau majority: should the court attempt to define "the best education"? The court's
response was conclusory, not analytical:
[Tihe determination of what special educational differences faced by some stu-
dents within a State or School District will be afforded corrective action, and the
intensity of the means undertaken, is a complex decision, calling for significant
amounts of executive and legislative expertise and non-judicial value judgments.
2380 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (emphasis added). See 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971). Other opinions in the same case are reported at 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972); 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For discussions of these cases,
see Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYR. L. REv. 995 (1972); Murdock, supra note 73, at 152-54. See
generally Symposium, The Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYR. L. Rav. 991-1165
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Judge Johnson found a constitutional right to habilitation in a due
process context,2 1 the analogy between special education assignment
and involuntary confinement suggests the appropriateness of applying
the Wyatt demonstrable benefit standard within the school.s 2 If bene-
fit cannot be demonstrated, either for particular students or for all
those placed in classes for the mildly retarded or handicapped, it
makes constitutional (and pedagogical) sense to reassign those stu-
dents to regular classes, providing them with supplementary instruc-
tion to help recapture lost educational ground. The standard seems
both manageable and just. 3 In defining justification in terms of
efficacy, it avoids the Scylla of "compelling interest" and the Charyb-
dis of "rational basis," imposing a burden more aptly tailored to
the problem. The standard also encourages more frequent evaluation
of each student's progress, thus assuring that special classes are not
transformed into a "penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely
for no convicted offense." 234 The demonstrated ineffectiveness of
special education programs for the mildly handicapped indicates that
few will survive if obliged to prove their mettle.
235
(1972). Cf. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
In Affleck, the court found unconstitutional the state's failure to provide some rehabili-
tative programs-including educational programs-to its juvenile inmates. The court noted:
"[t]here is a bitterly cruel irony in removing a boy from his parents because he is truant
from school, and then confining him . . . where he gets no education." Id. at 1369. See
also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Bazelon, Im-
plementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI L. REv. 742 (1969).
231 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971); cf. Jackson v. In-
diana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). See gen-
erally Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, United Nations Resolu-
tion 2856 [XXVI] (1971): "2. The mentally retarded person has a right to . . . such
education, training, rehabilitation, and guidance as.will enable him to develop his ability
and maximum potential."
2 32 In Wyatt, patients were confined involuntarily in the absence of criminal safeguards
and denied medical treatment. In the absence of medical treatment, the court declared,
the patient is deprived of liberty without either procedural protections or an adequate
substitute. In the school situation, by contrast, all children must undergo some restraints
on their liberty. If educational benefits may be similarly viewed as protection, those chil-
dren provided with only diminished educational offerings are denied due process insofar
as the alternative protection is inadequate and are denied equal protection insofar as they
are treated inequitably (regardless of whether the benefits received are sufficient to satisfy
a due process standard).
Under a different theory both Wyatt and the school classification case can be fit
within an equal protection framework. The involuntarily confined patients (or special
students) are a class singled out for adverse treatment; the state's interest is in protect-
ing the health and welfare of the affected class. Consequently, if the state does not pro-
vide the compensatory treatment which was the justification for the classification, its ac-
tion is irrational.
233 In this context, the argument that courts lack competence to judge such benefits
seems singularly weak. If courts can review the administration of mental hospitals-or,
for that matter, oversee the management of bankrupt corporations under statutory au-
thority-they can distinguish between plausible and implausible educational justifications.
Indeed, in other school contexts, they have demonstrated their willingness to do just
that. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
234 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concurring opinion).
23 5 See text accompanying notes 105-12 supra.
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b. Ability Grouping
Special education represents within-school sorting at its most con-
sequential. Such placement implies that, while an individual is not
ineducable, his potential is markedly more limited than the majority
of his peers. Of course, any grouping scheme is designed to produce
judgments of differentness; but the significance of the judgment-
defined both by the school and the child-varies with the classification.
If, to borrow from Dante, exclusion places a child in the ninth
circle of hell, assignment to a lower track leaves him at hell's gates;
there remains the possibility of reprieve. That difference in consequen-
tiality, phrased with unavoidable looseness, should result in a different
application of the constitutional standard as courts reviewing chal-
lenges to ability grouping balance individual and institutional needs.
Proof that tracking is harmful in fact should be requisite to a success-
ful constitutional challenge. And rigorous proof of injury is difficult
to come by.
Distinguishing between special education placement and routine
track assignment emphasizes differences both in the nature of the
school's decision and in the consequences of judicial inquiry. A chal-
lenge to programs for the educable mentally retarded or mildly emo-
tionally disturbed, on the grounds that they both stigmatize individuals
and reduce life chances without providing offsetting benefits, has a
relatively modest and accomplishable goal: the effective integration
of those students into the general life of the school.n2 6 Tracking, on
the other hand, lies at the heart of the educational enterprise; the
differentiation that it promotes is less easily distinguishable from any
school-created distinctions."s For that reason, a general objection to
tracking readily converts into an attack on any educational practice
which rewards some students-either in school terms, such as high
grades, or in life-success terms, such as college entrance2ss
It might be asked whether such an institutional attack is neces-
sarily a bad thing. If none of the sorting that schools engage in ap-
2 3 6 See K BEERYR, MODELS FOR MAISTREMIr G (1971) ; NEW DIRECTIONS 3n SPECIAL
EDUCATiON (R. Jones ed. 1970).
237 The factors listed at text accompanying notes 225-29 supra apply less easily and
less forcefully to tracking than to exclusion and to special education placement.
288 Cf. Raab, Quotas By Any Other Name, Com=NTARY, Jan. 1972, at 41, 44
("[Piroposals [to abolish grouping] are frustrated reactions to the fact that white school
children are informally but effectively ascribed a superior status. But surely the remedy
is to remove that ascription by affirmative action as swiftly as possible, not to move from
ascribed inequality to ascribed equality."). Yet if the empirical evidence is to be credited,
it is just such "affirmative action" that tracking cannot accomplish.
Christopher Jencks, reviewing the tracking literature, concludes that excluding some
students from the college curriculum "is mainly a matter of bureaucratic convenience and
'maintaining standards."' He would "let students place themselves." JFNCxs, INEQUALITY,
supra note 14, at 36.
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
pears to benefit students-except, as one commentary observes, "to
build (inflate?) the egos of the high groups" 9-- why not discard it?
Such a question frames the point too broadly, confusing what educa-
tors might well do with what courts can legitimately do in order to
secure equal protection of the laws. Phrasing a question as one of
educational policy does not, of course, render the courts impotent to
act.240 Yet the very facts which render research concerning the efficacy
of tracking so unsatisfying-tracking's near-universality, its links with
other school differentiations, its varied connotations--counsel for judi-
cial restraint rather than potentially disruptive action.
The difficulty of framing a remedy reveals yet another reason
for judicial restraint. A court order abolishing tracking does not auto-
matically result in an end to sorting, which is a central and perhaps
inevitable function of the school. Used with care, differentiation per-
mits the teacher to cope with the particular problems of an individual
student at a particular point in time. Used mechanically, as it too
often is, an initial and imperfect description of student ability may
become a self-fulfilling predictor of student achievement or failure.
While flexible sorting is easily praised and rigid grouping readily
damned, it is difficult to conceive of a court order which is clear and
specific enough to be effective but does not itself fall prey to inflexi-
bility. In fact, it is not clear precisely what a court order would
accomplish, or, to put the point differently, how the schools would
accommodate their need to classify with any court-imposed constraints.
Indeed, there may be no way to evaluate any given accommodation
except in terms of compliance with the particular court order, a
circular and unsatisfactory exercise.
The example of Washington, D.C., is instructive here. Hobson v.
Hansen,241 which declared that tracking as practiced in the District
of Columbia must "simply be abolished," has had no impact. School
officials-relying on the court of appeals decision in Hobson, which
limited the applicability of the district court order to the existing
tracking system while permitting "full scope for . ..ability group-
ing"2 -- retained the full panoply of student differentiation, while
simply changing labels.
A challenge to tracking on grounds that it impairs equality of
educational opportunity may well be, in reality, a disguised demand
239 FmhWEY & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 40.
2 4 0 But see Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (separate
opinion of Burger, J.) ; Note Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind
School Board, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1525 (1968).
241 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
2 4 2 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
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that schools eliminate disparities between student outcomes. The dif-
ficulty with that demand is simply that it is unaccomplishable through
any educationally sound and administratively feasible remedies pres-
ently available.243 Since individuals' capabilities clearly differ, it would
be a cruel hoax, a "deceit of equality,"2 44 to premise a challenge to
tracking on the argument that tracking caused school failure, implic-
itly promising that the educational differences would vanish if tracking
were done away with. Given the uncertainty concerning the causal
connections between slower learner track assignment and any educa-
tional effects, one can urge the researchers to explore their hypotheses
further and encourage school systems to question the premises of their
classifications, while staying judicial intervention which would abolish
tracking as a denial of equal educational opportunity. 45
D. Equal Educational Opportunity and the Mechanisms
of School Sorting
That tracking should not be judicially "abolished" unless harm
can be empirically demonstrated does not imply that all issues linked
with ability grouping should be skirted by the courts. Even if the
assumptions underlying tracking prove correct-or, more likely, un-
verifiable-sorting mechanisms may be defective, and consequently
risk mistreatment of students. Identifying the nature of the risk, and
the possibility of harm, requires an examination of the devices-tests,
grades, teacher recommendations-employed to facilitate sorting.
School systems employ a host of factors in determining how to
sort students. Past performance in school, student willingness to adapt
to the particular classroom regime laid down by the teacher, parental
intervention-all play some part in determining whether a given stu-
dent is assigned to a regular or slow class for the coming year. 40
Nor is sorting a once a year exercise; it is imbedded in the daily
life of the school. Teachers evaluate students constantly, distributing
praise and criticism in classroom comments, remarks on written work,
and gossip in teachers' lounges. For students, the stress on evaluation
243 The school official may take his defense from the hoary contract law doctrine of
impossibility of performance.
2 4 4 M . YoUNG, THE RISE OF MERITOCRACY 49 (1961).
245 However, since the evidence is-and is likely to remain-ambiguous, the society
'(may not wish to pay for more evidence on this point, but may prefer to decide on
the basis of its own value system to what extent it regards tracking as acceptable." Mos-
teller & Moynihan, A Pathbreaking Report, in MosTmIXR & MoYNIMN, supra note 14,
at 3, 54.
246 One anguished parent reported to me that students whose siblings have been
assigned to special classes are routinely assigned to the same classes. Such a practice is
obviously illegitimate; one hopes that relatively few school systems continue to believe
in the Kallikaks and Jukes myth of family stupidity, as developed in H. GODDAmD, T=E
KALLIxAx FmImy: A STUDY IN THE HEREDITY OF FEEBLEMERDEDNESS (1912).
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creates what Jules Henry has called "the essential nightmare," em-
broiling them all in the "drive" toward success. 47 While one might
hope to improve the quality of informal evaluations, render them
more compassionate or less likely to instill anxiety, there exist no
readily available ways of doing so.
248
Yet schools do use more objective measures of ability, intelligence
tests, which carry great weight in determining the child's educational
future. In many school systems, aptitude tests form the primary basis
for sorting decisions. Students who score below 75 are assigned to
classes for the educable mentally retarded; students who score be-
tween 75 and 90 are placed in slow learners groups; and so on. 249
These tests are at least nominally objective, and do not directly
depend on such concededly irrelevant factors as teacher prejudice
and social class.250 They are also decent predictors of subsequent
school success,25' better able to estimate performance than school
grades or teacher recommendations or parental pressure. Aptitude tests
do measure with considerable accuracy the adaptability of a given
student to the school's expectations
52
Aptitude tests and the uses to which they are put have been
sharply criticized for a number of reasons. (1) Their questions are
ambiguous, a trap for the overly thoughtful who rightly recognize
247 J. Etroy, supra note 53 (emphasis in original).
248 Professor Rist discusses the ways in which students are regularly sorted within
the classroom. Student Social Class and Teacher Expectation: The Self-fulfilling Prophecy
in Ghetto Education, 40 HAsv. E'uc. R v. 411 (1970).
24 9 The following table, taken from A. BAUM mJSTER, M NTAL RETARDATION 10 (1967),
describes a system of classifying retardedness according to scores on two generally accepted
IQ tests:
I.Q. Range
Level of Retardation Stanford-Binet Test Wechsler Test
Borderline 68-83 70-84
Mild 52-67 55-69
Moderate 36-51 40-54
Severe 20-35 25-39
Profound below 20 below 25
250 Cf. M. YouNG, supra note 244, at 73: "Teachers unconsciously favored children
from their own class; old-fashioned exams were kinder to the more cultured homes. In-
telligence tests, less biased, were the very instrument of social justice. .. ."
251 See Anastasi, Some Implications of Cultural Factors for Test Construction, in
TESTING PROBLEMS i PEsPEeTvE 453, 456 (A. Anastasi ed. 1966). The predictive valid-
ity of aptitude tests is far from perfect. "[Tjhe correlation between elementary school
test scores and eventual educational attainment [years of schooling completed] seems to
have hovered just under 0.60 for some decades." JENCeS, INEQUArITY, supra note 14, at
144.
252 Aptitude tests have greater "predictive validity" than do employment tests gen-
erally, cf., e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), tests which some school
systems have employed to determine teacher competency, cf., e.g., Baker v. Columbus
Mun. Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972), or administrative ability,
cf., e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
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that more than one answer may be correct. 53 (2) They treat intelli-
gence (or, more accurately, school intelligence) in aggregate terms,
failing to recognize that a given student is likely to be competent at
some things but not at others, and that combining those strengths
and weaknesses into a single score necessarily misdescribes and over-
simplifies the notion of intelligence 5 4  (3) They fail to measure
"adaptive behavior," the capacity to survive in society, and place
too high a premium on school intelligence 55 (4) The tests do not
indicate why a given student did poorly in a particular subject. That
a child scored in the fortieth percentile in mathematics aptitude, for
example, does not tell the teacher what he did not understand or why
he did not understand it. It provides no basis for educational inter-
vention to improve performance. (5) So-called intelligence tests treat
a highly mutable phenomenon-aptitude-as a given with which the
school can work. They identify intelligence as static and not dynamic,
and fail to account for the "uneven growth patterns of individual
children. 250
Those who design aptitude tests rightly argue that many of these
criticisms are properly directed not at the tests but at those who use
them. Aptitude tests need not be employed in punitive, prophesy-
confirming ways; test results can be of some use in developing appro-
priate educational strategies. Yet too often, the tests are misused: a
single score becomes the basis for student assignment in a particular
track from which there is no escape until the next test is administered.
That use of tests seems as inappropriate for placing students as it is
for placing teachers or would-be principals or other workers. 57 The
schools' apparent incapacity to test students accurately makes test
administration appear even more dubious.258
2 53 B. HoFE-AN, TE TYRANNY oi TESTING (1962). That criticism says interesting
things about the school performance which they predict. While the ample criticism of
Hoffman in the psychometric literature suggests his position is too narrow, misuse of tests
in schools may create undesirable effects. See Dunnette, Critics of Psychological Tests:
Basic Assumptions: How Good?, 1 PsYcHroLoGY IN T ScrrooLs 63 (1964).
254 Lesser, Fifer & Clark, Mental Abilities of Children from Different Social Class
and Cultural Groups, 30 MONOGRAPH OF = SocmTY FOSR RESEARcH IN CHILD DEVELOP-
11ENT #4 (1965); Stodolsky & Lesser, supra note 58.
255 Heber, A Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation, Am.
J. MENT. DEFICIENCY (Monograph Supp. 1961).
2 5
6 J. FRANSETB & R. KouRY, SuRvEY oF REsEARcH3 oN GROUP ING As RELATED TO
PuPiL LEARNIG 36 (U.S. Office of Educ., DHEW, 1966).
2 57 
See note 202 supra. See also I. BERG, EDUCATION AND JOBS: THE GREAT TRAINInG
ROBBERY (1970).
258 In Hobson, school psychologists examined 1272 students assigned to the "special
education" or "basic" track; almost two-thirds of them had been improperly classified
by the school system. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
See also Garrison & Hamill, supra note 66, at 48 (25-68% of those assigned to EMR
classes in Philadelphia should be in regular classes.). All of the suits challenging classifica-
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When aptitude results are the basis upon which disproportionate
numbers of non-white and non-English-speaking children are assigned
to slower learner groups and educable mentally retarded classes, the
criticisms acquire particular force. Tests are condemned as "culturally
biased," confirming white middle-classness rather than measuring in-
tellectual potential, "something in black and white to justify a prej-
udice."2 9 They assertedly function not as predictors of ability but as
"'built-in headwinds' for minority groups, 2610 asking for definitions
of words as exotic as belfry, shilling, and mosaic. The manner in
which aptitude tests are administered-in the highly structured school
setting, rather than in a more relaxed environment-may also impair
the performance of minority children.6 1
The deficiencies of such tests were the basis on which Judge
Wright overturned Washington, D.C.'s tracking system. Judge Wright
focused his inquiry on aptitude testing, viewing it as "a most impor-
tant consideration in making track assignments. 126 1 His conclusion
that "standardized aptitude tests ... produce inaccurate and mislead-
ing test scores when given to lower class and Negro students,
' 263
coupled with the school system's failure to advance any more cul-
turally "neutral" sorting alternatives, led him to strike down the
existing tracking scheme.
For the advocate bent on undoing school classifications, an at-
tack on testing holds considerable appeal. If it can be shown that
aptitude tests do not measure aptitude, the argument for sorting based
primarily on the results of such tests collapses like a house of cards.
tion practices have alleged marked discrepancies between the school's tests results and
scores attained on independently administered tests.
259 Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment
and Education, 68 CoLurm. L. Rav. 691, 735 (1968); cf. Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judi-
dal Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, supra note 240, at 1521. While tests
identify acculturation, not "innate ability," Mercer, I.Q.: The Lethal Label, 6 PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 44, school curricula are geared to the very same factors.
2 60 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ; cf. Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test for voter registration suspended under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970), because of discriminatory
effect on Negroes).
261 See, e.g., Labov, The Logic of Non-Standard English, in LANGUAGE AND PovERTY
193 (F. Williams ed. 1971); Cole & Bruner, Cultural Differences and Inferences About
Psychological Processes, 26 Am. PsYcHOLOGIsT 867, 874 (1971): "[Culturally deprived
black children, tested appropriately for optimum performance, have the same grammatical
competence as middle-class whites, though it may be expressed in different settings?' Mer-
cer argues that these practices render non-white children more vulnerable to adverse
school assignment. Mercer, Institutionalized Anglocentrism: Labeling Mental Retardates
in the Public Schools, in RACE, CHA GE AND URBAx Socran- 311, 322-23, (P. Orleans &
W. Ellis eds. 1971); Mercer, Sociocultural Factors in Labeling Mental Retardates, 48 PEA-
BODY J. EnuC. 188 (1971).
2 6 2 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 475 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
263 269 F. Supp. at 514.
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The basis for differential treatment becomes simply irrational. 6 The
difficulty with that approach rests in its failure to distinguish care-
ful from careless test use. Tests do indicate something about a stu-
dent's capacity to perform. They do not reveal, but merely remind,
that non-middle-class and minority children fare badly in schools as
they presently are organized.
To abolish the tests, while ignoring the fact that different students
(and different classes of students) perform differently, is about as
sensible as the ancient Greek practice of slaying the messenger who
brings bad news. In that light, it is sobering but instructive to recog-
nize that minority children do poorly even on so-called culture free
tests, which supposedly do not reward middle-classness. 65
When they are abused, however, testing processes are properly
amenable to judicial scrutiny. The practice of administering tests in
English to students whose native language is Spanish, and using the
results as a measure of ability, is simply indefensible; the scores of
those students are, at best, only a proxy for acculturation into the
dominant culture.266 Further, to the extent that test scores serve as
the primary basis for student assignment-ignoring a host of factors,
cultural and psychological, that could influence test performance; sum-
ming verbal and reading and numerical ability into a single "intel-
ligence score"; failing to take into account adaptive behavior-their
use becomes more suspect.
The importance that attaches to a single test also has legal rele-
vance. While achievement tests, which purport to measure subject
matter competence and not "ability," are appropriately employed to
group children in a particular subject for a limited time, the use of
aptitude tests to track students for a period of years, prohibiting
either cross-tracking (which recognizes the differential abilities of any
264 Adniinstrative relief for test misuse is also conceivable. Since title V of the Na-
tional Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 481 et seq. (1970), pays for about 35% of
secondary school aptitude testing, D. GosLYN, Tzm SEARan ioR AAu.xn 71-72 (1963),
the federal government could require school districts to validate the tests they use for
their particular school population, or cut off subsidies under title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970).
265 See, e.g., Rosenblum, Keller & Papania, Davis-Eells ("Culture-Fair") Test Per-
formance of Lower-Class Retarded Children, 19 J. CONSVLTiNo PsvycHooov 51 (1955);
Angelino & Shedd, An Initial Report of a Validation Study of the Davis-Eells Tests of
General Intelligence or Problem Solving Ability, 40 J. PsycHonoGY 35 (1955); Altus,
Some Correlates of the Davis-Eels Tests, 20 J. CoNsULrmG PSYCHOLOGY 227 (1956); S.
SARASON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MENT . DmcsNc zsc 482-87 (1959).
Similarly, when psychologists have looked at different students' performance on a
question-by-question basis, they have found that poor and non-white children do no
better on "culture-free" questions. See, e.g., Chase & Pugh, Social Class and Performance
on an Intelligence Test, 8 J. EDUC. TMEASURE'ENT 197 (1971); Lesser, Fifer & Clark,
supra note 254.
266 See, e.g., Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., No. C-70-37 (NJD. Cal. 1970); Guadalupe
Organization v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civil No. 71-435 (D. Ariz., filed
Aug. 9, 1971) (settled by consent decree Jan. 24, 1972).
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given student) or limiting egress from slow tracks when educational
intervention succeeds, should raise considerable judicial suspicion.267
Flexibility, test reliance, the utilization of tests as means to iden-
tify particular learning difficulties: these represent matters of careful
and complex judgment. For a court to insist upon them requires the
elaboration of distinctions between appropriate and dangerous testing
practices, avoiding the easier but inappropriate judicial alternatives
of abolishing testing or treating testing questions as unmanageable.
As long as some sorting is to be tolerated (and sorting is likely to
persist, no matter what courts or, for that matter, school administra-
tors, say and do) judgments about ability will necessarily be difficult
to defend with precision. Nevertheless, since classification decisions do
affect a student's educational career, a demonstration that the aptitude
tests which are employed can accurately predict school performance
for different types of students is an appropriate legal burden for the
school to bear.20 8
III. SCHOOL CLASsIFICATION, RACIAL OVERREPEESENTATION,
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
[C]ause for concern is found not in some repugnant discrim-
ination which may accompany a deprivation, but in the severe
deprivation itself; and this is true even though such depriva-
tions may take the form of, or be known through the obser-
vation of, particular kinds of "extreme inequalities.126 9
A. The Incidence and Consequences of Minority
Overrepresentation
Few schools sort students explicitly on the basis of race. Classi-
fication in large systems is routinely handled by a school official who
knows nothing about a given student except his academic record.
When counselors discuss appropriate track placement with their stu-
dents, their recommendations are not prompted by racial considera-
tions, but are premised on estimates of student ability and school
267Cf. A.H. PAssow et al., TowARB CREATING A MODEL URBAN ScaxooL SYs= 17
(1967) [hereinafter cited as A.H. PAssow), noting that, in Washington, "the tracking sys-
tem was as often observed in the breach as it was in adherence to any set of basic tenets."
268 Cf. Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing) (tests for promotion of police officers).
A sorting device would be invalid to the extent that it does not measure aptitude for
a group of students, or is misused in creating classes not based on aptitude; in both
cases the basis for separation is simply irrational. But a test need not be uniformly accu-
rate to satisfy equal protection requirements. "That the test might not be an educationally
valid one for a few individual children does not, and of itself, give rise to a constitutional
deprivation." Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 444 (5th
Cir. 1973). Erroneous, individual determinations, however, should be subject to due
process review, see text accompanying notes 332-410 infra.
269 Michelman, supra note 83, at 8.
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needs. The grounds on which school administrators defend sorting-
its alleged benefits to both students and teachers-reveal no apparent
racial motivation. And while prevailing sorting practices are widely
and vigorously criticized, it is usually their inefficacy and not their
racial effect that is noted.
Yet school sorting does in fact have significant racial consequences.
It isolates--or, more accurately, tends to concentrate-minority chil-
dren in certain less advanced school programs. While racial dispro-
portionality does not characterize programs for students with readily
identifiable handicaps 27 -- classes for the trainable mentally retarded
or the blind, for example-the proportion of minority students in
school classifications whose efficacy has been questioned-assignment
to special programs for the educable mentally retarded;2 7 ' placement
in slow learners' classes272 and non-academic high school programs
27 -
2 7 0 n California, for example, 9.3% of the students are black; 13.1% of the physi-
cally handicapped and 12.45o of the trainable mentally retarded are black. Sixteen percent
of the students are of Spanish surname; 14.6%o of the physically handicapped and 19.2%o
of the trainable mentally retarded are of Spanish surname. CAnrnourA STATE DEP'T OF
EDUC., RACIAL AND ETmic DISTRIBUTION or Puris iN CALIOiRNIA Puarac SCHooLs,
FAiL 1971, app., table 1 (1972).
2 71 In California, for example, 26.7% of the EMR students are black; blacks con-
stitute 9.3% of the student population. For students with Spanish surnames, the dis-
proportionality is slightly less dramatic; 23.9% of EMR students, and 16.0% of all
students, are of Spanish surname. A 1971 California statute asserts "that there should not
be disproportionate enrollment of any socioeconomic, minority, or ethnic group pupils in
classes for the mentally retarded.. . ." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.06 (West Supp. 1972).
In New York State, "segregated" school districts enroll 33.6%o of black students in
special classes, slightly more than their proportion of the school age population. In "de-
segregated" districts, however, 47.8% of the special education students are black, although
blacks account for only 22.5% of the school age population. COST or EDUCATION, supra
note 30, at 9.27-9.29.
Plaintiffs in Guadalupe Organization v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civ.
No. 71-435 (D. Ariz., filed Aug. 9, 1971) (settled by consent decree Jan. 24, 1972), al-
leged that, while 17.78% of the District's schoolchildren are Mexican-American, 67.59%o
of the children assigned to EMR classes and 46.34% of the children assigned to classes
for the trainable mentally retarded are Mexican-American.
See also J. JAsTAx, H. McPHE & M. W=TEAN, MENTAL RETARDATioN: ITS NA-
TuRE AND IwCmENcE (1963); Mullen & Nee, Distribution of Mental Retardation in an
Urban School Population, 56 Am. J. M NT. DEFIcIENCY 777 (1952).
2 7 2 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nori.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). FNDLEY & BRYAN, supra note 20;
Jones, Erickson & Crowell, Increasing the Gap Between Whites and Blacks: Tracking
as a Contributory Source, 4 Enuc. & URBAN Soc. 339 (1972). A study by the U.S.
Department of Labor found that, proportionally, whites are twice as likely as blacks
to be in the college preparatory track.
On the relationship of social class and income to tracking, see P. SExToNT, EDUCAiON
AND INconrE (1961).
273 [Within schools of similar racial compositions the program of study in
which a student is enrolled has a strong influence on the chance that he will
be in a majority white class. . . . [SItudents in the college preparatory
curriculum ... are most likely to be in classes which are more than half white
students. Those in vocational, commercial, or industrial arts programs are least
likely to have mostly white classmates.
McPartland, supra note 13, at 96.
See also McPartland, The Relative Influence of School and of Classroom Desegrega-
tion on the Academic Achievement of Ninth Grade Negro Students, 3. Socsmr IssuEs, Sum-
mer, 1969, at 93 [hereinafter cited as School and Classroom Desegregation]. In Boston,
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is typically two or three times greater than their proportion of the
school-age population. Substantial minority overrepresentation in these
programs is universally found, no matter who undertakes the inquiry:
education researchers, litigants objecting to particular classification
practices, even state departments of education. These findings indicate
that ability grouping functions as a means of making respectable the
procedures whereby pupils from lower socioeconomic and racial or
ethnic minority groups are relegated to a basically inferior education.
Observers of racially mixed schools frequently find that ability group-
ing is a means by which pupils are resegregated within the school 2 4- -
a sharp contrast to the historical assertion that "[sorting] is not a
social segregation. It is not a caste stratification.
275
The limited available evidence suggests that overrepresentation
in these less advanced programs may be particularly hurtful to minor-
ity students. Although few studies have examined the racially specific
harm of sorting,2 76 one reanalysis of Equality of Educational Oppor-
tunity did attempt to assess the impact of within-school segregation
on the verbal achievement of black students. It concluded that while
school integration does not benefit blacks, classroom integration does
improve black students' test scores. "[C]lassroom desegregation has
an apparent beneficial effect on Negro student verbal achievement no
matter what the racial enrollment of the school. ' 277 Since proportion-
ately more whites than blacks are assigned to higher tracks, advanced
track placement does influence student success. But "the differences in
verbal achievement between Negro students in mostly white classes
and those in mostly Negro classes cannot simply be explained by
selection processes which operate within the school. ' 2 7  Classroom
only 23% of the students in the elite Boston Latin School are black, while 23% of that
city's school population is black. Putting the child in its place, supra note 26. A suit in
San Francisco sought in part to challenge minority underrepresentation in that city's elite
high school. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. C-71-1875 (N.D. Cal.,
July 8, 1972) (defendant's motion for summary judgment granted) (motion for appeal
filed Jan. 15, 1973).
2 74 See A.H. PAssow, supra note 267.
275 H. RYAN & P. CREcELiuS, ABILITY GROUPING IN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS 1 (1927).
276The special education and ability grouping research discussed in Section II was
carried out either in white or racially unspecified communities, and thus is of limited rele-
vance. Since Equality of Educational Opportunity provides student performance informa-
tion for only one point in time, it is difficult to mine that richest of education data sources
for evidence of the consequences of reassigning students from one group to another. Cf.,
e.g., Smith, supra 117, at 239, 313-15 (The Report does not tell scholars and policymakers
"what will happen if they change the status quo." (emphasis in original)).
277 School and Classroom Desegregation, supra note 273, at 102.
278 Id. Tracking decisions also appear to have more significant effects for blacks than
whites. While half of all white children assigned to a college track actually enter college,
only a third of whites in non-college tracks continue their education beyond high school.
For blacks, the likelihood of college attendance is diminished even further by assignment
to a non-college track. JEVNCS, INQUAr.rTrY, supra note 14, at 156-58 (1972).
762 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:705
segregation itself causes harm, for black students in fast as well as
slow classes; classroom desegregation has racially specific benefits.
The United States Civil Rights Commission's reexamination of
the Coleman data noted a subtler (and difficult to document) effect
of within-school segregation: black students in nominally integrated
schools, "accorded separate treatment, with others of their race, in
a way which is obvious to them as they travel through their classes,
felt inferior and stigmatized. 2 79 The harm caused by between-school
segregation appeared to the Commission far less substantial than the
harm caused by within-school segregation: while between-school seg-
regation resulted from the relatively impersonal criterion of neigh-
borhood residence, within-school segregation was clearly caused by
personal and pejorative judgments of ability.
Aptitude tests, the most frequently used facilitators of school
sorting, also have harsher school impact on minority students than
on whites. While psychologists define learning deficiency in terms of
below-normal intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior (ability
to cope in social situations), the classification approach employed in
most schools considers only the first of these two criteria.28° One study
found that, for white children, intelligence and adaptive behavior
deficiencies coincided; however, 60 percent of all Mexican-American,
and 91 percent of all black children whose intelligence rendered them
vulnerable to the retarded label did demonstrate normal adaptive
ability.28 1 If they overcome the stigma of retardation, after school
graduation these "quasi-retarded" minority children lead lives similar
in important respects to their normal brethren. They are labeled
retarded, and treated accordingly, only while in school.
282
B. Overrepresentation and the Constitution: Defining the State's
Responsibility
School sorting has two racially specific consequences: first, minor-
ity children are disproportionately assigned to less advanced school
programs; second-and less clearly established-racial disproportion-
ality has a particularly damaging impact on the attitudes and verbal
achievement of minority students. The constitutional implications of
these conclusions are not, however, self-evident.
Racial classifications typically run afoul of the Constitution if they
279 2 U.S. Coie'N ON CIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION N TE PuBLIc SCHOOLS 86-87
(1967).
280 Heber, supra note 255.
281 Mercer, Sociocultural Factors supra note 36.
282 Id. See also R. EDGERTON, supra note 139.
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result either from explicit legislative mandate283 (as in the school
desegregation cases)2"" or from the discriminatory application of an
apparently neutral legislative scheme.28 5 The efforts of formerly dual
school systems to couple desegregation with the adoption of an ability
grouping scheme embody the latter form of discrimination. In those
instances, the motivation for initiating tracking is quite probably
racial.288 The fact that segregated schools have typically provided
black students with fewer school resources than their white classmates
suggests that such discrimination would be likely to recur in an ability-
grouped school. Since grouping inhibits school desegregation, it violates
those districts' obligation to desegregate "at once. 287 That segregated
school districts historically offered an inferior education to black
students does not justify maintaining such status differentials through
the device of tracking. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has refused to consider
plans which incorporate ability grouping, at least until southern dis-
tricts have functioned for several years as unitary systems, free from
the taint of racial discrimination.2 8
In most school systems, however, the overrepresentation of min-
ority students in less advanced school programs stems neither from
statutory command nor from discriminatory practice. It is, rather,
an unintended consequence of a policy whose premises are meritocratic,
not racial; the disproportionality is inadvertent. 89 Such unintended
disproportionalities have not been recognized by the courts as neces-
283 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
284 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
285 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 386 (1886). Cases concerning jury discrimination,
see, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), and municipal services discrimination,
see, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en bane 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972), have focused on discriminatory application of ostensibly neu-
tral policies.
288For two views of the importance of "motive" analysis in constitutional adjudica-
tion, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. RaV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YArLa L.J. 1205 (1970).
28 7 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
28 8
1n Johnson v. Jackson Parish School Bd., 423 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1970), the
school board "desegregated" its schools, while maintaining complete classroom segrega-
tion. Other tracking plans were rejected in Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d
1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Marvell School Dist. No. 22, 425 F.2d 211 (8th Cir.
1970); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1969), connected cases vacated & rev'd, 396 U.S. 226 (1969), 396 U.S. 290 (1970),
cert. denied in connected cases, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970); Moses v. Washington Parish School
Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971). For a quite different approach, see Punke, Com-
petence as a Basis of Student Assignment, 32 ALA. LAW. 24 (1971).
289 The possibility that tracking might produce such segregation apparently did not
concern those who argued Brown. As Thurgood Marshall said: "I have no objection to
academic segregation, only racial segregation. If they want to put all the dumb ones,
white and black, into the same school that is fine, provided they put all the smart ones,
white and black, into the same school." J. PELTAsox, FU'TY-EiGHT LONELY MEN 112
(1961).
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sarily stating a valid cause of action under the equal protection clause.
In Jefferson v. Hackney,9 0 the Supreme Court was confronted with
the contention that Texas' welfare policy was constitutionally suspect
because it provided a less adequate subsidy for the Aid for Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, whose beneficiaries were primarily black,
than for welfare programs whose recipients were primarily white. The
contention was characterized, and dismissed, as a "naked statistical
argument.;
2 9 1
In many instances, such curt treatment of claims premised solely
on disproportionate racial impact seems proper. Except for those
rare governmental actions which treat all persons uniformly, every
statute classifies on some basis. And in all save the statistically freakish
instance, an inadvertent consequence of that classification will be
racial: for example, government-subsidized research on the causes of
sickle cell anemia is of primary concern to blacks; in a residentially
segregated city, some municipal bus routes will attract more black
passengers while others carry mostly whites. Surely such effects do not
call for the "compelling" state justification demanded where racial
discrimination can be proved.
Yet in considering the racial consequences of school sorting, the
Jefferson standard is inappropriate for several reasons. Regardless of
the presence or absence of racial motivation, the disproportionate
impact of school sorting links race with education. Courts have long
recognized the harm done by state-mandated school segregation. Stu-
dent classification does pose legal questions different from the run of
desegregation cases. What differentiates school sorting is not the fact
of harm-indeed, the evidence that within-school desegregation is edu-
cationally damaging is, if anything, stronger than the "inherent" or
empirically demonstrated harm upon which Brown rests-but the na-
ture of the state's responsibility in the two cases. Yet judicial inquiry
involves more than blame-attaching; it also attends to the fact of harm.
The expansive view of state responsibility for school segregation
adopted by several northern federal courts may be premised on just
such considerations. Those courts have looked at the racial conse-
quences of ostensibly neutral policies-school boundary-setting, con-
struction, teacher assignment and the like-and have been willing to
infer state action from a finding of racially isolating effect.29 2 They
suggest that a school district may be held to answer for the foreseeable
290 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
291 Id. at 548. See also Copeland v. School Bd., 464 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1972), which
rejects the contention that racial disproportionality in special schools for the retarded is
on its face unconstitutional.
292 Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971);
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consequences of its actions (and even its failure to act) *293 What makes
these decisions defensible is not the legal legerdemain which converts
inaction into action, color blindness into culpability, but the fact that
segregation, whatever its source, may inflict real and perceived injury.
The educational harm caused by disproportionate placement of
minority students in the least advanced of educational programs is in
part racially specific. That proportionately more blacks than whites
populate the lower tracks and special education classes has more than
statistical significance. If the reanalyses of the Equality of Educa-
tional Opportunity data and the evaluations of aptitude test impact
are to be credited, such assignments affect blacks more harshly than
they do whites; the injury has racial connotations. That fact distin-
guishes school sorting from such governmental actions as the Texas
welfare policy affirmed in Jefferson which, while hurting more blacks
than whites, hurts the individual black no more than his white
counterpart. 294
The argument that minorities deserve special judicial solicitude
because of their vulnerability to majoritarian abuse,29 5 so frequently
advanced in cases involving racial discrimination, assumes particular
force in the context of school classifications. Track assignment (unlike,
for example, welfare roll-trimming) is not a general, public decision
around which the far from voiceless black political leadership can
coalesce. 96 It is, in form if not in fact, not a political issue at all
but an individual judgment of intellectual worth which the black
parent feels particularly powerless to challenge. As the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor noted:
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brad-
ley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).
293 When the power to act is available, failure to take the necessary steps so as
to negate or alleviate a situation which is harmful is as wrong as is the taking
of affirmative steps to advance that situation. Sins of omission can be as serious
as sins of commission.
Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971). For a general discussion of these cases, see
Dimond, supra note 3.
294The racially specific effect argument is generally discussed in Goodman, supra
note 88, 298-320.
295 The source of this argument remains United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938):
[Pjrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
That the claims of minorities do not always entitle them to such protection is made
clear in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971), where the Supreme Court char-
acterized black voters' claims of election district discrimination as embodying the dis-
appointment of political losers, not warranting judicial intervention.
290 For a discussion of such organizational efforts, see Kirp, Has Organizing Survived
the 1960's?, SocrA. PoLicY, Nov./Dec. 1972, Jan./Feb. 1973, at 44.
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Parents, according to printed policy, have always had the
right to protest the placement of their children .... Relatively
few did, or do, however. Most parents of poverty area [and
black] pupils would feel themselves incapable of arguing the
point, even if they are aware of it.
297
These factors-that racially disproportionate sorting practices
do plausible educational harm and affect a vulnerable minority-
suggest that judicial attention is properly directed to the phenomenon.
Once significant racial disproportionality has been shown, a school
district should be obliged to demonstrate that its classifications serve
substantial independent educational purposes.
Taken together, however, these arguments for judicial involvement
do not stress discrimination against minority students, as compared
with their white counterparts, but rather speak to the deprivation at-
tributable to racial overrepresentation. 29 This focus on deprivation,
not discrimination, has several noteworthy implications. It shifts the
analysis from blame-fixing to problem-solving, and thus is less attentive
to the causes of injury. It renders of limited utility the prima facie
case approach,'99 which fastens on evidence of disproportionate racial
impact (with respect to the provision of municipal services, for exam-
ple °°) as presumptively demonstrating racial discrimination, substitut-
ing an inquiry into the consequences of a school policy which isolates
minority students in particular school programs. 0' And it implies that
providing identical schooling experiences for minority and white chil-
2 9 7 TsK FORCE ON JUvENHE DErIQUENcY AwD YoUTH CaRl, THE PRESIDFNT'S
CoMmussioN ON LAW ENFORCEMNT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: JuvENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH Cm 241 (1967). Challenges to the testing
practices on which assignment to slow track or EMR classes are premised identify the po-
tential for abuse, however inadvertent the cause. In every suit challenging such placements,
individual retesting of adversely classified children revealed substantial underestimation
of minority students' ability. In Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
for example, each of the plaintiff children who had been assigned to an EMR class scored
significantly above the 75 IQ cutoff point when retested.
Since classification policies are made by the schools, school officials are in far better
position than parents to explain those policies; that fact also justifies imposing the ex-
planatory burden on the school.
298 The distinction is made by Professor Michelman in discussing revenue-expenditure
practices and their impact on the poor, unable by virtue of their poverty "to protect
against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society!' Michelman, supra note
83, at 9. Michehman does not discuss racial questions, many of which are doubtless best un-
derstood in discrimination terms. See, e.g., Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820,
824-26 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
299 This approach is described in Fessler & Haar, supra note 128; Dimond, supra
note 3, at 4-11. For a treatment of the racial overrepresentation question in terms of
the prima facie analysis, see Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in the Public Schools, 24
HASTINGS L. J.-(forthcoming: Apr., 1973).
oo See cases cited note 285 supra.
301 This approach qualifies the often-quoted assertion that "figures speak, and when
they do, Courts listen." Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1966). If figures-in this
case, racial disproportionality data-do "speak," they do so with real ambiguity, resolv-
able only by looking behind the figures to an understanding of their social effects.
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dren might be constitutionally appropriate only if such evenhandedness
promises to overcome the deprivation upon which the judicial inquiry
is premised. Analysis couched in deprivation terms is, in short, neces-
sarily more fully attentive than traditional approaches to the problem
posed by racial overrepresentation in a given school program.
Allegations of disproportionate racial impact in education and
employment, couched in deprivation terms, have prompted several
courts to shift the burden of demonstrating the efficacy of the classify-
ing device to those responsible for implementing it.80 2 However, the
analyses set forth in these cases are of limited utility because the
courts, while tacitly accepting the deprivation theory for the purpose
of shifting the burden of proof, continue to stress discrimination and
the traditional equal protection analysis when determining what show-
ing that burden requires.
To Judge J. Skelly Wright, for example, "the fact that those who
are being consigned to the lower tracks are the poor and the Negroes"
was a "precipitating cause" of the Hobson v. Hansen inquiry into the
workings of the Washington, D.C., track system.803 Although the Dis-
trict of Columbia had initiated tracking shortly after it was ordered to
dismantle its dual school system, Hobson did not treat the grouping
scheme as racially motivated. Yet lack of evil motive did not exonerate
the school system. As the court declared, "the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."304 That black
children were most likely to be placed in the slowest programs revealed
to the court "unmistakable signs of invidious discrimination" which
demanded explanation." 5
While racial overrepresentation provides adequate grounds for
judicial scrutiny of school policy, the particular burden imposed in
Hobson seems inappropriate.
Since by definition the basis of the track system is to
classify students according to their ability to learn, the only
explanation defendants can legitimately give for the pattern
of classification found in the District schools is that it does
reflect students' abilities. If the discriminations being made
are founded on anything other than that, then the whole pre-
302 See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (employment) ; Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Larry P. v. Riles,
343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (education); cf. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Test-
ing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1665 (1969).
3o3 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967).
304 Id. at 497.
305Id. at 513.
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mise of tracking collapses and with it any justification for
relegating certain students to curricula designed for those of
limited abilities. 0 6
The critical word here is "ability." If the court is referring to present
level of proficiency, then reliance on aptitude tests to classify students
might well be rational. Hobson, however, equates ability with "innate
capacity to learn," and correctly concludes that aptitude tests do not
reveal such inherited traits.0 7 But few school officials would ever claim
to base sorting decisions on grounds of innate capacity. The premise
of tracking (and classification generally) is that, whatever the source
of the differences, students with particular and varied learning styles
and abilities require the special assistance that only a differentiated
curriculum can offer. That premise does not countenance "discrimina-
tion," except in the non-pejorative (and non-legal) use of that word.
Whether or not classification does serve those varied needs, or indeed
has any educational consequences, is the crucial question for one con-
cerned with school-caused deprivation. But the Hobson court's analytic
missteps-equating ability with innate characteristics, and stressing
discrimination rather than deprivation-prevented it from confronting
the question. The remedy which followed from the court's analysis-
the abolition of tracking-was quite possibly unresponsive to the
problem at hand.
A similar analytic pattern-using deprivation analysis to shift
the burden of proof, but relying on disguised discrimination analysis
to define that burden-has been applied in an employment exam-
ination case. In Chance v. Board of Examiners, a suit challenging com-
petitive examinations for school supervisory positions on the ground
that the tests had "significant and substantial" differential racial im-
pact, the court of appeals found that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion had been established. 08 The court struggled to define the nature
of the discrimination, characterizing it as invidious but de facto, re-
jecting the argument that such conduct should be treated in the same
manner as intentional discrimination. Nonetheless, the court upheld
the claim of minority applicants, concluding that New York City had
failed to demonstrate that the supervisory exams were rationally related
to job performance.
The silliness of the particular test-which asked, among other
306 Id.
307 Id. at 514.
308 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1175-76 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Arm-
stead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
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things, who killed Cock Robin and which character in the Mikado
sang I've Got a Little List-left it vulnerable to ridicule 09 Yet the
"heavy burden of proof" imposed by the court indicates that more
than a rational defense was in fact demanded. °10 The competitive
examination might well have been defended as more objective, and
more likely to predict job performance, than other alternatives. Such
a showing would not have satisfied the court, which concluded that the
benefits to the school system of such examinations did not outweigh
the harm done to minority job applicants, whose job qualifications the
test could not effectively assess3 11 The constitutional standard explicitly
adopted in Castro v. Beecher812-- "[T]he public employer must ...
demonstrate that the means [of applicant selection] is in fact substan-
tially related to job performance"81 3-- seems at once more fitting, and
a more candid statement of the burden of proof actually applied in
Chance.14
In Larry P. v. Riles, 15 a suit challenging San Francisco's special
education assignment policy as racially biased, the district court asked
only that school personnel provide a "rational" defense of their clas-
sification procedure. But in Larry P., as in Chance, the inquiry was far
more exacting than that typically associated with the requirement of
mere rationality. The court asserted that intelligence tests were the
primary criterion for placement in classes for the educable mentally
retarded, dismissing evidence that those examinations were but one of
several bases on which placement decisions were made.
More significantly, the court rejected school officials' remarkably
candid statement that "the tests, although racially biased, are rationally
related to the purpose for which they are used because they are the
best means of classification currently available." 1' While "the best...
available" seems readily equatable with rational practice, the court
809 The test is exhaustively evaluated in the district court opinion, 330 F. Supp. 203,
220-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
310458 F.2d 1167, 1177 (2d Cir. 1972).
811 The court did not determine whether a "compelling interest test" was applicable.
Such a test would have required a showing that less discriminatory means were not avail-
able, even if the examination were found to be job-related. The court indicated, how-
ever, that the application of such a strict test to a case such as this, in which the discrimi-
nation was unintentional, would have gone beyond present Supreme Court precedent. Id.
312459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
313 Id. at 732.
314 Cf. Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1115
(5th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted): "When a test has a valid function [in distinguishing
among the quality of faculty applicants] and is fairly applied to all teachers, it out-
weighs the fact that it may result in excluding proportionally more blacks than whites."
See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 459 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1972).
315 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
316Id. at 1313.
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redescribed the issue, in effect penalizing the school authorities for their
candor. "[T]he absence of any rational means of identifying children
in need of such treatment can hardly render acceptable an otherwise
concededly irrational means, such as the IQ test as it is presently
administered to black students. ' ' 317
The fact that other bases for grouping students-such as achieve-
ment tests, teacher recommendations, and psychological evaluations-
exist does not, as the court implied, automatically render the measures
employed in San Francisco irrational. None of these alternatives is self-
evidently preferable to intelligence testing. The standard of review
adopted in Chance and Larry P. is both different from and more de-
manding than the courts' focus on rational school behavior indicates.31 8
Both decisions in fact call for a demonstration that the classifying
device used has real benefits-that it can predict job competence or
student performance-which justify its continued use.
Applying this standard to the racially disproportionate classifica-
tions themselves, the burden appropriately placed upon the school is
to show that its classifications actually serve a "substantial educational
purpose"-that they provide real benefits for the affected students.
C. Applying the "Substantial Educational Purposes" Standard
1. The School's Burden of Proof
Requiring school officials to demonstrate the benefits associated
with particular classifications that have racially specific adverse affects
poses many of the same judicial dilemmas that a non-racial challenge
to tracking might create. While the situations can be distinguished-an
added element of harm has been introduced in the racial case; the
inquiry is relatively more bounded, less readily converted into a chal-
lenge to all school differentiations-the problems noted in Section II,
notably those of proof and of remedy, persist.
School officials will have a difficult time establishing that place-
ment in a slow track or special class for the mildly retarded or disturbed
does in fact make good its promise of improving school performance.
Existing evidence simply does not support the proposition.3 9 Thus, the
"benefit" that the present system provides is more candidly described
in terms of teachers' (and school bureaucrats') needs. While the needs
of schoolmen assuredly must be kept in mind if a court decision is to
317 Id.
818 The courts' approach in these cases resembles the "means scrutiny" formulation of
equal protection in Gunther, supra note 87. The school or employer's behavior would not
be rational merely because there were no better methods available; rather, the means
would have to be justified by showing "an affirmative relation between means and ends."
This would be, "to a large extent ... an empirical inquiry." Id. 47.
319 See notes 59-65 supra & accompanying text.
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be implemented in fact, one can readily imagine educationally promis-
ing reform-less restrictive alternatives, if you will-which would not
produce either new crises in the classroom or administrative chaos.
School officials might construct a quite different argument, one
which sought to prove that blacks are genetically inferior to whites,
thus justifying minority overrepresentation in slow classes. Hobson's
analysis of "legitimate" classifying criteria clearly contemplates such
a justification.2 0 For political reasons, such an argument will rarely
if ever be voiced in a courtroom. The more interesting question, how-
ever, is not whether the position is actually advanced but whether it
is correct.
The scanty evidence that exists does not support the proposition
of genetic racial inferiority. The heredity-environment relationship
remains an unfathomable chicken-egg puzzle, even after the furore
created by inquiries into the influence of heredity on tested measures
of aptitude.321 How the influence of each factor is felt, the nature of
the interaction between them; these questions simply lack answers.
The evidence that does exist-concerning IQ differences between
identical twins reared apart, for instance--can be read in a host of
ways.3 22 Heritability estimates "tell us almost nothing about differences
between specific individuals, almost nothing about differences between
social groups, and rather little about populations.3 23 For those reasons,
it is impossible to know what to make of the consistently reported
finding that the average white child scores about 15 points higher on
standardized tests than the average black child.32V 4
[The research] difficulties derive from the fact that an
individual's genes can and do influence his environment. In a
certain sense, both sides [those who favor genetic explana-
tions of I.Q. disparities and those who favor environmental
explanations] agree that genes account for the difference be-
tween black and white test scores; they simply disagree about
the extent to which environment is also involved. One side
argues that the genes that cause dark skin thereby influence
320 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967) aff'd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
321 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 70; Shockley, Dysgenics, Geneticity, Raceology: A
Challenge to the Intellectual Responsibility of Educators, 53 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 297
(1972); Shockley, A Debate Challenge: Geneticity is 80% for White Identical Twins;
I.Q.'s, 53 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 415 (1972). But cf. Hunt, Has Compensatory Education
Failed? Has It Been Attempted?, 39 HARv. EDUc. REv. 278 (1969); Cronbach, Heredity,
Environment, and Educational Policy, 39 HAv. EDuc. REv. 338 (1969); Stinchombe,
Environment: The Cumulation of Effects Is Yet to be Understood, 39 HAnv. EDUC. REV.
511 (1969).
322 Cohen, supra note 179, at 52-53.
323 JENCXS, INmQ ALiTY, supra note 14, at 68-69.
3 2 4 1d. 142.
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opportunities and incentives to learn. The other side argues
that the genes that cause dark skin... influence how much
an individual learns from his environment. There is no way
to resolve such disagreement in the foreseeable future.3 25
That recital of unknowns suggests that only a court seeking confirma-
tion of previously held biases could, on the basis of existing knowledge,
endorse the heredity-inferiority approach.
3 26
And even if the genetic inferiority of non-whites were accepted by
a court, it does not necessarily follow that the isolation of these students
is an efficacious means of minimizing inherited handicaps. In focusing
on deprivation, not discrimination, blaming becomes irrelevant. We
care less about why something happens than about what can be done
to diminish the resulting injury. Similarly, while black children may
grow up in an environment less conducive to schooling success than
their white counterparts, that fact surely does not argue for the wisdom
of assigning minority students to school programs that only reinforce
racial stereotyping, while not providing offsetting benefit32 7
In sum, the "substantial educational purposes" test imposes a
heavy burden on school officials, who are obliged to show that slow
learner and special classes can overcome those existing educational
deprivations that correlate with the racial grouping. Unless such
benefit can be established, significant racial overrepresentation should
be constitutionally indefensible.
2. The Problem of Remedy
But what can be done to remedy the deprivation? The seeming
intractability of what economists term the "education production func-
825 d. 82-83.
326 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga.
1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964), a school desegrega-
tion suit, turns directly on the issue of heredity and intelligence. The district court,
accepting the conclusion that "the differences in educability between Negro and white
children were inherent," id. at 672, ordered a tracking plan "based on racial traits directly
concerned with proficiency and mental health." Id. at 681. While recognizing that some
blacks might be capable of doing advanced work, the court insisted upon total racial
segregation, arguing that selective integration would cause even greater psychological harm
than would total integration, for blacks as a group would be deprived of their most
promising members. Id. at 684. When that decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit,
the district court then ordered the adoption of a tracking scheme under which a student's
class assignment would be based solely on tested ability. 255 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1966),
rev'd, 387 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1967). The court of appeals again reversed:
The order of the trial court directing the Board of Education to assign its pupils
according to intelligence tests was beyond the power of the court. No person has
the constitutional right to attend schools in classes which are divided according
to ability or intelligence quotients.
387 F.2d at 491.
827 Quite different questions are raised by racial isolation sought by the minority
community, and accompanied both by minority control over school governance and by
educational programs tailored to the needs of that community. See, e.g., Kirp, Community
Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MIcrH. L. REv. 1355 (1970).
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tion"--how to manipulate school resources in a manner which affects
student performance--differentiates education from most state-sup-
ported activities. Where, for example, discrimination in the provision
of municipal services or representation on jury rolls has been proved,
the problem in effect defines its own remedy: equalize services, assure
minority representation on juries. But no such straightforward rela-
tionship between problem and resolution exists for school sorting. It is,
in other words, easier to identify the problem than the remedy.
That fact argues against the adoption of a remedial approach
which limits the school systems' options by seizing upon a single
solution as necessarily appropriate. A racial quota system for school
classifications or court-ordered abolition of sorting are equally mis-
guided remedies, albeit for different reasons.
In Larry P., plaintiffs proposed a racial quota standard, "whereby
the percentage of black students in EMR classes could exceed the per-
centage of black students in the school district as a whole by no more
than fifteen per cent. ' 828 That approach is undesirable, 329 for it em-
braces and sustains existing classifications whose pedagogical benefits
are at best dubious. To the arbitrariness of existing sorting practice it
adds another level of arbitrariness, responding not to educational
differences but to statistical nicety.so
To require wholesale randomization of classes seems equally un-
wise. In a given sixth grade class, the most advanced may be reading
at a ninth grade level, the slowest at a third grade pace; a uniform
curriculum could not hope to confront such variation. It is tempting,
but incorrect, to jump from the assertion that existing classifications
mislabel and miseducate students to the remedy of doing away with
all efforts to identify and intelligently address differences among stu-
dents.
Judicial insistence on a modification of existing classifications,
which seeks both to reduce racial overrepresentation in less advanced
groups and to secure greater flexibility in grouping, represents a far
328 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
329 Under such a standard, whether a school policy was constitutionally permissible
would turn in part on whether significant numbers of white children opted out of the
public school system.
830 In Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal.
1971), the court in its final order enjoined the district from: "Authorizing, permitting
or using tracking systems or other educational techniques or innovations without effective
provisions to avoid segregation.' A racial quota system would presumably be permissible,
since it would not "defeat the objectives of integration." Id. at 1329-26.
Notwithstanding that judicial imposition of such statistical remedies would be un-
wise, a court might well be obliged to accept such solutions if proposed by the school.
Removal of the racial disproportion, even though accomplished by arbitrary means,
alleviates the constitutional infirmities discussed at text accompanying notes 292-307 supra,
although it raises questions similar to those discussed in Section II, supra.
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better approach. That standard leaves the school district free to adopt
a variety of grouping alternatives taking account of varied student
needs, while not locking students into a tracked strait jacket. Given
the existing uncertainty concerning the causes and cures of this par-
ticular deprivation, the command of reconsideration and flexibility
has considerable virtue.
In rethinking and reconstructing its classification system, the
school district should focus on three variables, linking remedial efforts
in all three areas to develop a more rational and constitutionally
justifiable system. First, gross extremes of racial separation should
be reduced. Outside of the classroom, in those aspects of school life
that are more social than academic (for example, assemblies, athletic
events, lunch periods), efforts should be made to promote social mixing.
The second variable is the need for flexibility in the tracking
scheme itself. Classification decisions should be based on criteria
broader than the usual standardized tests; adaptive behavior, for
example, should be taken into account. Placement of students should
be reviewed frequently, to allow greater mobility. Cross-track integra-
tion in those areas that the tests do not measure-music, art, physical
education-will increase this flexibility. In the higher grades, testing
and tracking by subject, rather than by general ability, will render
the structure more rational, while increasing the possibilities of in-class
mixing. Larger school systems might consider adopting "stratified
heterogeneous grouping," which reduces ability disparities within any
given classroom, or team teaching with flexible grouping. 3'
Assuming that some classes will remain predominantly segregated,
attention should be focussed on relieving educational deprivation
within the minority-dominated tracks. The most obvious step would
be to increase the per student allocation of educational resources in
the lower tracks. But the educational benefits of such action remain
unclear. Alleviation of racially (or culturally) specific deprivation may
require something beyond "more resources"-the need may be for
different resources. Culturally sensitive pedagogical techniques, analog-
ous to the creation of Spanish-language classes for Mexican-Americans,
may be employed. The use of pedagogical methods geared to the
differences in minority learning patterns and cultural background, if
combined with efforts to increase integration and create a more flexible
system, should satisfy the "valid educational purposes" test.
"Modification" is a vague remedial standard, until given substance
by a school district plan. It would not necessarily eliminate all instances
S31 FiNDLEY & BRYAN, supra note 20, at 84-87, describes these and other alternative
schemes.
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of racial disproportionality; indeed, it would not be designed to do so.
While a modification approach encourages a school system to adopt a
sorting scheme which fixes less pronounced labels on students, it does
not pretend to remove all stigma. Yet modification of school classifica-
tions, if undertaken with an eye to integrating minorities into the life
of the school, might well benefit both the school and the minority stu-
dent upon whom the preponderant burden of adverse classification
presently falls, thus responding to the problems associated with racial
overrepresentation.
IV. CLASSIFICATION AND DUE PROCESS
[S]ubstantive rights are involved when the legality of gov-
ernment action is tested. It would be difficult indeed to deter-
mine whether a set of procedures fulfills the requirements of
due process without answering the questions: What rights are
placed in jeopardy here? How much protection do they need
or merit? ...
... Any procedure... may affect the allocation of sub-
stantive rights, but some procedures determine the rights
themselves. At that point, the relation between substantive
and procedural aspects of due process becomes intimate
indeed.3
A. The Constitutional Command of Fairness
The due process clause of the Constitution, which declares that
"no state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," states a command to the government:
act fairly. There is no attempt in the language of the clause to define
what fairness means in particular situations. As the Supreme Court
has observed:
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries
are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual contexts .... Whether the Constitution requires that
a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon
a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right in-
volved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden
on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken
into account.sa
The openendedness of the due process requirement, while contemplat-
ing the exercise of discretionary justice tailored to individual circum-
332p. SKZcK, LAw, SOcImTY, AND INDUSTIAL JUSTICE 256 (1969).
833 Hannah v. Larche, 363 US. 420, 442 (1969). The elusiveness of the due process
requirement has often been noted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 426 (1969) (quoting Hannah); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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stances, does not countenance arbitrariness. 834 It elevates the idea of
rational governmental behavior to the status of a constitutional require-
ment, imposing rational form (if not rationality) on governmental
action.33 5
That some procedural safeguards should attach to the provision
of public education is by now well-settled law."' While much of the
case law concerns school discipline, several recent decisions have
required that students be afforded procedural protection prior to such
basic changes in their status as assignment to slow learner groups or
special education programs, or school exclusion. 3 7 The appropriateness
of applying such safeguards is premised on factors discussed earlier in
this Article: the educational effect of these decisions, 38 the possibility
of arbitrary decisionmaking and consequent misjudgment, and the
stigma that these adverse classifications convey.m 9 The nexus between
educational injury and arbitrariness on the one hand, and loss of
liberty or property on the other, is both straightforward and constitu-
tionally familiar. The link between stigmatization and the necessity
of procedural protection is less obvious, and for that reason requires
some amplification.
The law seeks to regulate stigmatizing conduct in a variety of
ways. The law of defamation, for example, punishes statements which
injure reputation. It defines those injuries, as stigma has been defined
here, in relational terms. 40 "What is the reason why saying a man
884 See, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d
Cir. 1968) ("It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled
discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a vast program
... would be an intolerable invitation to abuse."). See generally K. DAvis, DIscIomnAY
JusTicE (1969).
835 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-08 (1959); cf. Cafeteria Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866, 894-99 (1969).
838 See, e.g., Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Banks v. Board of Pub. Instr.,
314 F. Supp. 285 (D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (1971).
The Supreme Court's willingness to expand the constitutional rights of nonadults is
apparent in the landmark cases of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (free speech) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile
court procedure).
Non-education cases upholding the right of prior review include Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
887 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (consent de-
cree) ; Stewart v. Phillips, Civ. No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1971) (order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss complaint which sought, in part, prior hearing for children classified as
retarded); Marlega v. School Bd. of Directors, CA. No. 70-C-8 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (tempo-
rary restraining order). But cf. Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
888 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 95, 105-09 supra.
8 89 See text accompanying notes 124-51 supra.
8 40 See Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936). The concept of "in-
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has the leprosy or plague is actionable? It is because the having of
either cuts a man off from society ... ",,4 1 Defamation actions serve
two quite different social purposes. They provide the aggrieved individ-
ual both an opportunity for monetary recoupment for the injury to
reputation and a public forum to test the justness of the stigma. Defama-
tion law does not, however, reach discretionary governmental action.
That exemption, couched in terms of judicial or legislative privilege,
presumably leaves government free to conduct its business in more
intrepid fashion. 42
Yet courts do examine governmentally imposed stigmas. Review
of stigma creation is but a different way of describing the familiar
process of judicial scrutiny of those classifications which are asserted
to violate equal protection guarantees. 43 Review of stigma imposition
describes judicial inquiry into the process by which a particular label
(which may or may not be otherwise constitutionally offensive) came
to be applied to a particular individual. The theory underlying insis-
tence upon appropriate procedural protection before the government
imposes stigma, or otherwise deprives a person of liberty or property,
is relatively straightforward: the process is designed to guard against
thoughtless or arbitrary governmental action.ll Two recent Supreme
Court decisions-Wisconsin v. Constantineau 45 and Board of Regents
v. Roth346-make explicit the tie between governmental stigma and
the due process requirement.
Acting pursuant to Wisconsin law, which permits designated offi-
cials to forbid the sale of liquor to one who "by excessive drinking"
poses a problem for family or community, 47 the Hartford, Wisconsin
police chief sent a notice to all local retail liquor stores, forbidding them
to sell or give liquor to Norma Grace Constantineau. The Wisconsin
statute provided for no hearing prior to the officially imposed prohibi-
jury to reputation" has been broadly viewed, to include, for example, imputations of in-
sanity, Kenney v. Hatfield, 351 Mich. 498, 88 N.W.2d 53 (1958), and poverty, Katapodis
v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38 N.E.2d 112 (1941).
8 4 1 Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wilson 403, 404, 95 Eng. Rep. 886, 887 (K.B. 1769). For a
good review of the sociology of deviance and stigmatization, which treats the issue in
relational terms, see D. MATZA, BEcoxMo DEVIAT (1969).
842 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971).
343 In this light, it is instructive to recall that Brown strikes down state-imposed
segregation in part because segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may
affect [children's] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954).
344See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1939); Holmes v. New York City
Housing Auth. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
345 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
840408 U.S. 564 (1972).
34 7 Law of Feb. 2, 1934, ch. 13, § 176.26, [1933-34 Spec. Sess.] Wis. Laws 39 (re-
pealed 1972) (last codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.26 (1969)).
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tion, and none was held; that fact, the Court concluded, rendered the
statute constitutionally defective.
Constantineau does not question the right of states to protect
themselves against public drunkenness. It concludes instead that such
a label is a "badge of infamy" which the state may not attach without
first providing an opportunity for challenge. "Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential .
48
Two aspects of this brief opinion bear mention. First, it is govern-
ment action (in the Court's colloquial phrase, "what the government
is doing to him") that brings into play the due process requirement.
Second, Constantineau reflects the importance that courts have tradi-
tionally attached to procedural fairness as a necessary check on gov-
ernmental power. "It is significant that most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much
of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat." 49
The Roth decision, while rejecting the contention that a non-
tenured university faculty member is routinely entitled to a hearing
before being dismissed at the end of a one-year appointment, recog-
nized that in certain circumstances the injury caused by contract
nonrenewal warrants procedural protection.
The State... did not make any charge against him that
might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract
on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dis-
honesty, or immorality....
[T]here is no suggestion that the State . .. imposed on
him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities 50
The circumstances most clearly envisioned by the Roth dicta empha-
size moral accusations; the "disabilities" the Court mentions seem
centered on absolute bars to future state employment. Yet, if the label
"alcoholic," or dismissal clouded by allegations of dishonesty, stig-
matize, the argument for treating similarly the adverse school classi-
fications which have equally devastating social and economic effects
assumes considerable force.
To the child and his family, the fact that certain decisions pre-
viously left to the discretion of the school are subject to review and
348 400 U.S. at 437.
8 49 Id. at 436.
350.-408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (emphasis added).
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challenge should matter considerably. Proceduralization makes the
school's decision appear more fair-if only because the bases of the
decision are shared and not secretsslmand minimizes the possibility
that school discretion will be abused. As Professor O'Neil notes:
Fair procedures ... are essential because ... few men are
angels. Even the few government administrators who have
achieved this state of grace occasionally make mistakes. The
average bureaucrat strays more often.8
52
And proceduralization increases the likelihood of educationally sound
decisions, for the exercise of review forces school officials regularly
to reexamine both the premises and conclusions of sorting. In that
sense, due process functions as a truth-seeking device, the legal analog
of the scientific method.
53
In this setting, the real significance of due process lies not in
the recognition that school sorting is too consequential to be under-
taken arbitrarily, but in the scope of procedural protection that courts
conclude is appropriate. The mere existence of something called a
hearing says nothing about the rules governing the inquiry, or the
likelihood that a particular showing will yield a given outcome-and
those issues frame the real points of contention. 54 To wax rhapsodic
about due process without providing either context or content for the
concept risks elevating principled means above just ends. 55
In determining precisely what due process should mean in this
particular context, courts are obliged to balance the needs and inter-
ests of several concerned parties. This balancing exercise is a familiar
one to courts, and distinguishes the request for procedural protection
851 See, e.g., Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAav. L. Rav. 1406
(1957); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. RaV. 1027 (1969).
852R. O'NmL, supra note 129, at 301.
853 See Foster, Social Work, the Law and Social Action, 45 Socrs= CAsEwoRX 383, 386
(1964). O'Neill, Justice Delayed and Justice Denied, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 184-95,
identifies as interests and values served by the due process bearing: (i) accuracy and fair-
ness, (ii) accountability, (iii) visibility and impartiality, (iv) consistency, and (v) ad-
ministrative integrity. O'Neill notes several governmental interests-(i) collegiality and
and informality, (ii) flexibility in the dispensation of benefits, (iii) agency initiative, (iv)
discretion and confidentiality, (v) minimization of expense-each of which is at least
potentially impaired by the insistence on procedural formality.
354 Cf. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PROCEEDooS orH AnmacA
Socrmay or INTEwAT OxAL LAw 1, 5-7:
[A)djudication must take place within a framework of accepted or imposed stan-
dards of decision before the litigant's participation in the decision can be mean-
ingful. If the litigant has no idea on what basis the tribunal will decide the case,
his day in court-his opportunity to present proofs and arguments-becomes use-
less . . . .There must be an extra-legal community, existent or in process of
coming into existence, from which principles of decision may be derived.
355 See, e.g., Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARv. L. Rav. 1329, 1381 (1971): "Indeed, it is at least arguable that there is nothing
good or bad about any trial outcome as such; that the process, and not the result in any
particular case, is all-important."
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from the more novel claim that courts review such substantive educa-
tional issues as the efficacy of particular school placements. As Profes-
sor Buss observes, " [h] owever little courts may know about education
. . . they do know about factfinding, decisionmaking, fairness, and
procedure." 56 For that reason, the development of procedural safe-
guards which promote fair classification-which render stigmatization
"just," if you will-is an easier task for the judiciary to contemplate
than is the development of substantive education rights doctrines.
B. Classification and Due Process: Interest Balancing
85W
In school sorting disputes, the contending parties include the
child, his family, and the school. The interest of each differs, and
each has to be taken into account. The child's interest is at once
obvious and vital. The importance of education to his future well-
being has often been recognized by courts.3 58 Brown's panegyric to
education has been so often repeated by so many interested parties
in support of such varied arguments that its force has been blunted,
the language rendered a cliche. But this cliche, like so many others,
is rooted in an important truth. Educational performance and educa-
tional status do affect life success, even if the nature of the relation-
ship differs from the model that Brown had in mind.
The structure of the school regime exerts a profound impact on
the lives of children both for the ten or twelve years that they are
compelled to attend school, and after the child graduates; that latter
impact may without hyperbole be likened to the effect on reputation
of which the Roth opinion takes note. The child also has an interest
in avoiding the unjust imposition of stigma and (to phrase the point
in more familiar language) in liberty. School-imposed stigmas bedevil
children because children are compelled to submit to them, to surren-
der at least a decade of their lives to the state. That infringement of
liberty itself raises constitutional issues.3 59 It also distinguishes school-
imposed classifications from those created by governmental agencies
whose control over the citizenry is in some sense voluntary.
The child's interest will of course vary with the nature of the
school classification. A failing grade, a whack on the backside by an
556 Buss, supra note 5, at 571.
57 This section does not attempt an exhaustive review of existing case law concern-
ing due process standards in school discipline cases. Professor Buss' excellent article, supra
note 356, provides a thorough and analytically helpful review of those cases; I have bor-
rowed from that analysis in this far briefer discussion.
558See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Ordway v. Hargraves,
323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
359 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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irate teacher, denial of school privileges: all can be said to have ad-
verse effects. What differentiates these from the classifications that
have been discussed here is the nature and long term significance of
the effect. That school exclusion exerts a more profound influence on
the child's future than, say, a failing grade does not imply that some
procedural safeguards are not appropriate in both situations.3" It
does indicate that the nature of the safeguard should vary with the
seriousness of the stigma or deprivation of liberty that the school
has imposed.
The child's parents also have an interest in the issue, but their
concerns should be distinguished from those of the child. Even if both
share the same perception of the school's decision, its consequences
will affect them differently. This point assumes particular importance
when the school, by assigning a child to a special class or excluding
him as ineducable, has in effect identified him as less than normal.
That determination may spawn a host of parental reactions: parents
may, for example, hire outside experts to supplement the school's
program, or they may give up-on the child, and see him in the school's
terms. Their reactions may reflect grief and shame, guilt (for presumed
parental mistakes), or resentment. Parents may be unwilling to endorse
the educational program which is objectively best for the child, if the
recommended course of action appears to compound parental problems.
The distinction between parents' and children's interests must be
kept in mind when framing procedures for reviewing adverse school
classifications."6'
860In Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965), the fed-
eral district court held that a student's claim that he had been dismissed from medical
school because of an arbitrarily awarded failing grade stated a cause of action. But cf.
Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968). Where
the accumulation of "minor" punishments, none of which taken by itself demands a
formal bearing, results in drastic school action, more careful due process review may be
required. See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1972) ("It would
be an undue burden to impose on the routine administration of the [United States Mili-
tary] Academy's disciplinary system the requirements of a hearing... before an adjudi-
cation of demerits for such infractions as a dirty uniform.. . . Short of expulsion, the
procedures available to a cadet (explanation of a reported delinquency, request for re-
consideration, and appeal to superior authorities) are ample to satisfy the demands of due
process ....
The demands of due process, however, are greater when the accumulation of demerits
subjects the cadet to the severe sanction of expulsion rather than a form of milder disci-
pline . . . .)
361 See, e.g., Schild, The Family of the Retarded Child, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CHID Anm His FAwmy: A MuTD CipmraNARY EIANDBoox 431, 441 (R. Koch & J. Dobson
eds. 1971). ("The impact of retardation on the family is generally stressful and traumatic
and adds to the family's vulnerability in coping with the problem.").
See also Freedman, Helme, Havel, Eustis, Riley & Langford, Family Adjustment to
the Brain-Damaged Child, in A MODEMN INTRODUCTION To THE FAILY 555 (N. Bell &
E. Vogel eds. 1968); S. SARAsoN, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROLEzmS IN MIETAL DmaimcxNacy 331-46
(1st ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as SARASON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMs]; lano, supra
note 139; Mercer, Social System Perspective and Clinical Perspective: Frames of Reference
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The school's interests are equally legitimate, and very different.
The school has to concern itself with the aggregate welfare of all
children as well as the individual welfare of any given child. It will
resist any arrangement, such as the provision of a particular program
not previously offered, which demands additional expenditures; the
cost of that program, if not subsidized by state categorical assistance,
will be borne by the district. And those added costs will require either
additional tax dollars or trimming other parts of the budget. The
education of an autistic child, for example, costs at least $10,000-
20 times what most school districts annually spend for the average
student. 2  Yet to the autistic person, the $10,000 investment may well
enable him to break through the psychological barriers that cut him
off from the world. To choose between those two interests poses prob-
lems of exquisite difficulty, unanswerable by recourse to such formulas
as "the [school district's] interest in educating the excluded children
clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources."
363
School officials will also resist proceduralization of school sorting
decisions as a diversion from the business of education. That claim
for Understanding Career Patterns of Persons Labeled as Mentally Retarded, 13 SOCIAL
PROBLF.IS 18 (1965).
Disciplinary action also affects parents and children differently: parents may, for
example, want their children back in school at any cost, while the child may be more
interested in affirming his right to behave in a particular way.
362The example is not merely hypothetical. Janice King, one of the named plaintiffs
in Mills, is described by the court as
thirteen years old . ... She has been denied access to public schools since
reaching compulsory school attendance age, as a result of the rejection of her
application, based on the lack of an appropriate educational program. Janice
is brain-damaged and retarded, with right hemiplegia, resulting from a childhood
illness.
348 F. Supp. at 870. Michael Williams, another named plaintiff, is "epileptic and allegedly
slightly retarded," id. Steven Gaston allegedly is "slightly brain-damaged and hyper-
active," id. at 869.
3
63 Id. at 876. McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970), declares
that
if New York had determined to limit its financing of educational activities at
the elementary level to maintaining public schools and to make no grants to
further the education of children whose handicaps prevented them from par-
ticipating in classes there, we would perceive no substantial basis for a claim of
denial of equal protection.
430 F.2d at 1149.
Yudof, Equality of Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAs L. REv.
411 (1973), offers one way of balancing the individual interests of the child and
the collective best interests served by the school. If the school can provide meaningful
education to a given child, by spending on his education exactly what it spends on the
average child living in the district, then (and only then) does there exist an obligation
to provide some level of education, not necessarily limited to the average expenditure.
That approach suggests, quite rightly, that there exists no absolute right to a "needs-
satisfying" education, but it poses problems of its own. Why should the balance between
individual and collective best interests be struck at the average expenditure level, since
the school district is at present likely to be spending more than the average on at least
some students? And how is the court to determine whether provision of educational
services that the average expenditure allotment can purchase is meaningful education?
While the balancing approach is appealing, some more subtle balance will in fact have
to be struck by the courts.
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may mask the feeling that any review of school-made decisions neces-
sarily threatens the authority of administrators, making their lives
less comfortable; but comfort does not deserve to be treated as a
legitimate interest."' When an administrator has erred, there is no le-
gitimate interest in upholding his authority; when he is right, re-
view will reinforce his authority, not threaten it. The "diversion"
argument also poses more serious issues. Insistence on adequate pro-
cedural protection of students prior to consequential sorting decisions
requires effort on the part of those who make the decisions. It de-
mands time, both for framing and defending an adequate justification.
It may demand money, for if the justness of a classification turns
on the opinion of specially trained school personnel, the school's bud-
get will have to be adjusted accordingly.
There exist other and subtler costs to the school: teacher resent-
ment at being obliged to defend a judgment; unwillingness on the
part of school personnel to make any decisions concerning special
treatment for a particular child for fear of the procedural regime in-
voked by such decisions. As Professor Gellhorn notes, "[a]wareness
that someone is constantly peering over their shoulders causes some
public servants to become too timid instead of too bold."3' 5
Many of these arguments are recited whenever a student chal-
lenges a disciplinary decision of the school, in the school board
meeting room or the courtroom. In those circumstances, courts since
Dixon36 have generally concluded that serious infringements on a
child's liberty cannot be imposed unless adequate procedural protec-
tion is provided. 7 The application of such safeguards to adverse
school classifications arguably poses a different problem. It questions
a judgment couched in educational and not disciplinary terms, a de-
cision central to the school's claim of pedagogical competence. For
that reason, the school official is likely to resist terming such classi-
fications as stigmatizing. He will also object to the creation of any
process which distinguishe' the interest of the school and the child,
claiming that school classifications further both interests.
6 8
864 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
365 IV. GELLoRN, WHEN A.rmCAws COMLAIN: GovERNm NTAL GRIvANcE PRO-
CEDURES 52 (1966).
300Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
367 Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54
Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1967). See generally Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend
Toward Student Academic Freedom, 30 U. FLA. L. Rv. 290 (1968).
368 Cf. Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological
Research, 1 LAw & Soc. Rlv. 9 (1966), for a more extended and general discussion of the
"adversary" and "mutual welfare" approaches to resolving the legal claims of the poor.
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Courts, in reviewing school decisions more obviously punitive in
nature than classifications, have not been unsympathetic to these as-
sertions. Judge Cameron's dissent in Dixon notes that schools "make
many rules governing the conduct of those who attend them... based
upon practical and ethical considerations which the courts know very
little about and with which they are not equipped to deal. 36 9 The
Second Circuit's decision in Madera v. Board of Education7" denied
procedural safeguards to a suspended student compelled to attend a
"Guidance Conference." The court stressed the pedagogical purpose
of the conference---"to provide for the future education of the child"
371
-and concluded that counsel could appropriately be barred from that
stage of the process . 72 Although the conference stage was a prelimi-
nary one, and procedural safeguards were provided at later, more
consequential proceedings, the court's rationale is disturbing, given
the unhappy consequences that could flow from even this initial hear-
ing 73
The distinction between "educational" and "punitive" decisions-
which has its analog in the claim that juvenile criminal proceedings
are intended to help and not punish youngsters, and therefore should
be unfettered by procedures3& 7 -- makes little sense in either setting.
However the school chooses to describe the enterprise, its consequences
vary for the parties at interest; what is best for one may well not be
suitable for the others. And for the student, the effect of "punitive"
and "educational" decisions is similar if not identical: exclusion,
whether premised on incorrigibility or ineducability, results in abso-
lute educational deprivation; suspension or special class assignment
both diminish educational opportunities and stigmatize the affected
student.
The school may choose to ease teachers' burdens by separating
children into groups according to tested measures of ability. If the
school cannot afford the educational services that a severely retarded
369 294 F.2d 150, 160 (5th Cir. 1961).
370 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1963).
871 Id. at 788.
37 2 The relevant statute did, however, allow the parents and child to be accompanied
by "a representative from any social agency to whom the family may be known." Id. at
781.
378 The court listed 3 possible consequences of this conference: 1. reinstatement of
the child in his former school; 2. transfer to another school on the same level; and 3.
transfer to a special school for socially maladjusted children, with the parents' consent.
Id. at 782. The court minimized the existence of harm in these options; but without the
presence of counsel, the provision for parental consent could become a mere formality for
parents confronted by school officials.
374 Cf. D. MATzA, DELINQUENCY AND DarT 133-34 (1964), who puts himself in the
place of the delinquent told that the court is 'helping him" with "his underlying prob-
lems." "What on earth could they [the judge and his helpers] possibly be hiding that
would lead them to such heights of deception?"
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child requires, it may attempt to relinquish its obligation to educate
the child by labeling him ineducable. The regular classroom teacher
who cannot cope with a child who "acts out" may propose assignment
to a less advanced track or a special education program as a means
of tempering behaviorY 5 The child's needs are more simply stated:
he needs an adequate education. Confronted with the school's state-
ment that he is ineducable or less educable than his peers, the child
is at the very least entitled to an advocate who can distinguish his
needs from those of the school and a forum in which to press his
contention.70
C. The Nature of the Due Process Requirement
in School Classification Cases
Characterizing the interests of children, parents, and school of-
ficials, while essential to comprehending the nature of the potential
dispute, does not define with precision the scope of procedural pro-
tection. The mechanical transplanting of procedural protections de-
veloped in the school discipline context to issues of school classification
ignores differences between the two problems.
In the routine discipline case, the decisive issue is the truthful-
ness of the accusation: did X threaten his teacher with a knife? The
hearing effectively concludes when this determination is made. The
facts concerning the wisdom of a school classification are not so
readily established. Is Y an educable mentally retarded child? On
what basis is that judgment made? What alternative explanations can
be suggested for his behavior? The appropriate remedy may also be
more difficult to develop. If X did indeed brandish a knife, he will
be punished by being suspended from school for some period of time;
the only determination that must be made is the duration of the
suspension 77 But the fact of retardation does not warrant punish-
ment. It requires careful and intelligent educational intervention which
demonstrates some promise of benefiting the child. The range of
plausible alternatives includes institutionalization, assignment to a spe-
375 "Segregation of problem children is the prepotent response to the professional and
personal dilenmmas teachers face." S. SARASON, supra note 225, at 156.
376 Cf. Buss, supra note 5, at 611-12:
When the proceeding has the sole purpose of excluding the student from the
school, however, the plea to avoid hardening positions along adversarial lines is
singularly weak, even assuming that the exclusion is to be temporary. A student
facing expulsion will usually be sufficiently at odds with those running the
school that he will be aware of his involvement in an adversarial proceeding even
without a lawyer to convince him. Precisely because the student has everything
to lose and because these proceedings are more adversarial than is usually
admitted, little is lost by increasing the student's ability to help himself.
377 That statement, of course, does not imply that punishment of such students in
fact curbs their antisocial behavior, or otherwise "rehabilitates" them.
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cial program, or placement in a regular class coupled with the pro-
vision of additional assistance.
Where the justness of diminished educational status is at issue,
two critical questions require resolution: the accuracy of the school's
classification (is the particular assignment consistent with general
guidelines for a given placement?) and the appropriateness of the
proposed treatment (is the particular assignment likely to benefit the
child?). The first query calls both for clarity and administrative regu-
larity, obliging school personnel to specify the bases upon which they
sort children. 378 The second question demands justification, joining
substantive standards (presumptions) with procedural nicety. 79 Sub-
stance and procedure must be linked in this fashion if the arbitrariness
against which due process protects is to acquire meaning.380
In this setting, such questions can be answered best by school
officials, and for that reason it makes sense to place the burden of
justification with them. School officials, not parents or children, con-
trol the information upon which a given decision is based; school
officials also determine the policies which the classifiers-teachers and
counselors-carry out. They are thus in the best position to explain
the rationale for any challenged placement.
The burden appropriately borne by the school is not satisfied
by mere explications of policy. The potential stigma and educational
inefficacy of certain treatments-assignment to special classes and
exclusion-suggests that placement in a regular school program, sup-
plemented with special help, should be presumptively appropriate,
that presumption rebutted only when the school can demonstrate that
another alternative offers substantially greater promise. As the Mills
court notes: "placement in a regular public school class with appro-
priate ancillary services is preferable to placement in a special public
school class." 38 ' Either is to be preferred to institutional care3 82
When a contested placement involves assignment to a slow track
378 Ci. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (paren patriae authority of the
state does not justify juvenile court's failure to give reasons for declining jurisdiction
over minor); Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968)
(authority must articulate standards for admission to public housing). See also Thorpe
v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
379 By "substantive standards" I refer to the type of standards discussed in Sections
II and III. In classical sociological terms, the suggested approach demands "substantive
rationality"--concern for the justness of outcomes in individual cases-as well as "formal
rationality"--the systematizing of general rules and patterns of procedural regularity.
MAX WEBER Ox LAW Ix EcoNo Y AND SOCIEY, ch. 11 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
380 See P. SExzNicx, supra note 332, at 255-56.
381 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.C. 1972).
88 2 l1 ennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257,
1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("[Placement in a special public school class is preferable to
placement in any other type of program of education and training.").
See also SARASON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 361, at 347-60.
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
within the regular school program, the burden on the school should
be proportionately less. The educational harm and stigma to the child
are not so severe as in the exclusion and special education classification
cases; 3 3 the cost to the school of justifying its decisions would also
be higher because of the greater number of students involved in such
tracking. The school should be expected to justify its classification
of each child who contests placement, but there would be no presump-
tion against that classification.
Before reclassification (or assignment to a special program) be-
comes a fact,38 the school should inform the family and the child
affected, to explain the proposed action and to indicate what alterna-
tives might be available. If such a process actually functioned-if
parents and students understood "what the government is doing to
[them]""' and voluntarily approved that determination-the need to
secure the more formal protections of due process might well disap-
pear. There is, however, little evidence from past school behavior to
justify hope that such wise and preventive measures will be adopted s6
Schools do not encourage parental involvement in any sorting
decision. Even where state law requires parental consent before a
child is assigned to a special education class, that requirement is often
either ignored or satisfied by coercing parental acquiescence. Parents
are informed that a particular placement is the only option available
and occasionally threatened with criminal sanctions if they reject it.
Misunderstanding or intimidation become even more common when
parents speak little or no English, and school officials speak only
English. 87 Schools are unwilling to discuss sorting decisions with
parents for many of the same reasons that they object to formal pro-
cedural review: such discussions take time, they require that educa-
tional decisions be rendered in a language comprehensible to laymen,
and they necessarily invite challenges over matters that the school
treats as its prerogative.
In terms of due process requirements and parental and student
participation, there are two essential time references: the point of
3 8 3 See text accompanying notes 218-34 supra.
384 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), establishes detailed
prior notice requirements regarding such placement.
385 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
386 See, e.g., T. WriLwLrs, OPins, ATTUEs AND PEcEPToNs oF PARENTS oF
CHILDREI IN SPEcrAL CLAssES FOR TnE SocIALLY M ADJUSTED AND EmOTIONALLY DIs-
TURED iN NEw YORK Crr PuBIc ScHOOLS (Center for Urban Education Report
A074C, 1969).
38 7 See Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School Dist., No. 70-394-S (settled by
consent decree, July 31, 1972); Guadalupe Organization v. Tempe Elementary School
Dist. No. 3, Civ. No. 71-435 (D. Ariz., filed Aug. 9, 1971) (settled by consent decree
Jan. 24, 1972); Arreola v. Board of Educ., Civ. No. 160-577 (Super. Ct., Orange County,
Cal., filed 1968).
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decisionmaking, and the subsequent event of implementation. There
are valuable policy advantages to rationalizing the initial decision-
making, and encouraging parent and child to participate at this first
evaluative stage. The parents' and student's views can be most fully
reckoned with at this point, before the teachers' and counselors' opin-
ions have been rendered as a decision. Moreover, an adverse decision,
whether or not implemented, may have a negative impact on the child.
A balance of the competing interests at stake,388 however, suggests
that the primary focus for due process protection is the implementation
of the classification decision.
The child has a vital interest in obtaining a fair hearing prior
to his exclusion from school or assignment to a special education
class. Once he is removed from the mainstream of the school, injury
has been incurred 3 89 It is a clear message of Constantineau that a
hearing should be provided before the imposition of a stigma. Simi-
larly, during the period that he is misclassified, the child suffers edu-
cational deprivation. This harm outweighs the school's interests in
immediately carrying out its determination. There is not the same
need for present action as there might be in a discipline case where
restraint of disruptive behavior demands summary action 90 Dis-
ruption and expense would be minimized, not aggravated, if an er-
roneous decision were reversed before an actual shift in classification
occurred391
After an adverse classification occurs, effective review of the de-
cision requires both access to the school's records and the opportunity
to have the school's determination reviewed by an impartial outside
authority. Unless parents can examine test scores, psychological inter-
view writeups, teacher recommendations and the like, the school's
decision is not only unchallengeable; it is simply incomprehensible. 0
And unless the parents can obtain the services of a disinterested pro-
388 The interests of the school in postponing due process protections are stronger,
and the child's interests weaker, prior to the implementation stage itself. Disruption in the
initial evaluation process could involve substantially more students and greater expense;
at the implementation stage, only adverse decisions are challenged. The harm to the
child at the earlier point is much more speculative; when his placement is changed,
the consequences are readily discernible.
889 When the classification is within the mainstream, but to a lower class, the harm
is proportionately less, the school's burden significantly greater. Cf. text accompanying
note 383 supra. Arguably, post-implementation review would be sufficient in these
circumstances. A requirement to the contrary could stymie the entire classification pro-
gram.
890 In the discipline case, action beyond restraint of disruptive behavior would require
a hearing before implementation. See cases cited note 364 supra.
391 The school would avoid the disruptive effect of returning the child to his former
class; it would also be spared the expense of remedying whatever educational depriva-
tion the child suffered.
392 Mills, PARC, and Marlega all require access to student records in classification
hearings.
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fessional, they may well lack the competence to understand the basis
of the school's action. This need for expertise distinguishes classifica-
tion from discipline cases. The significance and complexity of these
adverse classifications, as well as the possibility of professional mis-
judgment, suggest that parents should be entitled to expert assistance,
a right which should not depend on their capacity to pay for the
expertise. 9 3
If the need for expert help is greater in classification cases than
in discipline disputes, the need for legal counsel may be less impor-
tant. A great deal of energy has been expended in deciding whether
a child confronted with the possibility of punitive school action is
entitled to legal assistance, or-to make the point differently-whether
lawyers should be barred from such proceedings because they might
convert orderly discussions into miniature courtrooms. Lawyers con-
tend that only with their help will justice be served; school officials
resist with all the vehemence of the Andorrans, who bar "[t]he ap-
pearance in our courts of these learned gentlemen of the law, who
can make black appear white, and white appear black." This energy
seems misspent. Although the child is likely to need the assistance of
someone familiar with his particular problem and willing to represent
his interests, that person can be a lawyer or almost any other out-
sider. While the lawyer may be a particularly useful advocate-he is
familiar with hearing procedures, understands (perhaps too well) the
need to negotiate and the requirements of a formal record for appeal-
he is by no means the only person who can adequately discharge the
duties of an advocate.
The utility of a lawyer in classification hearings will depend upon
the nature of the issues raised. If the sources of evidence are varied,
the evidence itself ambiguous, and the issues complicated or confused,
a person with lawyerly qualities can usefully present such evidence in
an orderly fashion. The competency and qualifications of the decision-
maker and the need for lawyer-type advocacy skills are also related:
the better the advocacy, the less demanding the decisionmaking func-
tion; the more amateurish the advocacy, the greater the need for control
by a competent decisionmaker, capable of imposing clear ground rules
for the proceedings. 9
3o3 A comparison of the complexity and the importance of discipline and classification
cases suggests the greater need of expert assistance-appointed, if necessary-in the
latter cases. That retesting has revealed substantial school-made errors makes the need
for such expert assistance all the stronger. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (en banc); Stewart v. Phillips, Civ. No. 70-1199-F (E.D. Mass. 1971). See,
e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1028 (1968).
89 4 Professor Buss (in private communication) first noted this point.
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For the advocate to function effectively, he must be permitted to
question those whose judgments are being reviewed. Such examination
may well be both novel and frightening to school teachers and school
psychologists. For that reason, there is real need for care and respect
in probing; for avoidance of tactics suitable for courtroom confronta-
tions which might increase discomfiture and tension. Such care is
also likely to encourage candid conversation, and thus to illuminate
the bases for the school's decision.
Finally, if the process is to function fairly (and to appear fair)
the reviewing panel should be impartial. It will not do, for example,
to have the school psychologist review his own decision, or even to
have the school superintendent review the psychologist's decision; the
identity of interests is too great, the overlapping of decisionmaking
and decision-reviewing functions too substantial.395 As Professor Davis
notes:
A superior officer has a continuing relation with each sub-
ordinate and often has official, psychological, or personal
reasons for protecting that relation, so that his review of a
subordinate's decision is often affected by and even controlled
by considerations other than its merits.... [A] check by an
independent officer rather than by a superior is often what
justice requires.a 9o
Several alternatives are conceivable. The school board could act
as a reviewing agency; the limited expertise and already substantial
agenda of that body make that option unappealing. The school board
could create an ad hoc group to make recommendations to the board;
such a group might well develop the expertise that review of these
decisions and judgments among competing alternatives require. A
master, himself an expert but not otherwise connected to the school
system, might be appointed to consider classification matters. 3T Yet
another option, possibly linked with one of these three, would leave
ultimate review in the hands of a higher education agency (a repre-
sentative of the county or state department of education, for example)
whose ostensible detachment from the school's recommendation would
suggest fairness.298 None of these alternatives is constitutionally re-
3952 K. DAVIS, A miNrsTRATv LAW TREATISE ch. 13 (1958, Supp. 1970), reviews
the voluminous case law concerning impartial tribunals.
BOS K. DAVIS, DISCRETnONARY JuSTicE 144-45 (1969).
97 The PARC court ordered the appointment of a master to oversee placement of
excluded children, 334 F. Supp. at 1266; Mills suggests that failure by the school system
properly to place children will result in such an appointment, 348 F. Supp. at 877.
as8 Administrative decisions made by officials with sufficient expertise can consider
subtle judgmental problems which, although crucial to the individual child, are likely
to escape judicial notice. See, e.g., Traurig v. Board of Educ. (NJ. Comm'r of Educ.,
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quired. What is required is a tribunal sufficiently divorced from the
initial decision to be capable of unbiased and informed judgmentf 99
The Office of Civil Rights has recently promulgated draft regu-
lations which (if ultimately adopted) would require all districts to
create an independent "Assessment Board" fulfilling many of these
procedural functions. 40 0 The source of the Civil Rights Office's con-
cern lies with the prevalence of minority overrepresentation in special
classes, a fact which provides statutory warrant for the proposed re-
quirement. But the Assessment Board-whose membership is to be
"drawn from persons broadly representative of the community," in-
cluding "at least one outside psychologist, social worker, and teacher"
as well as parents-confronts the racial issue only indirectly. Its
duties include informing parents about special education programs,
determining whether or not individual evaluations are appropriate, and
-most notably-passing on proposed placements in classes for the
retarded. "If . . . the Assessment Board concludes on the basis of
either (1) the psychometric indicators interpreted with medical and
sociocultural background data, or (2) the adaptive behavior data, that
the assignment of the student to a special education class for the
mentally retarded is inappropriate, the Assessment Board may terminate
the proposed assignment."
401
For the child who has been excluded from school or improperly
assigned to the wrong track for a considerable period of time, due
process review comes rather late.402 If the arguments developed here
carry any weight, such exclusion or misplacement was legally wrong-
ful because the student was not provided with procedural protection.
More pertinently, injury has been done: the child has been denied
some or all of the benefits of an education to which he was entitled.
June 16, 1971). The commissioner adjudicated a dispute concerning which special
program was best suited for Traurig. The opinion is a model of how administrative
hearings can function at their best. Cf. Parents of "K. K." v. Board of Educ. (N.J.
Comm'r of Educ., June 1, 1971).
399 An unbiased and independent tribunal is easier to conceptualize than to enforce.
Experience in other realms-particularly the quasi-judiciary regulating agencies-suggests
that the "independent" agency may in fact come to represent the interests of those
whose conduct it is supposed to review. See, e.g., R. NoLL, RExoPunG REGuLATIOx 99-101
(1971). And who is "impartial" in the realm of schooling decisions? Despite these
caveats, judicial scrutiny can be invoked as a check on unfair partiality that threatens
a child's due process rights.
400 Office of Civil Rights, Draft Guidelines to State and Local Agencies, Elimination
of Discrimination in the Assignment of Children to Special Education Classes for the
Mentally Retarded (Nov. 2, 1972).
40 Id. v (Appendix: Model of an Assessment Board).
402 In reviewing welfare cutoffs, the Supreme Court has insisted that a due process
hearing be provided prior to the cutoff. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The
harm done by "educational cut-off" may be regarded by courts as even more substantial.
Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 229 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring); notes
150-70, 173-75 supra & accompanying text.
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Especially for the handicapped or severely retarded child, who can be
helped more quickly and more effectively early in life, the injury is
real indeed.403 For that reason, the child should be entitled to educa-
tional assistance equivalent to that which the school has denied him.404
While one federal district court has insisted on just such relief where
exclusion was not preceded by a due process hearing, 05 schools may
well resist this measure even more strenuously than they oppose the
imposition of process itself, since adequate educational assistance for
these children is expensive. That consideration might lead a court to
conclude that the state, obliged by constitutional and statutory lan-
guage to educate all children, and not the financially strapped school
district, should bear the additional cost.406 The fact of financial bur-
den should not, however, release the educational system from its
obligation to undo the wrong caused by exclusion or misclassification.
D. Does Due Process Provide Adequate Relief?
The procedural approach to sorting issues converts matters of
substance into matters of form, leaving the critical placement deter-
minations in the hands of assertedly neutral educators. The minimal
judicial involvement implicit in the approach has considerable appeal
to courts reluctant to make what appear to be educational policy
decisions. Yet the ultimate impact of proceduralization on both the
school and the student remains a subject for speculation. While hear-
403 J. GALLAGHER, TUTOING O BRAIN INwjuRD MENTALLY RETAIED CHU.DREN
(1960), found that: (1) tutoring helps brain-injured children; (2) tutoring in verbal
skills was more effective than tutoring in non-verbal ones; and (3) younger children
profited more than older ones.
404 The definition of equivalency is tricky. Money damages do not necessarily secure
educational opportunity; determining what education the child has not had poses a
formidable task. In the clearest case requiring remedy--exclusion-obliging the school to
make up the amount of schooling lost, measured simply in terms of school days, com-
mends itself only because of its ease of application. In Knight v. Board of Educ.,
48 F.R.D. 115, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court ordered periods of remedial work during
the school day, after-school tutorial classes, guidance and psychological services, and
summer make-up programs to remedy wrongful exclusion. Guidance and psychological
counseling would be an important element in remedying the stigmatic injury from any
adverse classification. See also CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 18,102.11-102.12 (West Supp. 1973),
which provides "transitional" education assistance to students moving from special to
regular classes. But cf. Elgin v. Silver, 15 Misc. 2d 864, 182 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1958), in
which the court on nonconstitutional grounds upheld the decision of the school board
to refuse further education to a retarded student who had reached age 18, despite a
state statute assuring public education until age 21.
405 Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
406 Themetropolitanization order in Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), fastens constitutional responsibility on the state for acts of de jure segrega-
tion; the analogy is admittedly imperfect, but apt nonetheless. Many states already
provide school districts with additional resources for special education programs, or
maintain state-run special schools. See, e.g., CAL. EDuC. CODE §§ 18,355, 18,358 (West
Supp. 1973), amending CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 18,355, 18,358 (West 1969).
SCHOOLS AS SORTERS
ings may force schools to adopt uniform decision criteria, that very
fact may leave the school less willing to make (plausibly better) de-
cisions tailored to specific cases. 40 7 The possibility that a school might
retaliate against a child intrepid enough to demand review of a sort-
ing judgment, in subtle ways that a court could never hope to confront,
represents a quite different cost of review. 0 Further, neither the child
nor his parents are likely to perceive themselves well-served if a
formal hearing reveals that an adverse school classification has in fact
been justly imposed. Such a finding denies both child and parent the
opportunity to feel wronged, to view the school's action as a misrep-
resentation of the child's "true" potential. Process protects against
the arbitrary imposition of unjust stigmas; it also reinforces the im-
pact of stigmas found to be properly imposed.40 9
The introduction of procedural niceties into the life of the school
may also have unintended but important beneficial consequences. The
school required to review each adverse classification may, in the face
of that considerable burden, choose to reconsider the process of sorting.
It may conclude that children are better served by labels that are
less conclusory, and carry with them less pervasive consequences, than
those presently in use. In this sense the claims for procedural and sub-
stantive justice share identical aspirations. Professor Buss, in discuss-
ing the application of due process to student discipline matters, voices
much the same thought, that a school's approach to discipline is likely
to influence its approach to education proper. "[F]air procedures will
tend to force the rules and the reasons for punishment into the open,
subjecting the wisdom of the rules to the scrutiny of all.)
410
One ardently hopes that this is true. Yet even if this hope is mis-
placed, even if schools continue to develop ever more intricate classify-
ing schemes to sort the students they minister to, the application of
procedural standards makes public what has hitherto been secret and
hidden, and provides a means of contesting particular decisions. That
represents at least a step in the right direction.
407 Cf. Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict
Resolution, 7 J. CoNFCT REsovUTioN 26 (1963).
408 Cf. Handler, Controlling Oial Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CAnn'.
L. REv. 479 (1966). Professor Handler discusses the ways in which the welfare depart-
ment can retaliate against contentious clients.
A permanent, expert review panel, see text accompanying notes 395-97 supra, would
have an advantage over the court system in its ability to supervise compliance with its
decisions.
409 Cf. M. YouNG, supra note 244, at 152. "[Wlidespread recognition of merit as
the arbiter may condemn to helpless despair the many who have no merit, and do so
all the more surely because the person so condemned, having too little wit to make his
protest against society, may turn his anger against, and so cripple, himself."
41o Buss, supra note 5, at 550.
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V. CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE CULTURE
OF THE SCHOOL
Castes or classes are universal, and the measure of harmony
that prevails within a society is everywhere dependent upon
the degree to which stratification is sanctioned by its code
of morality.411
Sorting, long considered to be one of schooling's chief functions,
has been called into question for a host of reasons. That courts are
being asked to review the legitimacy of school exclusion and to re-
assess the ways in which children are classified within schools is only
one manifestation of this broader criticism. Educational researchers
have generally concluded that sorting does not improve children's aca-
demic performance. Educational reformers have advanced a variety of
alternatives which challenge the utility of existing school sorting prac-
tices. Minority group leaders assail special education and slow learner
classes as segregating devices which keep black and Mexican-American
students in their place.
412
To one unfamiliar with the ways in which schools operate, that
array of legal, political, and pedagogical criticism might signal immi-
nent and perhaps revolutionary change in schooling practice, precipi-
tated by political crisis, voluntary school action, or judicial intervention.
Yet change, though devoutly to be wished, will not occur so readily.4 13
As a generation of would-be educational reformers have learned
to their sorrow, long entrenched school practices are not lightly tamp-
ered with. School teachers and administrators do not deliberately set
out to act arbitrarily; their behavior is at least convenient, and some-
times necessary in light of the constraints placed upon them. That
behavior serves particular needs: to maintain order; to provide tran-
quility for the majority; to define relationships among school personnel,
demarcating the boundaries that separate teachers, counselors, and
administrators. It is behavior tested and found appropriate (or com-
fortable) over a considerable period of time. Whether it is functional
for the society is almost beside the point; what matters is that it is
functional for the school as an institution. To the extent that any
411 M. YouNG, supra note 244, at 152.
412 I1 this context, lawsuits may function as "society's last line of defense in the
indispensable effort to secure the peaceful settlement of social conflicts." Hart &
McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 52 (D.
Lerner ed. 1958).
413 Cf. M. CRzIER, TaE BuREAucRATic PHENOmNON 198 (1964):
[A] bureaucratic system of organization is not only a system that does not
correct its behavior in view of its errors; it is also too rigid to adjust without
crisis to the transformations that the accelerated evolution of industrial society
makes more and more imperative.
(emphasis in original)
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bright new idea threatens to undermine this culture of the school,414
it is for that reason suspect.
That observation applies to any alteration of the status quo,
whether it be a new math curriculum or an in-service teacher training
program. It applies even more forcefully to the issues that this Article
raises-most generally put, the legitimacy of prevailing differentiations
in student treatment-because they are so critical to the school's per-
ception of its task. A brief recapitulation of one aspect of that percep-
tion may clarify the point. Teachers are frustrated when asked to
instruct students whose ability and willingness to undertake schoolwork
vary widely; they feel threatened when what they have done in the
past no longer seems to work well; they react to that threat by remov-
ing the offending student, either by within-class segregation or by creat-
ing some new special classification.415 Counselors respond to teacher and
parent demands by encouraging less bright or less well-mannered stu-
dents to enroll in special programs, thus protecting the school from
the implicit challenge to its competence posed by those students. Admin-
istrators, who lack the skills (or feel they do) to deal with "problem
children, 4 10 acquiesce in decisions made by the professionals, defend-
ing those decisions as in the best interests both of the child and the
school.
No mandate, whether from school officials or courts, will easily
upset this pattern. And no mandate can ever hope to undo the informal
determinations of worth and worthlessness that everywhere occur.
James Herndon's description of the playground behavior at one of the
country's best schools is sadly typical:
It appears that the kids (kindergarten to sixth grade) are
all running around yelling kill and murder and beat up and
about stupid and MR and dumb-ass.... Back in the class-
room . they are all these goddamn nice neat marvelous
white middle-class children, even if occasionally black, talking
about equal rights . . . and everyone is smart (even them
fucking MR's)....411
A visit to the teachers' lounge would prove instructive to one who be-
4 14 The phrase is borrowed from S. SARASoN, supra note 225. This section addresses
explicitly the problem of organization resistance to change in educational practice, a
question that has surfaced intermittently throughout the Article. G. ATLISON, EsszncE
or DECIsIoN (1972), offers an elegant review of theories of organizational decision-making.
See generally A. DowNs, INsmE BuaAnucaAcy (1967); HANBOOK oF ORGANIZATIONS
(J. March ed. 1965).
415 "Segregation of problem children is the prepotent response to the professional
and personal dilemmas teachers face." S. SARASON, supra note 225, at 156. See also
McIntyre, Two Schools, One Psychologist, in PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL CLNIc: PAPERS AND
RESEARCH STuDms (F. Kaplan & S. Sarason ed. 1969).
416 S. SARASON, supra note 225, at 156 n.2.
417 J. HERNDoN, supra note 27, at 59.
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lieves that people grow out of these childish intolerances. "Those
Porteguis," one teacher says, standing two feet from the Portuguese
students in the class (presumably they can't hear) "are just dumb.
They can't learn anything." Surely the comment reveals bias. And
just as surely the behavior that accompanies such perceptions will
not be directly affected by anything that educators or judges say to
them, no matter how forcefully and cogently it is said. "The power to
legislate change," observes Professor Sarason, "is no guarantee that the
change will occur."41 8 Some sorting, often of the most logically indefen-
sible nature, may well be as inevitable in the schools as in the society.4 19
Yet to state that change will be difficult to accomplish does not
imply that currently prevailing school practices will forever persist.
Educators have changed their minds, altered their cultures before;
they are likely to do so again. And judicial intervention to secure one or
another of the constitutional principles discussed in this Article may
well serve to encourage such changes of mind by insisting upon changes
in behavior.
How might that process work? We can only venture informed
guesses. The school obliged to readmit students it had deemed in-
educable or incorrigible may find a way to educate those on whom it
had given up. Called upon to defend a sorting scheme which places a
disproportionate number of minority students in the least advanced
school classifications, a school may devise educational strategies which
treat cultural differentness as a school resource. The school, asked to
explain the devices by which particular children are assigned to certain
educational programs, may come to recognize subtleties of student
ability and performance that those devices simply ignored. The insis-
tence that school systems provide procedural safeguards for those
whom they would adversely classify may evoke a reexamination of the
premises on which sorting is based.
Each of these statements embodies only a sentiment, a hope of
what will happen in the culture of the school as the result of a judicial
418 S SARAsoi-T, supra note 225, at 120 (referring to the obstacles faced by a principal
in trying to change a teacher's method of teaching).
419 In a generally favorable discussion of English "open education" prepared for
Educational Testing Service, Edward Chittenden notes that
[g]iven the demonstrated emphasis on respect for the children . . . I found
it difficult to understand why some of the teachers used unnecessary global
labels in describing children-labels such as "backward," "dull," "lazy." I found
too that staff members were quite aware of the measured ability of students in
their schools .... And while most of these educators voiced a view that such
measures had little value, they might, at the same time, refer to their students as a
"low ability" group.
Chittenden, What Makes the British Bandwagon Roll, LEARwmG, Apr., 1973, at 6, 9.
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decision which addresses some aspect of within-school classification.420
But every notable constitutional claim embodies the similar hope that
a declaration of rights will lead people to change their lives, to act con-
sistently with what has been held to be just behavior. In the school
setting that this Article describes, the hope seems at least plausible,
and justifies judicial efforts to protect school children against the too
often ill-considered, arbitrary and hurtful distinctions made by their
elders.
420 There is always the risk that judicial intervention will lend "unnecessary rigidity
to treatment of the social problems involved by foreclosing a more flexible, experimental
approach." Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, supra note 240, at 1525. This Article attends (perhaps in too great detail) to
that risk; the standards that it suggests are meant to discourage rigidity both of judicial
review and school behavior.
